NOBODY doubts that
China has joined the ranks of the great powers: the idea of a G2 with America
is mooted, albeit prematurely. India is often spoken of in the same breath as
China because of its billion-plus population, economic promise, value as a trading
partner and growing military capabilities. All five permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council support—however grudgingly—India’s claim to
join them. But whereas China’s rise is a given, India is still widely seen
as a nearly-power that cannot quite get its act together.
That is a pity, for
as a great power, India would have much to offer. Although poorer and less
economically dynamic than China, India has soft power in abundance. It is
committed to democratic institutions, the rule of law and human rights. As a
victim of jihadist violence, it is in the front rank of the fight against
terrorism. It has a huge and talented diaspora. It may not want to be co-opted
by the West but it shares many Western values. It is confident and culturally
rich. If it had a permanent Security Council seat (which it has earned by being
one of the most consistent contributors to UN peacekeeping operations) it would
not instinctively excuse and defend brutal regimes. Unlike China and Russia, it
has few skeletons in its cupboard. With its enormous coastline and respected
navy (rated by its American counterpart, with which it often holds exercises,
as up to NATO standard) India is well-placed to provide security in a critical
part of the global commons.
The modest power
Yet India’s huge
potential to be a force for stability and an upholder of the rules-based
international system is far from being realised. One big reason is that the
country lacks the culture to pursue an active security policy. Despite a
rapidly rising defence budget, forecast to be the world’s fourth-largest by
2020, India’s politicians and bureaucrats show little interest in grand
strategy (see article).
The foreign service is ridiculously feeble—India’s 1.2 billion people are
represented by about the same number of diplomats as Singapore’s 5m. The
leadership of the armed forces and the political-bureaucratic establishment
operate in different worlds. The defence ministry is chronically short of
military expertise.
These weaknesses
partly reflect a pragmatic desire to make economic development at home the
priority. India has also wisely kept generals out of politics (a lesson ignored
elsewhere in Asia, not least by Pakistan, with usually parlous results). But
Nehruvian ideology also plays a role. At home, India mercifully gave up Fabian
economics in the 1990s (and reaped the rewards). But diplomatically, 66 years
after the British left, it still clings to the post-independence creeds of
semi-pacifism and “non-alignment”: the West is not to be trusted.
India’s tradition
of strategic restraint has in some ways served the country well. Having little
to show for several limited wars with Pakistan and one with China, India tends
to respond to provocations with caution. It has long-running territorial
disputes with both its big neighbours, but it usually tries not to inflame them
(although it censors any maps which accurately depict where the border lies,
something its press shamefully tolerates). India does not go looking for
trouble, and that has generally been to its advantage.
Indispensable India
But the lack of a
strategic culture comes at a cost. Pakistan is dangerous and unstable,
bristling with nuclear weapons, torn apart by jihadist violence and vulnerable
to an army command threatened by radical junior officers. Yet India does not
think coherently about how to cope. The government hopes that increased trade
will improve relations, even as the army plans for a blitzkrieg-style attack
across the border. It needs to work harder at healing the running sore of
Kashmir and supporting Pakistan’s civilian government. Right now, for instance,
Pakistan is going through what should be its first transition from one elected
civilian government to the next. India’s prime minister, Manmohan Singh, should
support this process by arranging to visit the country’s next leader.
China, which is
increasingly willing and able to project military power, including in the
Indian Ocean, poses a threat of a different kind. Nobody can be sure how China
will use its military and economic clout to further its own interests and,
perhaps, put India’s at risk. But India, like China’s other near neighbours,
has every reason to be nervous. The country is particularly vulnerable to any
interruption in energy supplies (India has 17% of the world’s population but
just 0.8% of its known oil and gas reserves).
India should start
to shape its own destiny and the fate of its region. It needs to take strategy
more seriously and build a foreign service that is fitting for a great
power—one that is at least three times bigger. It needs a more professional
defence ministry and a unified defence staff that can work with the country’s
political leadership. It needs to let private and foreign firms into its
moribund state-run defence industry. And it needs a well-funded navy that can
become both a provider of maritime security along some of the world’s busiest
sea-lanes and an expression of India’s willingness to shoulder the
responsibilities of a great power.
Most of all,
though, India needs to give up its outdated philosophy of non-alignment. Since
the nuclear deal with America in 2005, it has shifted towards the west—it tends
to vote America’s way in the UN, it has cut its purchases of Iranian oil, it
collaborates with NATO in Afghanistan and co-ordinates with the West in dealing
with regional problems such as repression in Sri Lanka and transition in
Myanmar—but has done so surreptitiously. Making its shift more explicit, by
signing up with Western-backed security alliances, would be good for the
region, and the world. It would promote democracy in Asia and help bind China
into international norms. That might not be in India’s short-term interest, for
it would risk antagonising China. But looking beyond short-term self-interest
is the kind of thing a great power does.
That India can
become a great power is not in doubt. The real question is whether it wants to.