MUCH of the rich world is fascinated by Germany. Despite being at the heart of sclerotic Europe, its GDP per head has risen by more than any other G7 country's over the past decade. Unemployment in the troubled euro zone is at its highest since the single currency's birth; in Germany it is at a record low. In most rich countries manufacturing exports have been hammered by foreign competition; in Germany they remain powerful drivers of growth. No wonder hard-pressed political leaders in France, Spain, Italy and Britain are talking wistfully of becoming more like Germany.
Germany's recent success has both new and old roots. Only a decade ago, still struggling with the costs of unification, it was a basket-case. It has since bounced back to show that a high-wage country can succeed in top-end manufacturing, not least by holding down unit labour costs. The Germans have long since repaired their public finances—the budget deficit is barely 1% of GDP, public spending as a share of GDP is well below the European average and German bond yields are at record lows. Thanks mainly to the Agenda 2010 reforms begun by the Social Democrat-led government of Gerhard Schröder in 2003, Germany has liberalised many of its labour-market rules, one reason for today's enviably low unemployment.
Yet Germany's cutting edge has an ancient blade. The country's Mittelstand clusters of firms, which often specialise in niche areas of manufacturing, developed in the late 19th century. Impressively resilient and versatile, they have benefited from rocketing demand for high-quality capital and consumer goods in emerging markets. Germany's corporatistMitbestimmung model, which gives workers a say in management, has made it easier both to push through structural reforms and to hold down wages. And the German system of apprenticeships and vocational training, divided into some 350 trades, has helped keep youth unemployment lower than elsewhere in Europe (see article).
The sincerest form of flattery
So what should Europe's weaker countries be trying to copy? The relaxation of labour-market rules, certainly. That is beginning to happen, though as Italy has been discovering (see article), liberalising labour markets is harder in tough economic times. Germany freed up its job market when demand was strong in the rest of Europe. There is also much to be said for emphasising vocational training instead of producing more and more graduates with often useless university degrees. But many of the things that work well in Germany—its corporatism, its business clusters, its manufacturing prowess—are part of a traditional culture that would be hard, if not impossible, to transplant from one country to another.
Nor should Germany's neighbours try to import the model wholesale. Its corporatist industrial relations, for instance, help companies hold wages down, but they can also be bad for shareholders. And while the country's manufacturing sector may be productive, its service sector is not; and services now account for some two-thirds of GDP. The financial industry is relatively unprofitable and has a record of investing in dodgy foreign assets (including rotten American mortgages). Germany's demographic outlook is lousy. Its native population is shrinking and ageing fast, and the country does not welcome immigrants.
Above all, the country's hair-shirt philosophy that favours austerity over growth, saving over spending, and foreign over domestic demand has often been damaging. It has held down Germans' living standards (despite faster growth, personal consumption has risen by less than in the rest of Europe over the past decade). And it has been catastrophic for the rest of the euro zone as Germany has acted, in effect, as a drag on demand. Investors who sold off Spanish and Italian bonds this week were worried as much about the effects of excessive austerity as about public-debt levels (see article). Germany's reliance on exports has led to huge current-account surpluses that have been matched by deficits elsewhere, a big contributor to the euro crisis.
German policymakers who urge only austerity and wage restraint on the rest of Europe forget that the goal of growth is to raise personal incomes (and spending), and that the real benefit from higher exports is to pay for more imports. The rest of Europe would do well to copy the best features of the German model. But Germany too should learn from its partners about the importance of raising and sustaining domestic demand. Then everybody would be better off.译言網
德国经济：德国模式高于一切
14/04/2012｜Economist|译言網翻譯
德国引起了众多发达国家的关注。尽管地处僵化的欧洲中心，德国在过去十年里的人均国内生产总值（GDP）增幅超过任何一个G7国家。在困难重重的欧元区，其失业率已达到实行单一货币制度以来的历史最高点；而德国的失业率却处于历史低点。当大多数发达国家的制造业出口在面对来自外国的竞争中遭受重创时，德国的制造业出口仍为国家经济发展提供着强大的动力。难怪来自法国、西班牙、意大利和英国的政坛领袖们都纷纷表示要效仿德国以助国家摆脱困境。
德国近期所取得的成功既取决于新的思路、也有来自历史的原因。十年前，德国还在疲于应对统一后留下的烂摊子。而如今它又恢复了活力，并证明高薪酬的国家在高端制造业领域是能够取得成功的，特别是在通过降低单位劳动成本的境况下。德国在很早以前就对本国公共财政进行了修复——财政赤字仅占GDP的1%，其公共开支在GDP中所占比例也远低于欧洲平均水平，此外德国的债券收益率也保持在历史最低水平。这主要归功于由格哈德·施罗德（Gerhard Schröde）所领导的社会民主党政府在2003年所推行的名为“2010年议程”的改革。通过改革，德国多项劳动力市场规则得以放宽，这被视为德国能够实现目前令人羡慕的低失业率的原因之一。
德国之所以能够取得目前的成就，其背后也存在着历史的原因。德国在19世纪兴起了一些从事专业化制造并专注于细分领域的中小型企业集群，这些企业有着很强的适应性和灵活性并从新兴市场对高质量资本和消费品激增的需求中获利。德国企业这种共同决策的模式使得工人能够在管理方面获得发言权并促进了结构改革与降低薪酬。此外，德国的学徒制度和职业培训体系覆盖了350多个行业，这为德国能够在青年失业率上低于欧洲其他国家提供了帮助。
最衷心的赞誉
那些经济相对薄弱的欧洲国家应当向德国效仿什么呢？当然是德国宽松的劳动力市场规则。尽管意大利发现在经济困难时期放宽劳动力市场比较困难（见文章），但这种效仿已经悄然开始了。德国在欧洲其他国家需求旺盛的时候开放了劳动力市场。值得一提的还有，德国非常重视职业培训而不只是制造一批又一批的手持毫无用途的学位证书的大学毕业生。但仍有许多成功因素是源于德国的传统文化而很难被移植到其他国家的，其中包括它的企业形式、商业集群以及制造工艺。
另外，欧洲其他国家也不应该全盘照搬德国模式。例如德国的企业劳资关系在降低薪酬的同时也损害了股东的利益。相对制造业而言，占本国GDP三分之二左右的德国服务业仍欠发达。德国金融业的盈利能力较低并有过投资不良外国资产的记录（包括美国的不良抵押贷款）。德国人口前景也不容客观：其本地人口正急剧萎缩且老龄化迅速，此外移民在这里也不受欢迎。
最重要的是，这个国家重紧缩而轻成长、重储蓄而轻支出、重外需而轻内需，这种自我克制的哲学在很多情况下是具有破坏性的。这种哲学降低了德国人的生活水平（尽管其个人消费在过去的十年中增长迅速，但增速仍低于欧洲其他国家）。由于其产生的实际效果是对需求的减少，因此这对欧元区的其他国家来说也是灾难性的。在本周抛售了西班牙和意大利债券的投资者们对这种过度紧缩的担心不亚于其对公债水平的担心。德国对出口的依赖导致了经常项目上的巨大顺差，从而使其它国家出现赤字，这是造成欧洲危机的一大原因。
德国的决策层在向欧洲其他国家推行紧缩和控制薪酬政策的同时不应忘记，经济的增长最终是为了带来个人收入（以及支出）的提高，而大量出口所能带来的好处也莫过于能够进口更多的东西。欧洲其他国家应对德国模式中那些值得称道的地方进行效仿。而德国也应从合作伙伴那里认识到提高和保持内需的重要性。这样所有人都会过得更好。
