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$123,000,000,000,000:China’s estimated economy by the year 2040. Be warned

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 |Robert William Fogel  |Foreign Policy.
In 2040, the Chinese economy will reach $123 trillion, or nearly three times the economic output of the entire globe in 2000. China's per capita income will hit $85,000, more than double the forecast for the European Union, and also much higher than that of India and Japan. In other words, the average Chinese megacity dweller will be living twice as well as the average Frenchman when China goes from a poor country in 2000 to a superrich country in 2040. Although it will not have overtaken the United States in per capita wealth, according to my forecasts, China's share of global GDP -- 40 percent -- will dwarf that of the United States (14 percent) and the European Union (5 percent) 30 years from now. This is what economic hegemony will look like.

Most accounts of China's economic ascent offer little but vague or threatening generalities, and they usually grossly underestimate the extent of the rise -- and how fast it's coming. (For instance, a recent study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace predicts that by 2050, China's economy will be just 20 percent larger than that of the United States.) Such accounts fail to fully credit the forces at work behind China's recent successor understand how those trends will shape the future. Even China's own economic data in some ways actually underestimate economic outputs.
It's the same story with the relative decline of a Europe plagued by falling fertility as its era of global economic clout finally ends. Here, too, the trajectory will be more sudden and stark than most reporting suggests. Europe's low birthrate and its muted consumerism mean its contribution to global GDP will tumble to a quarter of its current share within 30 years. At that point, the economy of the 15 earliest EU countries combined will be an eighth the size of China's.
This is what the future will look like in a generation. It's coming sooner than we think.
What, precisely, does China have going so right for it?
The first essential factor that is often overlooked: the enormous investment China is making in education. More educated workers are much more productive workers. (As I have reported elsewhere, U.S. data indicate that college-educated workers are three times as productive, and a high school graduate is 1.8 times as productive, as a worker with less than a ninth-grade education.) In China, high school and college enrollments are rising steeply due to significant state investment. In 1998, then-President Jiang Zemin called for a massive increase in enrollment in higher education. At the time, just 3.4 million students were enrolled in China's colleges and universities. The response was swift: Over the next four years, enrollment in higher education increased 165 percent, and the number of Chinese studying abroad rose 152 percent. Between 2000 and 2004, university enrollment continued to rise steeply, by about 50 percent. I forecast that China will be able to increase its high school enrollment rate to the neighborhood of 100 percent and the college rate to about 50 percent over the next generation, which would by itself add more than 6 percentage points to the country's annual economic growth rate. These targets for higher education are not out of reach. It should be remembered that several Western European countries saw college enrollment rates climb from about 25 to 50 percent in just the last two decades of the 20th century.
And it's not just individual workers whose productivityjumps significantly as a result of more education; it's true of firms as well,according to work by economist Edwin Mansfield. In a remarkable 1971 study,Mansfield found that the presidents of companies that have been early adoptersof complex new technologies were on average younger and better educated thanheads of firms that were slower to innovate.
The second thing many underestimate when making projectionsfor China's economy is the continued role of the rural sector. When we imaginethe future, we tend to picture Shanghai high-rises and Guangdong factories, butchanges afoot in the Chinese countryside have made it an underappreciatedeconomic engine. In analyzing economic growth, it is useful to divide aneconomy into three sectors: agriculture, services, and industry. Over thequarter-century between 1978 and 2003, the growth of labor productivity in Chinahas been high in each of these sectors, averaging about 6 percent annually. Thelevel of output per worker has been much higher in industry and services, andthose sectors have received the most analysis and attention. (I estimate thatChina's rapid urbanization, which shifts workers to industry and services,added 3 percentage points to the annual national growth rate.) However,productivity is increasing even for those who remain in rural areas. In 2009,about 55 percent of China's population, or 700 million people, still lived inthe countryside. That large rural sector is responsible for about a third ofChinese economic growth today, and it will not disappear in the next 30 years.
Third, though it's a common refrain that Chinese data areflawed or deliberately inflated in key ways, Chinese statisticians may well beunderestimating economic progress. This is especially true in the servicesector because small firms often don't report their numbers to the governmentand officials often fail to adequately account for improvements in the qualityof output. In the United States as well as China, official estimates of GDPbadly underestimate national growth if they do not take into accountimprovements in services such as education and health care. (Most greatadvances in these areas aren't fully counted in GDP because the values of thesesectors are measured by inputs instead of by output. An hour of a doctor's timeis considered no more valuable today than an hour of a doctor's time was beforethe age of antibiotics and modern surgery.) Other countries have a similarnational accounting problem, but the rapid growth of China's service sectormakes the underestimation more pronounced.
Fourth, and most surprising to some, the Chinese politicalsystem is likely not what you think. Although outside observers often assumethat Beijing is always at the helm, most economic reforms, including the mostsuccessful ones, have been locally driven and overseen. And though China mostcertainly is not an open democracy, there's more criticism and debate in upperechelons of policymaking than many realize. Unchecked mandates can of courselead to disaster, but there's a reason Beijing has avoided any repeats of theGreat Leap Forward in recent years.
For instance, there is an annual meeting of Chineseeconomists called the Chinese Economists Society. I have participated in manyof them. There are people in attendance who are very critical of the Chinesegovernment -- and very openly so. Of course, they are not going to say "down withHu Jintao," but they may point out that the latest decision by the financeministry is flawed or raise concerns about a proposed adjustment to the pricesof electricity and coal, or call attention to issues of equity. They might evenpublish a critical letter in a Beijing newspaper. Then the Chinese financeminister might actually call them up and say: "Will you get some of your peopletogether? We would like to have some of our people meet with you and find outmore about what you are thinking." Many people don't realize suchback-and-forth occurs in Beijing. In this sense, Chinese economic planning hasbecome much more responsive and open to new ideas than it was in the past.
Finally, people don't give enough credit to China'slong-repressed consumerist tendencies. In many ways, China is the mostcapitalist country in the world right now. In the big Chinese cities, livingstandards and per capita income are at the level of countries the World Bankwould deem "high middle income," already higher, for example, than that of theCzech Republic. In those cities there is already a high standard of living, andeven alongside the vaunted Chinese propensity for saving, a clear and growingaffinity for acquiring clothes, electronics, fast food, automobiles -- all aglimpse into China's future. Indeed, the government has made the judgment thatincreasing domestic consumption will be critical to China's economy, and a hostof domestic policies now aim to increase Chinese consumers' appetite foracquisitions.
And Europe? Europe, by which I mean the 15 earliest EUmembers, faces twin challenges of demography and culture, its economic futureburdened by a mix of reproductive habits and consumer restraint.
Europeans, of course, won't be eating grass in 2040. Theireconomic decline over the next 30 years will be relative, not absolute, astechnological advances and other factors should allow Europe's overall laborproductivity to continue to grow about 1.8 percent annually. Yet theirpercentage contribution to global GDP will tumble, shrinking by a factor offour, from 21 percent to 5 percent, in a generation.
Demography is the first key issue. The population of WesternEuropean countries has been aging rapidly, and that is likely to continue overthe next several decades. The basic reason: European couples aren't producingenough babies. Europe's total fertility rate has been below the level needed toreplace the population for about 34 years, according to a 2005 Rand Corp.study. As a result, the percentage of women of childbearing age will decline,in the earliest 15 EU countries, from about 50 percent in 2000 (it was alsoabout 50 percent in 1950) to the U.N. projection of about 35 percent in 2040.So we have a double whammy: Not only will reproductive-age women have sharplyreduced fertility rates, but the proportion of women who are in theirchildbearing years will also have declined sharply. By 2040, almost a third ofWestern Europe's population may be over age 65.
Why are there fewer babies? One key reason is that Europeanattitudes toward sex have evolved sharply. One-hundred fifty years ago, it wasconsidered a sin to enjoy sex, the only legitimate purpose for which wasprocreation. But today, young women believe that sex is mainly a recreationalactivity. Behind the fertility trend is a vast cultural shift from thegeneration that fought in World War II, which married early and produced thegreat baby boom of 1945 to 1965. The easy availability of birth control and therise of sex as recreation mean that populations are likely to shrink in manyEuropean countries. As early as 2000, the natural rate of increase (birthsminus deaths) was already negative in Germany and Italy. By 2040, it is likelythat the natural increase will be negative in the five largest Europeancountries, except Britain.
So what if Europeans have a little fun now and then? Well,fun has consequences. Declining fertility pushes up the age of the citizenryand shrinks the percentage of people in the workforce, and so impedes growth.Demographic changes also shape the hiring and promotion structures ofindividual companies, and not necessarily for the better; if the elderly clingto the best jobs well past retirement age, younger workers may have to wait anextra decade, perhaps longer, to get their turn. And because younger workersare a major source of new ideas, slowing down the ascendancy of the nextgeneration may retard the pace of technological change. (If fertility ratesremain as low as they have been, Italy's population will fall by half in 50years. Naturally, politicians are doing everything they can. They are joiningwith the Holy See and telling young women: Please procreate.)
In another way, Europe's culture confounds economists.Citizens of Europe's wealthy countries are not working longer hours to makehigher salaries and accumulate more goods. Rather, European culture continuesto prize long vacations, early retirements, and shorter work weeks overacquiring more stuff, at least in comparison to many other developed countries,such as the United States. In my observation, those living in most WesternEuropean countries appear to be more content than Americans with the kind ofcommodities they already have, for example, not aspiring to own more TVs perhousehold. Set aside whether that's virtuous. A promenade in the Jardin duLuxembourg, as opposed to a trip to Walmart for a flat-screen TV, won't helpthe European Union's GDP growth.
Of course, China faces its own demographic nightmares, andskeptics point to many obstacles that could derail the Chinese bullet trainover the next 30 years: rising income inequality, potential social unrest,territorial disputes, fuel scarcity, water shortages, environmental pollution,and a still-rickety banking system. Although the critics have a point, theseconcerns are no secret to China's leaders; in recent years, Beijing has provenquite adept in tackling problems it has set out to address. Moreover, historyseems to be moving in the right direction for China. The most tumultuous localdispute, over Taiwan's sovereignty, now appears to be headed toward aresolution. And at home, the government's increasing sensitivity to publicopinion, combined with improving living standards, has resulted in a level ofpopular confidence in the government that, in my opinion, makes major politicalinstability unlikely.
Could Europe surprise us by growing substantially more thanI have predicted? It seems farfetched, but it could happen, either by Europeanscurtailing vacations and siesta time to adopt a more workaholic ethos, or bymore young women and their partners aligning their views of sex more closelywith those of the pope than those of movie stars. Anything's possible, butdon't bet on it -- Europeans seem to like their lifestyles just fine, and they'velong since given up their dreams of world domination. An unexpectedtechnological breakthrough could also shake things up, though this isn't thesort of thing economists can base predictions on.
To the West, the notion of a world in which the center of globaleconomic gravity lies in Asia may seem unimaginable. But it wouldn't be thefirst time. As China scholars, who take a long view of history, often pointout, China was the world's largest economy for much of the last two millennia.(Chris Patten, the last British governor of Hong Kong, reckons China has beenthe globe's top economy for 18 of the past 20 centuries.) While Europe wasfumbling in the Dark Ages and fighting disastrous religious wars, Chinacultivated the highest standards of living in the world. Today, the notion of arising China is, in Chinese eyes, merely a return to the status quo.




     1. 中国正在快速转型为资本主义消费经济

     2. 中国目前的政治体系资本主义化更甚于美国

     3. 中国最近对教育的大手笔投入

    4. 中国七亿人口的农村经济为经济增长添砖加瓦

     5. 中国政府的数据其实是低报了中国的经济发展


     6. 到2040年,中国将再次成为全球唯一的一个超级经济大国    “在西方人看来,全球经济中心位于亚洲的世界格局是难以想象的。不过这种情况并非前所未有……在过去2000年的1800年中,中国一直都是全球最强大的经济体……当欧洲还处于黑暗时代、陷于宗教战争的纷飞战火之时,中国却滋养出了全世界最高的生活水准。如今,在中国人眼里,中国的崛起不过是一次辉煌的回归而已。”


月号预测了2040 年中国经济。按照福格尔的预测,到2040 年,中国经济规模将达123
万亿美元,是2000 年全球经济产出的将近三倍。中国的人均收入估计将达8.5 万美元,
比欧盟高出一倍多,远远高于日本和印度的水平。到2040 年,中国占世界GDP 的比

的教育投资。1998 年,中国开始高校扩招,此后四年,高校入学人数增加了165%
海外留学生增加了大约152%。在2000 2004 年之间,大学招生继续猛增,增长率
几乎达到50%。福格尔预测,未来20 年左右,中国中学入学率将达到100%,大学入
学率将达到50%仅此一点就能使中国的年均经济增长率提高六个百分点以上。第二,农业部门的劳动生产率将持续提高。从1978 年到2003 年,中国的农业、工业和服务
业三个部门的劳动生产率年均增长率均在6%以上2009 年,中国仍然有大约55%
人口生活在农村。中国的经济增长至少有1/3 归功于农业部门,未来30 年,农业部门

始迅速老龄化,2040 年,欧洲大约有1/3 的人口会在65 岁以上。老龄化导致劳动
尔玛买一台纯平电视。这对其GDP 的增长是不利的。这篇文章的娱乐色彩比较重。
福格尔教授对这个问题更学术性的研究是其2006 年在NBER 的一份研究报告《为什

曾经提出“Chinamerica”概念的哈佛大学历史学家弗格森(Niall Ferguson)在《外
交》3-4 月号上谈到,美国的衰落来得可能比历史学家们想象的更快更突然。过去,
国的衰落,只用了一代人的时间。在50 年内,罗马帝国的人口减少了3/4。弗格森指
2009 年美国的财政赤字为1.4 万亿美元,大约为GDP 11.2%,是60 多年来的最高
纪录。2008 年公共债务为5.8 万亿美元,到2019 年将达到14.3 万亿美元。利息支出
公债余额占GDP 的比例只有44%,但是到2080 年,根据不同的情景分析,这一比例
不达米亚平原受挫。比如苏联从阿富汗撤军是在1989 年,不到两年之后,苏联就解
最近被翻译成中文的乔治·弗里德曼(George Friedman)的《未来一百年》,充满信

心地宣称,21 世纪才刚刚是美国世纪的开始。不妨对照一读。
|Robert William Fogel

2002年,中国共产党宣布了到2020年使人均收入实现翻两番的目标。从2000年开始,要实现这一目标,中国的人均收入的年均增长率必须达到7.2%,而GDP的年均增长率需要达到8%左右(M. Wang2005)。中国有可能实现这一目标吗?这一问题已经在亚洲、欧洲和美洲引起了广泛讨论,对此既有人持乐观态度,也有人表示悲观。
 = 农业、工业和服务业各自的劳动力份额
 = 农业、工业和服务业中每个工人的产出
* = 变量上加星号表明该变量的增长率
   变量或加权数    1978-2000年的年均变化率

美国 c
       cJorgenson Stiroh2000,表2

由于在中国的经济增长率中有30%可能继续来源于劳动力的部门转移以及劳动参与率的小幅增长(Johnson 2000),因此,各行业内的平均劳动生产率每年只需要提高5%,即可实现预定的人均收入增长目标。若干因素显示,这种增长率的实现不是没有可能的。尽管近几十年来中国已经取得了巨大的进步,但在农业、工业和服务业这三个部门中,平均的技术水平还是大大低于国际领先者。因此,先进经验的推广会促进各部门的增长。其次,前沿技术的创新速度非常快,尤其是在工业和服务业领域,当然农业领域也是如此。第三,对资本尤其是人力资本的投资也会在接下来的几十年中促进经济的快速增长。最后,尽管目前人们都认为由于地方政府上报的增长率存在夸大现象,中国的经济增长率有可能被高估了,但总体而言,由于没有考虑到经济产出的质量的进步,以及小企业低报收入的情况,中国经济的实际增长率尤其是服务业的增长率也很有可能被低估。现在,我想对上述的最后两个因素做一个简要地说明,并对这两个因素在未来二三十年中可能对增长率造成的影响进行估计。


通过图2中的等式,我们可以将由教育导致的劳动力质量的提高对人均收入增长率的影响进行定量处理。等式(3)是一个反映要素升级影响的生产函数,其中,  分别代表劳动和资本的升级指数(我的讨论将仅限于劳动)。等式(4)是等式(3)的变形,因变量是劳动生产率,中括号里的项包括各种要素的升级指数与全要素生产率的增长指数。等式(5)是从等式(4)中得到的增长率表达式,它意味着如果其他所有变量都为常数,那么劳动生产率的增长率应该等于劳动升级的增长率乘以劳动在收入中所占的比重。
其中: Q = 产出
A = 全要素生产率指数
L = 劳动投入
 = 劳动升级指数
 = 资本升级指数
 = 星号表示变量的增长率
α= 劳动所占的收入份额
1-α = 资本所占的收入份额  
列出了实现等式(5)的增长率所需要的一些条件。表的上半部分列出了具有小学、高中以及大学文凭的劳动力的相对生产率指数。该指数的计算基础是美国具有不同教育水平的男性的收入。它表明,具有大学和高中文化程度的员工的劳动生产率分别是受教育年限少于9年的工人的3.1倍和1.8[3]。表的下半部分显示了入学率的增加对经济的贡献。如果在未来20年,初中入学率达到了100%,那么劳动力升级的年均增长率会达到1.8%。 将这个数字乘以劳动在收入中所占的份额,就意味着劳动生产率的增长率会提高约1.1个百分点。
不同教育程度的相对生产率指数                      指数
少于9                                           100
高中毕业生                                         179
学士或更高学位                                     310
α                                                         0.6
 如果初中入学率在20年后达到100%                1.8
 如果高中入学率在20年后达到255                  7.4
如果高中入学率在20年后达到50%                 11.2
α值来源于Young 2000),指数值是根据美国的以教育程度衡量的中期收入计算出来的(美国教育部、国家教育统计中心,2001,表383http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d01/dt383.asp
中国政府也意识到了人力资本投资作为经济增长引擎的重要性。早在1998年,国家领导人就发出了高等院校进行大规模扩招的号召。这一号召很快得到了响应:在接下来的4年中,高等院校的招生人数增加了165%(从340万增加到了900万),而海外留学人员的数量也增加了152%(中国统计年鉴,2003)。目前估计,到2010年,至少20%的高中毕业生会继续进入高等院校学习,而到2050的长期目标是达到50%。从2000年到2004年间,大学入学率增长了约50%(从12.5%增加到了19.0%),因此,表4中的计算结果很可能还过于保守了(中国统计年鉴,2005)。目前,中国高等院校的学生约有2 000万,这一数目比现阶段美国高等院校的学生人数要多60%Newcomb2005;美国统计概要,2005)。据估计,2005年至2006年间,中国大学毕业生会达到330万,印度为310万,而美国仅为130万(Colvin2005)。不过,在科技教育的前沿领域,美国仍然遥遥领先。
到目前为止,我只是单纯地考虑了经济因素。有些分析人士认为,政治不稳定将严重阻碍中国维持高经济增长率。这样的观点描绘了好几种糟糕的可能性。有些人首先指出,由于剧烈的周期性经济波动所引起的萧败会引发失业,打破目前并不牢固的社会稳定局面。另一些人则认为金融问题和低效率的国有企业已经使中国的社会越来越动荡。他们认为,这些问题不仅会导致城市失业增加,而且也使得工资、养老金、医疗以及住房补贴不能兑现(Bremmer2005Chaohua 2005)。此外,还有人警告说,受巨额不良贷款困扰的中国银行体系即将崩溃,而这一崩溃会影响微观经济的稳定(GarnautSong2004)。
其他一些威胁到社会稳定的因素还包括:普遍存在的腐败;内部权力斗争;房地产行业、国际贸易以及钢铁(还有其他一些产品)行业的泡沫;城乡之间、沿海和内陆之间、高级知识分子和教育程度较低的大众之间、汉族和少数民族之间的发展不平衡问题。还有一个较为新颖的观点指出,由于15岁至34岁之间的中国人的男女性别比急剧不平衡,这会引发高犯罪率和暴力行为,导致不稳定的婚姻关系。有些人还指出,国际局势的紧张,尤其是台湾问题,会使领导人不再注意力放在经济目标上(Pei2005Bradsher 2004Dunphy2004, Hu2000Lim2004Business Asia2002McGregor2004Wilson 2004EIU ViewsWire 2004)。
在预测未来的时候,可能出现的情况几乎是没有穷尽的。但问题的关键不是有可能发生什么,而是更容易发生什么。重要的是,很多人提出的问题事实上都是中国社会长期存在的,比如低效率的国有企业问题等。尽管这些国有企业或许会成为经济发展的包袱,但中国仍然在过去25年中取得了年均8%以上的经济增长速度。 那种认为这些低效企业会在一夜间破产的观点是没有说服力的。中国政府已经出台了政策,逐渐关闭了某些亏损企业,或者在保证盈利的基础上对这些企业进行了重组,以确保不会导致失业率的急剧上升。即便政府出于某些经济或政治因素的考虑需要对这些低效企业提供补贴,它也有足够的资金支持,而且这种补贴负担会逐渐消失,因为随着经济的快速增长,经营状况欠佳的国有企业提供的工业产出的比例会逐渐降低,财政补贴负担也会快速消失。
尽管领导层对实行什么样的经济政策或许会存在分歧,但他们的基本立场却是一致的,那就是中国应该继续推进向市场经济转型的改革。此外,关于加大地方政府的经济决策权以推动经济增长这一点,领导层也没有异议。正如很多分析人士指出的那样,中国政府团结在一个叫做“市场联邦主义的政策周围。这种具有中国特色的联邦制会限制中央政府对经济决策的过多控制,促进地方政府之间的有效竞争,抑制寻租行为,并刺激创新型的地方企业的发展。这种联邦制在税收体系方面也体现得较为明显,被称为“财政联邦主义”,它可以避免税收对经济增长的抑制。在1994年的税收改革中,中央政府的权限限制在了增值税和中央下属的企业的所得税方面。此外,还建立了归属地方政府的地税局。尽管在财政体系构建的过程中还有很多工作要做,尤其是要缩小地方发展的不平衡,但这些问题都已经提上了国家领导人的改革日程。中央领导人同样明白地方自治权过多的危害和副作用——可能导致寻租、道德风险及其他形式的腐败,他们知道必须对地方政府的行为进行监管,同时在必要时对腐败给予处罚。要成功实现自治权的下放需要一个强有力的中央政府,它既能够将中央与地方的发展目标统一起来,又能很好地约束地方政府那些危害改革进程的腐败行为,同时还能对推动改革进程的地方政府给予奖励(林毅夫、蔡昉和李周,2003Bahl  Martrinez-Vazquez2003Blanchard Shleifer 2000Montinola、钱颖一和Weingast1996Krug ZhuHendrischke2003)。
有些分析人士还提出,除非中国引入多党竞争机制,否则中央和各省之间的关系就会非常紧张,从而会危害中国的政治稳定并阻碍经济的高速增长。还有人认为,难以解决的发展不平衡问题也使基层集聚怨愤,甚至有可能使局势失控(Goldstone1995Ohman 1995Esarey2002)。分析人士强调的其他事情还包括,环境的不断恶化、公共医疗改革发展滞后以及地方政府的腐败等(Shambaugh2000Chapman2002)。
有些分析家认为中央政府丝毫不关心公众的意见。然而,大量翔实的证据否定了这一论调。自20世纪90年代末以来,中国的各级地方政府和省政府在制定经济和社会政策时都开始采纳民意调查的意见。对政府政策的学术讨论也非常活跃,评论者与政府最高领导人之间的互动很频繁。有关的社会调查发现的问题与学术界和国外分析人士的担忧大致相同,具体都包括腐败的蔓延、发展不平衡扩大、失业率居高不下、赋税过重以及养老金的拖欠等。但在另一方面,这些调查也反映出绝大多数人对于中央政府都持支持态度,他们坚信法院、媒体以及政府机关会对他们的困难采取负责任的态度(Pei2001Lin等人,2002China Newsweek2005[4]
                                                   (李淑萍 译 吴素萍 校)
  *  本文从CES会议、芝加哥伊利诺伊大学、芝加哥大学以及西北大学研讨班受益匪浅,此外,A.J. AiseiritheLouis CainThomas ChappelearJack GoldstoneJames HeckmanJustin Lin以及Werner Troesken 也为本文提供了很多有益的建议。本文仅代表作者个人的观点,不代表国民经济研究局(NBER)的立场。——作者注
 ** 本文作者Robert W. Fogel1993年诺贝尔经济学奖得主,《比较》第5辑曾发表了他的《经济学与时俱进》一文。——编者注。
1, 关于有可能阻碍中国经济增长目标的经济因素的讨论可参见Shane2005);Zakaria 2005);R. Wang2005);The Economist2004a2004b2005a);Prasad2004
2 1中的分解分析所采用的数据来源于《2003年中国统计年鉴》第26页、27页、第313页。由于没有GDP平减指数,我们采用了零售价格定基指数以获得实际GDP。由于等式(1)中微分逼近值的总和与 的值不太一致,因此在计算LFRP、行业间劳动力流动以及部门内生产率的变化对人均收入总体变化的贡献时,我们将等式右边各项的和作为分母。
              加拿大    法国    德国    意大利    英国    美国    
12年级以下     100      100     100      100      100     100
高中毕业生      120      119     128      172      154     149
学士及更高学历  183      201     201             263     269    
资料来源:ShermanHoneggerMcGivern 2003,表A31
4,其他有关政治压力和回应的有趣研究包括Huang1995);Chapman2002);Gong2005);D. Wang2005);以及 Bremmer2005)。
5,还需要注意的是Fareed Zakaria对自由民主、非自由民主和自由专制所做的区别。自由民主的特征不仅包括竞选,而且还体现在政府会竭力保护公民的自由和尊严而非强权统治,对各级政府的权力进行监督并保证法律面前人人平等。非自由民主也有竞选制度,但选举出的政府会利用手中的权力压制人们的言论和集会自由,并对经济和社会行为进行限制。自由专制实行一党制,但同时给予公民有限的政治权利并改善了一国的经济状况、社会状况和公民权利状况。他提出,目前大多数东亚国家的政府“都是民主主义、自由主义、资本主义、寡头统治和腐败的混合产物——就像1900年左右西方国家的政府”(Zakaria1997,第 28页;Zakaria2003;也可参见The Ecolnomist2005b)。


Why China is Likely to Achieve its Growth Objectives
Robert W. Fogel
Working Paper 12122 
Issued in March 2006
1050 Massachusetts Avenue,Cambridge, MA 02138,

I have benefitted from discussions at the CES meeting, seminars at the University of Illinois Chicago, the University of Chicago, and Northwestern University, and from suggestions by AJ Aiseirithe, Louis Cain, Thomas Chappelear, Jack Goldstone, James Heckman, Justin Lin, and Werner Troesken. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 ⊙ copyright 2006 by Robert W. Fogel. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including . notice, is given to the source. 
   In 2002, the Chinese Communist Party announced a goal of quadrupling per capita income by the year 2020. Starting at income levels of the year 2000, this would require a growth rate of 7.2 percent per annum in per capita income or close to 8.0 percent in GDP. Such unresolved and emerging problems as growing income disparities, increasing pollution, pressures on infrastructure, the inefficiency of state owned enterprises, and political instability are often cited as reasons to doubt the attainability of the CCP’s goal. However, China’s progress in addressing fundamental constraints that might limit rapid economic growth augurs well for the success of its economic goals. Although there are disagreements about economic policy among top leaders, the continued transformation into a market economy and the promotion of increasing local autonomy in economic matters are not in doubt. In education, China has substantially increased the percentage of its workforce receiving a college education, and continuing growth in this investment in human capital could account for a large portion of the desired growth rate. In addition, the value of improvements in the quality of economic output unmeasured by GDP, such as advances in the quality of health care and education, could raise reported growth rates by as much as 60 percent. Finally, the government’s increasing sensitivity to public opinion and issues of inequality and corruption, combined with improving living conditions, have resulted in a level of popular confidence in the government that makes political instability unlikely.
Robert W. Fogel,The University of Chicago,Graduate School of Business 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue Chicago, IL 60637 and NBER ,rwf@cpe.uchicago.edu ,
Why China Is Likely to Achieve Its Growth Objectives 
In 2002, the Chinese Communist Party announced a goal of quadrupling per capita income by the year 2020. Starting at income levels of the year 2000, this would require a growth rate of 7.2 percent per annum in per capita income or close to 8.0 percent in GDP (M. Wang 2005). Is China likely to meet that objective? That question has been a subject of debate in Asia, Europe, and America, with an array of both pessimistic and optimistic views. 
In this paper I present some reasons for joining the optimists. Indeed, I will argue that China’s GDP is likely to grow at rates of 8 percent per annum or more for a least a generation— that is, to 2030—and perhaps beyond that date. Before getting into substantive issues about the economic, structural, and political problems that will have to be overcome if the growth objectives are to be met, it is useful to look at some numbers in order to set the context for analysis. 
Exceptionally rapid rates of growth have been achieved by several poor Asian countries for relatively long stretches of time since World War II. During the twenty years from 1950 to 1970, Japan grew at an average annual rate of 8.4 percent in per capita income, increasing its per capita income more than sixfold, an achievement that is 50 percent higher than the goal set by the Chinese leadership. Over the twenty years between 1960 and 1980, Singapore’s growth in per capita income averaged 7.3 percent. The corresponding figure for South Korea between 1965 and 1985 was 7.6 percent, and Taiwan-China averaged 7.2 percent over the same period. Even China exceeded its new growth target over the 22-year period from 1980 to 2002, when the achieved growth rate averaged 8.2 percent per annum (Fogel 2004b). So the target set by the leadership is well within the experience of the rapidly growing economies of Southeast Asia. 
However, those who question whether the new goal is achievable do so not because they are unaware of the past experience of nations within the region, but because they doubt that China will be able to replicate the experience of past leaders between now and 2020. The doubts arise from beliefs that unresolved or emerging economic, political, and international problems are likely to reduce the recent growth rate substantially. One of the economic issues is the shaky state of the banking system, which is saddled with a high proportion of nonperforming loans. The inefficiency and unprofitability of many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is also seen as a threat to future growth. Another problem is the growth in income disparities between the rapidly growing coastal provinces and the more slowly growing interior provinces, between urban and rural labor, and between highly skilled and manual labor (cf. Heckman 2005). There are also bottlenecks in infrastructure, including pressure on fuel supplies and electrical power, and the growth of environmental pollution. Although concern over the capacity of China to feed itself has diminished, concern over the adequacy of water supplies has risen. This is not an exhaustive list of the potential economic impediments to a continued high rate of economic growth, but it captures some of the main concerns.1 
Although I recognize the importance of these issues, I shall not dwell on them at this point. I view them as issues that need to be addressed during the course of economic growth and, for reasons that I discuss in the second half of the paper, I believe that they will be addressed. 
They are certainly on the “to do” lists of China’s political leaders and their economic advisors, who stress the need for reducing social and economic imbalances. My initial focus is on more fundamental constraints to sustaining rapid economic growth for another generation, constraints that might undermine long-term growth prospects even if all the right things are done to resolve the current litany of problems.
To get at these potentially more binding constraints it is useful to disaggregate the sources of growth in per capita income between 1978 and 2002. The process is facilitated by equations (1) and (2) in Figure 1. Equation (1) is merely an identity which states that the level of per capita income is equal to output per worker multiplied by the labor force participation rate. In equation (1) the output of the economy is divided into three sectors: agriculture, industry, and services. Labor productivity in each sector is weighted by that sector’s share of the labor force. 
Equation (2) is the rate of growth transformation of equation (1). It says that the rate of growth in per capita income is a weighted average of the sum of the rate of change in the labor share and of labor productivity of each sector plus the rate of change in the labor force participation rate. The sectoral weights are the mid-period shares of income originating in each sector. 
Table 1 shows that 69 percent of the growth in per capita income between 1978 and 2002 was due to increases in labor productivity within each of the three main sectors of the economy.2 The rise in labor productivity was most rapid in industry (6.2 percent per annum) despite the inefficient state-owned enterprises and the inefficiencies in the allocation of capital. As Lin and Tsai (2004, 355-356) have pointed out, the policy of gradually shifting from central control appears to have been more effective than the “big bang” approach. By sequencing reforms that successively enlarged the scope of the market sector, even the SOEs shifted most of their purchases and sales to market prices rather than plan prices. 
Table 1 also shows that while changes in labor productivity were highest in the industrial sector, they were nearly as high in agriculture (5.7 percent in agriculture as compared to 6.2 percent in industry). Moreover, this high rate of growth in agricultural productivity has been sustained for more than two decades. Table 2 shows that although China’s rate of growth in agricultural labor productivity over a two-decade period is not unprecedented, it is at the high end of experience in both Asia and Europe. Only Korea exceeded the Chinese growth in agricultural labor productivity between 1980 and 1997, but in contrast to China, most of the Korean agricultural labor force had already shifted into industry and services. In the Chinese case, half of the labor force is still in agriculture, so the interindustry effect might yet prove to be substantial. Indeed, it is likely to be somewhat larger in the next two decades than it was between 1980 and 2000. 
Since about 30 percent of China’s growth rate is likely to continue to come from interindustry shifts and modest increases in the labor force participation rate (cf. Johnson 2000), growth rates of labor productivity within sectors need only average about 5 percent per year. 
Several factors suggest that such growth rates are likely. Despite the remarkable advances of recent decades, the average technology is still well below best prevailing practice in each of the three sectors. Hence, growth in each sector will be stimulated by the diffusion of the best prevailing practice. Moreover, the frontier of technology is moving out rapidly, especially in the industrial and service sectors, but also in agriculture. Third, the investment in capital, especially human capital, is capable of rapid improvement in the next several decades. Finally, despite the preoccupation with possible overstatement of the Chinese growth rate due to inflated estimates of growth sent from localities, on balance it is likely that the true Chinese growth rate is understated, especially in the service sector, due to the failure adequately to account for improvements in the quality of output and the underreporting of small firms. I now want to elaborate briefly on these last two factors and assess their likely impact on growth rates over the next two or three decades. 
The Role of Factor Enhancement 
Table 3 presents enrollment ratios in primary, secondary, and tertiary schools for 1980, 1990, 1997, and 2000. China is compared with seven Asian nations, four Western European nations, and the United States. At the primary level, China’s ratios exceed those of all the other nations. At the secondary level China compares favorably with the other newly industrializing countries (NICs), but it is behind South Korea, Japan, Western Europe, and the United States. However, the gap diminished rapidly between 1990 and 1997. In this brief span the enrollment ratio at the secondary level increased by over 40 percent. China lags furthest behind the rich nations at the tertiary level. There its enrollment level is between 15 and 27 percent of enrollment levels in Korea, Japan, Western Europe, and the United States. However, once again it is rapidly closing the gap. Between 1990 and 2004 the Chinese tertiary enrollment ratio sextupled (China Statistical Yearbook 2005). 
It is possible to quantify the impact of enhancing the quality of labor through education on the growth rate of per capita income by making use of the equations shown in Figure 2. Equation (3) is a factor-augmenting production function in which . L and . K are indexes of labor and capital augmentation (in this discussion I will focus only on labor augmentation). Equation (4) merely rearranges equation (3) to put it in a more convenient form. The dependent variable is now labor productivity and the term in square brackets brings the augmentation indexes together with the index of total factor productivity. Equation (5) is the rate of growth transformation of equation (4). It indicates that when all other variables are held constant, labor productivity will grow at the rate of growth of labor augmentation multiplied by labor’s share in income. 
Table 4 presents the information needed to implement equation (5). The top part presents an index of the relative productivity of labor with primary, high school, and college degrees. The index is based on the income of U.S. males by education level. It indicates that a college-educated worker is 3.1 times as productive, and a high school graduate is 1.8 times as productive, as a worker with less than a ninth-grade education.3 The bottom half of the table indicates the contribution of various scenarios of increases in enrollment ratios. Labor enhancement would grow at the rate of 1.8 percent per annum if the secondary ratio reached one hundred in 20 years. 
Multiplying this figure by the labor share indicates that such an achievement would add about 1.1 percent to the growth rate of labor productivity. Labor enhancement would grow at 7.4 percent per annum if the tertiary ratio rose from 6 to 25 in the next twenty years, which would put the tertiary level of education in China at about where the Western European nations were in 1980. That level of labor augmentation would add 4.4 percent to the growth rate of labor productivity, and by itself would account for over 60 percent of the target set in 2002. With a more ambitious expansion of higher education, reaching enrollment ratios of 50 in 20 years, labor augmentation would grow at 11.2 percent. The rate of investment in human capital would by itself add 6.7 percent to the overall growth rate. These targets for higher education are not out of reach. It should be remembered that as recently as 1980, the Western European nations had ratios of about 25. Only the United States was above 50. The movement to enrollment ratios of 50 in Western Europe was a product of the last two decades of the twentieth century. In the case of the U.K., two-thirds of the increase from 19 to 52 percent took place between 1990 and 1997.
The significance of investment in human capital as an engine of economic growth has not eluded the State Council. In 1998 Jiang Zemin called for a massive increase in enrollments in higher education. The response was swift: over the next four years enrollment in higher education increased by 165 percent (from 3.4 million to 9.0 million) and the number of students studying abroad also rose by 152 percent (China Statistical Yearbook 2003). It is currently estimated that by 2010 at least 20 percent of high school graduates will be enrolled in institutions of higher education and the long run target is 50 percent by 2050. The tertiary enrollment ratio increased by about 50 percent between 2000 and 2004 (from 12.5 to 19.0 percent), so the calculations shown in Table 4 may well be too conservative (China Statistical Yearbook 2005). China currently has about 20 million students enrolled in higher education, which exceeds current U.S. enrollments by about 60 percent. (Newcomb 2005; U.S. Statistical Abstract 2005). It is estimated that in 2005-6 China will produce 3.3 million college graduates, India 3.1 million, and the United States 1.3 million (Colvin 2005). However, in advancing the frontier of scientific training, the United States still has a considerable lead. 
Errors in the Measurement of Output 
So far I have focused mainly on factor enhancement to support my contention that China is likely to achieve its growth targets. I want to turn now to the problems of measurement on the output side of equation (5). Errors in the measurement of national income from the output side have become increasingly severe. It is now clear that official estimates of GDP for the United States badly underestimate U.S. economic growth because they do not take into account improvements in the quality of output, especially in such services as education and health care. Children in secondary schools are taught more about science and technology today than postgraduate college students used to be taught a generation ago, let alone two generations ago. 
Even more dramatic are the improvements in health care. A century and a half ago, people in their late thirties and early forties were more afflicted by chronic disabilities than people in their late sixties and early seventies are today. Not only has the average age at onset of disabilities been delayed by a decade or so, but once disabilities appear, there are now numerous effective interventions. Hernias, which used to be permanent and exceedingly painful conditions afflicting one out of every four males, can now be repaired by a surgical procedure that in the United States requires hospitalization for only 23 hours. Other areas where medical interventions have been highly effective include treatment of genito-urinary conditions, control of hypertension and reduction in the incidence of stroke, replacement of knee and hip joints, curing of cataracts, and chemotherapies that reduce the incidence of osteoporosis and heart disease (Fogel 2004a). 
Yet most of these great advances in health care and education are overlooked in the GDP accounts, because the values of these sectors are measured by inputs instead of by output. An hour of a doctor's time is considered no more effective today than an hour of a doctor's time was half a century ago, before the age of antibiotics and modern surgery. It has recently been estimated that the value of improvements in health care, if properly measured, are at least twice the cost of health care, but such calculations have not yet made their way into the GDP accounts (Cutler and McClellan 2001; Murphy and Topel 2003; Nordhaus 2003). In the case of the United States, my own rough estimates indicate that allowing for such factors as the increase in leisure time, the improvement in the quality of health care, and the improvements in the quality of education would come close to doubling the U.S. annual growth rate of per capita income over the past century (from 2.0 to 3.6 percent per annum). 
What is the implication of these statistics for understanding the change in standards of living for the typical American? If we use the conventional measure of growth, the real income of the typical American in 2000 was 7 times greater than it was in 1900. However, if an adjusted measure is used, Americans in 2000 had real incomes that were 34 times greater than in 1900. In other words, 80 percent of the goods and services that Americans enjoy today are outside of the measured economy (Fogel 2000 and 2004a). 
What is the implication of the failure to take account of improvements in the quality of output for the measurement of Chinese economic growth? In China the main increases in life expectancy took place before the onset of the period of reform. Between 1950 and 1980, life expectancy at birth increased from 40.8 to 67.8 years. By 2000 life expectancy stood at about 71.4, an increase of about 0.18 years of life expectancy per calendar year during the period of accelerated economic reform (Keyfitz and Flieger 1990; China Statistical Yearbook 2003). Studies of the value of a statistical life year in rich and poor nations suggest that the value of an additional year of life in China is about 3.5 times per capita income (see, e.g., Murphy and Topel 2002; Viscusi and Aldy 2003). Hence, the value of the unmeasured improvements in life expectancy may have been high enough to raise the rate of economic growth between 1980 and 2000 by about 60 percent. If the true growth of GDP between 2000 and 2040 is 13 percent instead of 8 percent, then the true size of the Chinese economy in 2040 will be about 6 times the size of the measured economy. Of course, if both the United States and China similarly neglect changes of quality in their measurements, the relative ranking of the two economies may not be changed significantly. 
Will Political Instability Undermine Economic Growth? 
So far I have focused purely on economic issues. Some analysts argue that political instability is a serious impediment to China’s ability to maintain high rates of economic growth. Several scenarios have been outlined in which political factors could thwart economic goals. 
Some of these scenarios begin with an economic breakdown brought on by a sharp cyclical downturn that would raise unemployment and undermine a precarious social stability. Others warn that a growing social unrest has been brought on by the financial problems and inefficiencies of the state-owned enterprises. These problems have not only led to rising urban unemployment but have also resulted in the failure to pay promised wages, pensions, health-care allowances, and housing allowances (Bremmer 2005; Chaohua 2005). Still others warn of an impending breakdown in the banking system, which is beset by a huge burden of nonperforming loans, a breakdown that could undermine the microeconomic stability of the economy (Garnaut and Song 2004). 
Other threats to stability that have been observed include: widespread corruption; internal power struggles; bubbles in real estate, international trade, and steel (among other products); inequality between the urban and rural areas, between the coastal and interior provinces, between the highly educated elites and poorly educated masses, and between the Han majority and the ethnic minorities. One unique warning singles out the sharp rise in the sex ratio concentrated at ages 15–34, which, it is argued, will translate into high rates of crime and violence and may promote concubinage. Some single out international tensions, particularly over Taiwan, which divert the attention of the leadership from their growth objectives (Pei 2005; Bradsher 2004; Dunphy 2004, Hu 2000; Lim 2004; Business Asia 2002; McGregor 2004; Wilson 2004; EIU ViewsWire 2004).
When speculating about the future, the range of possible scenarios is virtually unlimited. The point at issue is not what might occur, but what is likely to occur. Moreover, many of the problems singled out are of long standing, such as the inefficiency of many state-owned enterprises. While these SOEs may be a drag on the economy, China has nevertheless been able to grow at over 8 percent per capita for a quarter of a century. The idea that these inefficient firms will suddenly go bankrupt is far-fetched. The policy of the State Council has been to gradually phase them out or to reorganize them on a profitable basis so as not to sharply increase unemployment. Not only does the government have the finances needed to continue subsidizing inefficient firms if it chooses to do so for economic or political reasons, but the burden of these subsidies will also gradually diminish, because the share of the industrial output supplied by these underperforming SOEs will gradually decline and the burden of a given level of subsidies will rapidly diminish with the economy growing so rapidly.
These points also apply to the problem of the state banks. Although the proportion of nonperforming loans may be about 35 percent, China is not in immediate danger of a collapse of its banking system. It is within the power of the government to remove this burden. The banks originally became saddled with the bad paper because the government obliged the banks to finance unprofitable SOEs. The inefficiencies and distortions in the economy produced by banking policies have been relieved by the large injection of foreign direct investment, encouraged by government policy, which has also facilitated the transfer of advanced technologies to China. With direct investment going largely into large-scale industry, the banks have been able to supply part of the capital needed by small-scale enterprises (Lin, Cai, and Li 2003; Fan 2005). Movements in the direction of more effectively using the monetary system to manage business cycles, and contemplated reforms in capital markets, should also alleviate economic distortions. For example, the government recently restructured two of the four largest state-owned banks to bring their capital position up to international standards. Most important, perhaps, is the very low level of government indebtedness (less than a fifth of GDP), which gives the State Council leeway to pursue needed stabilization policies, including a rapid restructuring of the banking system, instead of the gradual policy of reform it is currently pursuing (Lin, Cai, and Li 2003; Fan 2005). 
Although there are disagreements about economic policy among the top leaders, the proposition that China should continue to transform itself into a market economy is not at issue. 
Nor is there disagreement over the policy of promoting increasing autonomy in economic decisions as a lever of rapid economic growth. As many analysts have pointed out, the government is unified around a policy that has been called “market preserving federalism.” This Chinese form of federalism limits the central government’s control over economic decision making, promotes creative competition among local governments, constrains rent seeking, and provides an array of incentives to induce creative local enterprises. This type of federalism is also apparent in the design of the tax system, which has been called “fiscal federalism,” and which is aimed at preventing taxation from stifling economic growth. In the tax reform of 1994, the central government limited its primary administration to VAT and taxes on centrally owned enterprises. It also set up local tax bureaus under the direction of local governments to supervise income taxes. While much remains to be done in the design of the fiscal system, especially with respect to narrowing regional inequalities, these issues are on the leadership’s agenda of needed reforms. The central leadership is also aware of the danger that local autonomy may move in counterproductive ways that promote rent seeking, moral hazard, and other forms of corruption, and that it must monitor performance and penalize corruption where possible. The successful unfolding of autonomy requires a center strong enough to integrate national and local goals, to discipline local authorities whose corrupt practices threaten the progress of reform, and to provide rewards to those who advance it (Lin, Cai, and Li 2003; Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2003; Blanchard and Shleifer 2000; Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 1996; Krug, Zhu, and Hendrischke 2003). 
Some analysts argue that unless China permits competing political parties, powerful pressures will build up between the provinces and the center that will undermine political
stability and thwart continued high rates of economic growth. Others argue that the unsolved inequalities have also built up pressures at the grass roots that threaten to become unmanageable (Goldstone 1995; Ohman 1995; Esarey 2002). Other issues stressed by analysts include mounting environmental hazards, lagging development of public health programs, and endemic corruption (Shambaugh 2000; Chapman 2002). 
The difficulty with these arguments is that they assume that the leaders of the CCP and the State Council are unaware of these problems. The leaders are quite well aware that the successes of their growth policies have weakened the central government’s control over daily life and access to information. Indeed, one purpose of the reforms was to promote creativity at the local level by promoting local initiative and by encouraging the entry of global firms into the Chinese market in order to facilitate new ideas and technologies. Moreover, critiques of current policies that hamper economic growth are encouraged, although competitive political parties are prohibited. Debates over governmental policies at all levels are as vigorous and wide-ranging at the meetings of the Chinese Economists Society as they are at the American Economic Association. 
The leaders of the CCP have responded to the changing economic and social conditions by changing the central goal of the CCP and by co-opting the elites who are at the forefront of China’s economic and social transformation. This process of adaptation is reflected in the new slogan of the CCP, “Three Represents,” introduced by Jiang Zemin in the spring of 2000 to replace the previous slogan of “Three Revolutionary Classes” (peasants, workers, and soldiers). 
The new slogan portrays the CCP as: (1) the embodiment of society’s most advanced productive forces; (2) the promoter of an advanced culture; and (3) representing the needs and interests of the great majority of the Chinese population. To extend its connections with the elites who are bringing about the transformation of China, the CCP encouraged the formation of a wide array of new business and professional societies with strong ties to the state. It also transformed the membership of the CCP, bringing into its fold the technocratic leaders of business, social, and intellectual life. During the two decades following 1982, the proportion of the Central Committee members holding college degrees increased from a little over half to nearly 99 percent (Dickson 2003a and b). 
The 16th Congress of the CCP, which met in November 2002, made provincial leaders the most prominent group in the Politburo, representing 42 percent of its membership. By contrast, the military represented only 8 percent of the Politburo, and central party institutions accounted for 25 percent. The balance of the Politburo membership came from Shanghai political circles or from institutions other than provincial leaderships or central government institutions. Given the dominant role of provincial leaders in the shaping of national policy, it makes little sense to dwell on the possibility of a conflict between the national and provincial leaders, especially when many of the central leaders came from provincial posts (Bo 2004). 
Some analysts argue that leaders of the CCP and the State Council are out of touch with public opinion. However, the weight of evidence contradicts that view. Local and provincial governments have been using polling techniques to determine public opinion on an array of economic and social issues since the late 1980s. Academic critics of government policies abound and interactions between these critics and top government leaders are numerous. The range of problems raised by respondents to surveys mirrors the complaints of academic critics and foreign analysts, including widespread corruption, increasing inequality, persistent unemployment, burdensome taxes, and unpaid pensions. Nevertheless, the polls also reveal majority support for the central government and overwhelming belief that the courts, the press, and government institutions will be responsive to their grievances (Pei 2001; Lin et al. 2002; China Newsweek 2005).4 
Popular confidence in the government reflects the widespread belief among the Chinese that their living conditions have improved (67 percent better, 12 percent worse, 20 percent no change). The level of confidence about whether living conditions will continue to improve is similar. According to another poll, optimism about the future is slightly higher in rural areas (75 percent) than in the cities (68 percent). Hence, it is not surprising that political reform is quite limited, although there is an expectation that the government will gradually improve legal and governmental institutions. This generally favorable view of government not only reflects the pragmatic responses of leaders at all levels of government to grievances, but also the frequent intervention of the central government with local officials when they are too slow to respond to complaints. It also reflects the rapid increases in income experienced by the great majority of households for more than a quarter of a century (Fewsmith 2003).5 
This combination of widely shared economic advances and governmental attention to public opinion, especially with respect to grievances, is a formula for continued political stability. One indication of the stability of the regime and the self-confidence of its leaders is its successful bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. Another is its encouragement of Chinese students to enroll in American and European universities. The gradual loosening of constraints on expression in China is likely to continue over the next several decades. Whether or not these developments lead to a multiparty system of the American type remains to be seen. However, the government’s responsiveness to popular concerns indicates that political stability is likely to remain at the level required for continued long-term economic growth. 
1. Discussions of economic impediments that may foil the growth targets of China are summarized in Shane 2005; Zakaria 2005; Morrison 2005; R. Wang 2005; Economist 2004a, 2004b, 2005a; Prasad 2004. 
2. The disaggregation shown in Table 1 is based on data from the China Statistical Yearbook 2003, pp. 26, 27, 313. In the absence of a GDP deflator, the retail fixed-base price index was used to obtain real GDP. Because the differential approximation shown in equation (1) does not quite add up to Y , the sum of the terms on the right-hand side of the equation was used as the denominator when computing the contribution of changes in the LFPR, in inter-industry shifts in the labor force, and in within-sector productivity to the overall change in per capita income. 
3. The relative index for other G-8 countries reporting data were somewhat different from those shown for the United States in Table 2, but not materially so. Their use would not materially change the analysis. I prefer the U.S. figures as reported in Table 2 because it
is likely that even they underestimate the impact of labor-augmentation on Chinese economic growth. The data reported by OECD for 6 of the G-8 countries for 1997, 1998, or 1999 are as follows: 
Canada France Germany Italy UK U.S. 
Less than 12th grade 100 100 100 100 100 100
High-school graduate 120 119 128 172 154 149
B.A. or higher degree 183 201 201 — 263 269
Source: Sherman, Honegger, and McGivern 2003, Table A31.
The values of the U.S. index in this table differ from those in Table 2 for several reasons. 
The values here are based on average income over both sexes rather than the median income for men only. The age range here excludes persons aged 65 and over. The years used here are 1997, 1998, or 1999 rather than 2000. But the most important factor is that the base here is less than twelfth grade rather than less than ninth grade. It should be noted that in Table 2, the ratio of the income of persons with college degrees to those with high school degrees is 173. In this note it is 181. 
4. Other interesting discussions of political stresses and responses include Huang 1995; Chapman 2002; Gong 2005; D. Wang 2005; and Bremmer 2005. 
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罗伯特·福格尔(Robert Fogel)简介
罗伯特·福格尔 中国人应改变养老方式
 http://finance.sina.com.cn 2005年06月04日 09:51 中国证券报


中国网 | 时间:2005 年05 月30 日 | 文章来源:央视国际
主持人 中国社科院人口所所长蔡昉:由于时间有限,提问就到这里。我做一个很简短的小结,福格尔教授给我们描述非常乐观的前景,更如他所指出,我们需要跨越人口问题本身去思索这样一个问题,我们能不能承受得起这样一个更长的寿命,更多的闲暇。回答这个问题,涉及了对一系列经济和社会制度问题的适应性的选择性问题,虽然说对21世纪人口预测的工作是基于他说的技术生理演化理论,但是实际上它也是社会经济重要的选择问题。这些问题涉及了我们的公共政策和政府长期的政策考虑,例如包括人口增长问题,人口转变问题,环境和气候变化问题,养老保障体系的模式、成本选择问题,还有医疗保障问题等等。同时我们也可以看到,它会影响到人们的生产方式和生活方式。中国在成功地实现了人口转变之后,也比较早得迎来老龄化的时代,作为人类进步现象预期寿命的延长以及相应延长闲暇,同时提出诸多的挑战。福格尔教授的研究具有重要的政策含义,值得我们深思。女士们,先生们,请让我们再一次感谢福格尔先生的演讲。


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