SHANGHAI --Is China's extraordinary rise a model of economic reform without political reform? Is China's Achilles' heel its political system? Is China's one-party governance doomed in the face of mounting challenges from a more diversified economy and demanding society?
These are questions in many Western minds whenever China is mentioned. But the assumptions behind these questions may be misplaced, as one's understanding of China could be vastly different if a Chinese perspective were adopted. China's political governance, adapting itself constantly to new challenges through many minor reforms, has proven crucial for China's economic success. The following five aspects of China's political governance merit special attention:
First, one-party governance. In fact, there is nothing new about one-party governance in China: in most of the past two millennia since its first unification in 221 BC, China almost always practiced a kind of one-party rule, or rule by a unified Confucian ruling elite selected through public exams (the Keju), claiming to represent -- or genuinely representing -- most if not all under heaven. Furthermore, in most of the one-party-rule era, China was arguably a better governed country and a more prosperous economy than Europe of the same epoch. China only began to lag behind Europe when it closed its door to the outside world and missed the Industrial Revolution of the 18th century, but the country is now catching up fast.
The Communist Party of China has to a great extent followed this tradition and built an impressive system of selecting its leaders based on merit and performance. For instance, its top decision-makers (6 out of 7 Politburo's Standing Committee members) all worked at least twice as much as party secretaries or governors at the provincial level, which means they have on average administered a population of about 100 million before being promoted to their current positions in Beijing.
The CPC today, like its predecessors in China's long past, also claims to represent the whole nation, but with a mission to restore the country's premier world-class status. Key independent surveys, including those by the Pew or the Asian Barometer over the past decade, show a consistent pattern in which the Chinese central authorities command a high degree of respect and support (above 75 percent) within the country. Depicting China's polity as being on the verge of collapse, as appears so often in the Western media, is out of touch with China's reality.
In this context, the word "party" may be a misnomer for the CPC, as it bears no similarity with the type of political institutions like the Republican or Democratic parties of the U.S., which openly represent group interests of a society and compete with each other. The CPC has tried, in China's own political tradition, to represent the interests of the overwhelming majority of people, who apparently accept this, at least up to now, thanks largely to the fact that most people have found their living standards significantly improved over the past three decades.
In this sense, the CPC should better be viewed as a state party or, in a hypothetical American context, a merge of the Republican and Democratic parties in which competition of ideas and competence is the norm and consensus and can-do spirit is prized.
"China is not an East Germany writ large awaiting a color revolution, as perceived by many in the West. Rather, it is a civilizational state, an amalgam of the world's longest continuous civilization with a huge modern state, which is also a product of hundreds of states amalgamated into one over its long history."China is not an East Germany writ large awaiting a color revolution, as perceived by many in the West. Rather, it is a civilizational state, an amalgam of the world's longest continuous civilization with a huge modern state, which is also a product of hundreds of states amalgamated into one over its long history. It is analogous, perhaps, to the Roman Empire, but continuous to this day, with all its diverse regional and cultural differences joined to a modern economy and centralized government, with its people speaking the same one language like Latin.
This kind of state may indeed become ungovernable and break up if it ventures into the Western adversarial political model just as the Soviet Union did -- a lesson that Chinese leaders seem to have taken to heart. China's meritocratic system, in line with its own tradition and various adaptations such as widely practiced "selection plus election" governance system, seems working reasonably well for China. Imperfect as it is, this system can compete with other political models in the world.
Second, neo-democratic centralism. China's success is inseparable from its much reformed decision-making process, which can be described as neo-democratic centralism or a modern form of democratic centralism. The old Soviet-style decision-making process was indeed more about centralism than democracy, but China has improved on it and institutionalized a procedural accountability for its democratic centralism. Under such a system, a typical major decision like the nation's five-year plan for development takes well over a year of extensive and interactive consultations at various levels of the Chinese state and the society, with several cycles of "from the people to the people, and to the people from the people".
This decision-making process receives inputs from thousands of think tanks, government agencies, universities, prominent scholars and professionals, including not infrequently heated debates in the social media and on the micro-blogging Weibo.
The recently adopted Third Plenum's decision on deepening reforms is a good example in this regard. Its drafting group, chaired by President Xi Jinping himself, solicited opinions from well over 100 institutions across the country and received 2500 suggestions over a period of half a year. About 50 percent of these suggestions were accepted. And during the process, all the seven top leaders went to different regions of China to make investigations in preparation for the deliberations on the decision.
As a result, the final decision reflects the broad consensus of Chinese society on many issues such as public health reform, adjustment of the one child policy, deferred retirement age, banking sector reform, education reform and the end of the "reform through labor" system. Many decisions are made based on the results of pilot projects.
"With a higher degree of legitimacy in the decision-making process, there is usually no need to 'sell' the state's decisions, as the United States does, to the public. "With a higher degree of legitimacy in the decision-making process, there is usually no need to "sell" the state's decisions, as the United States does, to the public. Once decisions are made in Beijing after such a process, they are usually ready for "study and execution" or to be further tested in various pilot projects.
Third, demand creation. Cycles of institutionalized consultations and policy debates in major decision-making processes tend to generate, at regular intervals, a lot of public expectations, usually more positive than negative, for economic development. Such expectations in turn create new and often medium to long term demand. A typical five-year plan in China catches the attention of the vast part of the Chinese society, from private firms to state-owned enterprises to individual shareholders. The fact that China has been able to sustain an annual GDP growth rate of over 9 percent for over three decades is inseparable from these regular and predictable cycles of expectation and demand creation.
"The fact that China has been able to sustain an annual GDP growth rate of over 9 percent for over three decades is inseparable from these regular and predictable cycles of expectation and demand creation. "
Fourth, development administration. It's not far from wrong to claim that China has created its own model of development, an important feature of which can be called "development adminstration," in contrast to public administration. China's five-year national plans and CPC's annual economic conference are definitely part of China's development administration. The same is true with many local development strategies and plans. Chinese universities may eventually offer courses and even degrees in development administration just as degrees in public administration are common everywhere.
But the Chinese case may be unique, as the Chinese state, under the "socialist market economy," commands not only such Keynesian instruments as fiscal and monetary policies, but also other "tools," which may not be available in other countries, such as public ownership of land and of strategic resources as well as a largely performing state sector. These "tools" give the Chinese state greater leveraging power.
Fifth, minyi versus minxin. Behind all the above is the Chinese philosophy of governance, including, inter alia, the two distinctive concepts: minyi and minxin, the former referring to "public opinion", and the latter to "the hearts and minds of the people" (approximate English translation), which was first put forward by Mencius (372 - 289 BC). Minyi or public opinion can be fleeting and change overnight, while minxin or "hearts and minds of the people" tends to be stable and lasting, reflecting the whole and long-term interest of a nation. Over the past three decades, even under the occasionally populist pressure of minyi, the Chinese state has still generally practiced "rule by minxin". This allows China to plan for medium to long terms and even for the next generation, rather than for next 100 days or next election as in many Western countries.
China is still faced with many daunting challenges ranging from corruption to regional income gaps and environmental degradation. But China is indeed better than at anytime in its modern history. The country is now the world's largest laboratory for economic, social and political experimentation. There is a every reason to believe that China, which has a continuously adaptive political system, will reach its objective of becoming the world's largest economy in a decade's time -- with all the implications for China itself and for the rest of the world at large.
张维为：中国成功的五个原因
07/03/2014｜张维为｜观察者网
按：本文根据张维为教授2013年11月3日在“21世纪理事会北京会议”上的发言整理而成，英文版发表于2014年2月26日美国《赫芬顿邮报》。观察者网独家发表中文版，以飨读者。
“中国的崛起是一个只有经济改革，没有政治改革的模式吗？”“中国的政治体制是中国的阿喀琉斯之踵吗？”“面对多样化的经济与日趋壮大的社会，中国的一党执政能够应对吗？”
一提到中国，这些都是西方人经常提到的问题，但这些问题背后的基本假设可能是错误的。如果换一个角度，即从中国人自己的角度来看事情，则可能得出截然不同的结论。中国经济之所以能取得成功，中国政治制度是一个关键原因。这个制度一直在不断地进行微调，以适应各种新的挑战。下面是中国政治制度值得特别关注的五个方面：
第一，一党执政。其实，在中国漫长的历史上，这并不是什么新鲜事：在公元前221年秦始皇统一中国开始的两千余年的大部分时间里，中国实行的大都是某种形式的“一党执政”，或者更加确切地说，一个统一的、通过科举考试选拔出来的儒家精英集团在执政。这个集团宣称（或确实）代表了天下大多数百姓的利益。相比同时期的欧洲，“一党执政”下古代中国在大多数时期都比同时期的欧洲治理得更好，经济也更加繁荣。后来闭关锁国的政策使中国与18世纪的工业革命擦肩而过，中国开始落后于欧洲。而今天，中国又在“一党执政”下迅速地赶超西方。
中国共产党还是继承了中国古代的传统，基本上建立了一个选贤任能的干部制度。中共中央政治局的绝大多数常委至少担任过两任省委书记，也就是说在担任中央要职之前，他们大都有管理至少1亿人口的经验。与古代的情况相似，今天的中国共产党也表明自己代表中国人民的整体利益；不同的是，中国共产党今天还肩负着让中国重返世界头等强国的历史使命。过去十年中，许多独立可信的民调，包括美国皮尤中心的民调和“亚洲动态”的民调，均显示中国中央政府在民众中享有极高威望，支持率超过75%。西方媒体总是宣称中国政治体制处于崩溃的边缘，这是严重脱离中国国情的误判。
坦率地说，西方语境中的“政党”概念，用在中国共产党身上是不准确的，毕竟中国共产党这个“党”和美国民主党、共和党的“党”有着完全不同的含义。西方的政党公开代表社会中部分群体的利益，为了当权，政党之间互相竞争。中国共产党遵循着中国自己的政治传统，力求代表整个国家绝大多数人的利益。至少到目前为止，中国多数老百姓也接受这个事实。
在这个意义上，中国共产党应该被看做是一个“国家型政党”，也就是代表一个国家整体利益的政党。如果我们换一个虚拟的美国政治语境，那么中国共产党至少等于共和党与民主党两党之和再加上其它政治力量，而中国共产党内部在执政理念和工作能力方面都鼓励良性竞争，同时又高度重视实干精神和共识精神。
中国不是一个正在等待颜色革命的放大版东德。中国是一个文明型国家，是世界上延续时间最长的古老文明与一个超大型现代国家的结合；它是一个由成百上千的国家在自己的历史长河中不断融合而形成的超大型国家。这更像欧洲的古罗马帝国延续至今，在保持地区和文化巨大差异的同时，又有现代经济和一个统一的中央政府，全国上下使用统一的语言拉丁语。
这样的国家，如果采用西方对抗性的政治制度，可能变得无法治理甚至走向分裂。苏联解体的悲剧对中国领导人可谓前车之鉴。今天的中国继承了古代贤能政治的传统，结合当代实际，广泛采用了“选拔加选举”的政治模式。这个制度虽然还可以进一步完善，但就现在这个水平，也可以和世界其他政治模式进行竞争。
第二，新型民主集中制。中国的成功离不开国家决策过程的大幅改进，这个制度安排可被称为“新型民主集中制”。老式的苏联式的民主集中制内，“集中”过多，“民主”过少，结果带来很大的问题。中国今天实行的已经是一种全面改良过的民主集中制。这个过程已经将决策的程序和责任制度化了。中国的重大决策，如五年计划制定，基本上需要一年多的时间，在社会各个层面进行成千上万次的磋商和咨询，从群众中来，到群众中去，几上几下，最后才形成共识，作出决定。
在中央政府做出重大决策的过程中，往往会向数以千计的智库、政府机构、高校、学者、专业人员征询意见，甚至会从微博等社交媒体的激烈讨论中吸取有用的建议。最近通过的十八届三中全会关于深化改革的决定就是一个很好的例子。由习近平亲自担任组长的三中全会文件起草小组在半年时间内，向全国上下一百多个机构征集了超过2500条建议，最终采纳了近一半的意见。在决策过程中，七名常委分别前往中国各地进行调查研究、听取各方意见，再经过慎重的讨论，最后才出台了这个决定。所以这种决定往往能够反映中国社会业已存在的广泛共识，这种共识涵盖了医疗改革、计划生育政策、推迟退休年龄、银行系统改革、教育改革和废止劳教制度等许多领域，而且许多政策已经在小范围内进行过试验并取得了良好的效果。
无疑，这样的决策过程具有更大的合法性，所以中国很少需要像美国那样，先在小圈子里做出决定，然后再依靠公关公司向公众“出售”（sell to the public）政府的决定。只要中国中央政府遵循这样的过程做出的决定，接下来基本上就是“学习”和“落实”或者是进一步的试点。
第三，预期创造和需求创造。从广泛的咨询和磋商，到媒体和网络上对许多公众关注议题的讨论，到重大决策的制定和最后公布，这个过程在中国已经基本上定期化和制度化了，这个定期化和制度化的决策过程往往能使公众产生对于发展的新预期，新预期又创造新的需求，而且往往是中、长期的需求。从普通股民到民营公司到国有企业，中国社会上上下下对五年计划等决策都高度关注。在过去30多年里，中国国民生产总值能维持9%以上的高速年增长率，离不开这种经常性的预期创造和需求创造。
第四，发展管理（development administration）。中国确实形成了自己的发展模式，其重要的特点之一就是“发展管理”，这也许可以与西方发明的“公共管理”相对应。中国的国民经济五年计划和每年的中央经济工作会议，乃至地方政府出台的许多发展规划，都是中国“发展管理”的重要组成部分。最终中国的大学或许能够开发出一整套“发展管理”的课程，就像今天大学开设的“公共管理”课程那样。但中国的情况有其特殊性：中国今天的宏观调控早已超出了凯恩斯经济学的范畴，因为在“社会主义市场经济”模式下，中国政府可以采用的手段远远超出了凯恩斯所讲的财政政策和货币政策，中国还拥有其他许多国家不具备的一些“工具”，如国家掌握的土地资源和战略资源、一大批表现不俗的大型国企等。它们给中国政府更大的宏观调控能力。
第五，“民意”和“民心”。上述四点的背后，蕴含着中国人自己的政治哲学理念，尤其是两个有一定差异的观念：“民意”和“民心”。“民意”一般指公众舆论；“民心”则是指宏观意义上的“人心向背”。中国哲学家孟子早在两千多年前就提出了“得其心，斯得民矣”这个概念。中国人讲“民意如流水，民心大如天”，也就是说“民意”很重要，但“民心”更重要。“民意”有时候可以反映“民心”，有时候不能反映“民心”。在微博时代，“民意”甚至可能在一个小时内就发生变化，但“民心”一定是一个相对稳定的东西，用现代政治学的话语，“民心”反映的应该是一个民族整体和长远的利益。所以一流的治国应该是“民心治国”，而非简单的“民意治国”。在过去三十多年里，即使经常受到民粹主义的压力，但中国执政者在大多数情况下还是可以实行“民心治国”。这使中国得以进行中、长期的规划，甚至为下一代的发展进行规划，从而避免像许多西方国家那样，最多只能规划一百天或者只能规划到下一次选战。
中国还面临着许多严峻的挑战，如腐败问题、地区差异、环境恶化等。但中国目前还是处在自己近代史上最好的时期。今天的中国是世界上最大的经济、社会和政治改革的试验室。中国有一个适应性很强的政治体制。我们有理由相信，十年内中国将成为世界最大的经济体，这将对中国和整个世界都产生全面而深远的影响。
（杨晗轶翻译）
