关于如何处理好中国与美国正在恶化的关系，中国现有的外交政策暴露出了耐人寻味的观点分歧。这也可能凸显了中国的文职和武职之间的日益加剧的失谐。自从华盛 顿在上个月指出，解决南中国海的主权争端是美国一项关键的“国家利益”之后，中美关系就急转直下。北京在数月前坚称，整个南中国海都是它的“核心（中国） 国家利益”，外界绝不可干涉，此次华盛顿的说法被广泛地认为是对北京的回应。
与此同时，在8月16日开始的美国与南韩海军在黄海举行的军演无意中证实了北京认为华盛顿有“遏制中国策略”的看法。到目前为止，在中共（CCP）——尤其是解放军（PLA）上层中的强硬派，已经让北京对美国的挑战作出了高调的回应。然而，国家媒体也发出了一些要灵活应对，甚至是妥协的声音，这可能表明胡锦涛政府仍在权衡不同的选择。
考虑到中美争论的根本原因，是北京扩大了它的一贯的“核心国家利益”的定义。新的定义超越了传统“核心区域”如台湾、西藏和新疆。而官方媒体在这个敏感的问题上持相对温和的观点显得意义非凡。国防大学的国家安全专家韩旭东在7月底指出，中国在提出“核心利益”的时候，应当采取谨慎的态度，他对官方的说法感到惊讶。韩说，“我们（中国）总体的国力，尤其的军力，还不足以保卫我们所有的国家核心利益。”
这样，在条件还未成熟的情况下就公开所有的中国核心利益也许只会起到反作用。此外，这位著名的战略家说，过度强调“核心利益”可能会导致中国的外交家和军事 人员“把重点全放在核心利益上，忽视了非核心利益”。韩教授建议，北京公布中国核心利益清单的时候，应采取分阶段、有步骤的做法。“中国正在变得强大，我 们可以逐步公布我们国家可以有效保护的那一部分核心利益。”韩补充说（《瞭望周刊》，7月25日；新华社，7月25日）。
更重要的是，中国现代国际关系研究院的高级研究员达巍警告：不要“任意放大”中国的国家核心利益。达巍提倡有一个核心利益“最低限度的定义”，他说，“在中国国力不断增强的时候，我们必须防止对中国核心利益的任意扩大。”这位在美国事务方面的高级专家指出，一个国家应当使用一个“宽泛”而不是“狭隘”的核心利益定义。
他以领土完整的问题举例。对于大多数国家来说领土完整是核心利益。“当处理领土争端的时候，许多国家经常采取让步的办法，比如交换（争议）领土，或者承认现状”，他指出。“通常，一些强国也许会‘放弃’一些争议地区。但是这并不意味着它们就抛弃了它们的核心利益”（人民日报网，7月27日；《环球时报》，7月27日）。
当然，韩和达的观点都回避了这个问题：构成北京的“核心利益”的完整内容究竟是什么？比如，考虑到中共领导人强烈反对8月16日在黄海公海举行的外国军演，这块位于中韩之间的水域也是中国的核心利益吗？也难怪南韩媒体最近一直在炮轰北京把整个朝鲜半岛纳入自己的影响范围（《韩国时报》，8月7日；《环球时报》8月9日）。
中国当局不大可能公布它所有的核心利益，但是重要的是，有相当多的强硬派在推动建立尽可能广泛的——并不断扩大的——核心利益的定义。然而，无论是哪一种情况，这实际上意味着，在中国变得强大的时候——而且需要更多的资源以维持它进军超级大国地位——它的核心利益的名单将会相应地拉长。
《解放军报》的评论员黄昆仑在去年刊登的一篇名为《国家利益的边界》的文章中指出，中国的国家利益已经超过了它的领土，领海和领空，它已经包括中国油轮需要经过的广大海域——还有外太空。“国家利益拓展到哪里，人民军队的使命就延伸到哪里”，黄写道。“考虑到新的历史使命，我们不仅要保护国家的‘领土边界’，还要保护‘国家利益边界’；我们不仅要保护国家安全利益，还要保护（将来）国家发展的利益，”他补充道（《解放军报》，2009年4月1日；《明报》香港，2009年4月2日）。
国防大学的韩旭东和（尤其是）中国现代国际关系研究院的达巍所发出的警告，反应出了部分温和观点论者的担忧，他们担心那些理论，比如说黄昆仑的，会点燃起“中国威胁论”的熊熊大火——并打击中国和它的邻邦的关系。
著名学者，中国人民大学经验丰富的国际关系教授庞中英建议，积极考虑多边战略，也许才是一个处理南中国海争端更实用的办法。在8月早些时候《环球时报》的一篇文章上，他争论说，“北京要维持它的‘双边’方针”来解决同它国和地区（包括越南、菲律宾、马来西亚、文莱和台湾）的领土纠纷会有相当大的困难。数十年来，有关主权的谈判，北京一直坚持使用双边模式，一边是中国，一边是个别申诉方。
中共的领导拒绝考虑包括中国-东盟协商、或者引入诸如美国作为第三方的“国际化”对话等选择。“过去20年来，中国已经在多边（外交）操作上积累了丰富的经验，”庞写道，并补充指出，南中国海问题可以通过一个引入东盟，美国，日本和联合国参与的多边平台来解决。“排除多边主义无疑将给（中国的）对手攻击中国的借口”（《环球时报》，8月5日；新浪网，8月6日）。
此外，一些外交家和学者私下里援引了“搁置争议、共同发展”的方案的例子来解决南中国海争端。2008年，胡主席和时任日本首相的福田康夫在处理中国东海主权争端的时候，这个运作模式曾经达成了理论共识。但是，北京和东京在把胡-福协议变成一个正式条约的时候功亏一篑。一个可能的原因，就是中国的民族主义者以及解放军将军们反对“共同发展”方案。（《中国日报》，8月4日；Stratfor.com，2月22日）。
很明显，在北京对美国，朝鲜半岛，日本和南中国海的外交和安全政策上，解放军将军中的鹰派观点占主导作用。军队的官员是最大限度扩大中国核心利益参数的坚定支持者。
尽管平壤继续进行自己的核武器项目，而且据说是3月底击沉南韩军舰天安号的主谋，军中的鹰派将军据信也是金正日政权最坚定的支持者，军方强硬派影响到国家政策的其它例子包括：在去年6月，国防部长罗伯特·盖茨（Robert Gates）在亚洲访问时，中国拒绝邀请盖茨访华（《纽约时报》，6月4日；《时代》亚洲版，7月22日）。
喜欢在国家媒体上露脸的两位解放军大将是强硬派的典型代表。军事科学院的学者和战略家罗援就是第一批表达了这样的观点的人。他在6月首次宣称，反对美韩将在黄海举行的联合军演的计划。“卧榻之侧岂容他人鼾睡？”表达了北京对军演的愤怒，罗将军以他朴实的表达赢得了全国性的声誉。
安排在夏末举行的黄海军演的消息传来的时候，罗将军加重了自己的修辞。他引用了毛的战斗名言——“人不犯我，我不犯人；人犯我，我必犯人”——中国军队应当采取强硬的立场来反对美国展示出的“霸权主义，单边主义和炮舰外交”。（解放军报，8月12日；明报，8月13日）
另外一位经常被引述观点的军事评论家，海军少将杨毅更进一步，他指责华盛顿在加强它对中国久负盛名的遏制政策之外，对中国采用了双重标准。杨毅在8月13日的《解放军报》上写道。“一方面要求中国在地区安全问题上发挥作用，一方面又对中国进行日渐严密的围堵，不断挑战中国的核心利益”他补充说，由美军领导的在本地区的军演，旨在挑起“敌意和亚太地区的冲突——因此，中国必须要有坚定的回应。”杨毅在《中国日报》上的另一篇文章中指出，“华盛顿将不可避免地为自己糊涂的决定付出高昂的代价”（《解放军报》8月13日；路透社，8月13日；《中国日报》，8月13日）。
当被问及在如何回击美国的挑战时军队发出了超常的声音时，另一位著名的鹰派，中国军控与裁军协会的研究员，徐光宇大将指出“在这些问题上，解放军先说话很正常。”他补充说，“捍卫中国的领土和利益是解放军的神圣天职。”
但是，中国的将军们可能已经抓住了中美关系恶化的趋势——和亚太地区的全面紧张的时机——来游说获得更多的经济和政治资源，以升级他们的军备——这也是事实。尤其考虑到在即将到来的18大会出现大规模人员变动，胡主席想提升自己的“团派”的数量（包括第六代的政治新星，比如说内蒙古自治区的总书记胡春华），就需要得到军队的支持（路透社，8月12日；《南华早报》8月4日；《苹果日报》，8月13日）。
但是，中共的领导层还是允许出现温和的声音，这似乎表明，胡在考虑一些核心问题的时候，比如说核心利益的定义的时候，既会考虑鹰派的意见，也会考虑鸽派的观点——自从奥巴马总统在去年执政以来，面对北京认为的来自美国最猛烈的攻击，怎样才是最好的防御。但是，无论是哪一种情况，这基本意味着，随着中国变得更加强大——而且要求更多的资源来支撑它向大国地位进军——它的核心利益的名单也会相应地拉长。
与此同时，在8月16日开始的美国与南韩海军在黄海举行的军演无意中证实了北京认为华盛顿有“遏制中国策略”的看法。到目前为止，在中共（CCP）——尤其是解放军（PLA）上层中的强硬派，已经让北京对美国的挑战作出了高调的回应。然而，国家媒体也发出了一些要灵活应对，甚至是妥协的声音，这可能表明胡锦涛政府仍在权衡不同的选择。
考虑到中美争论的根本原因，是北京扩大了它的一贯的“核心国家利益”的定义。新的定义超越了传统“核心区域”如台湾、西藏和新疆。而官方媒体在这个敏感的问题上持相对温和的观点显得意义非凡。国防大学的国家安全专家韩旭东在7月底指出，中国在提出“核心利益”的时候，应当采取谨慎的态度，他对官方的说法感到惊讶。韩说，“我们（中国）总体的国力，尤其的军力，还不足以保卫我们所有的国家核心利益。”
这样，在条件还未成熟的情况下就公开所有的中国核心利益也许只会起到反作用。此外，这位著名的战略家说，过度强调“核心利益”可能会导致中国的外交家和军事 人员“把重点全放在核心利益上，忽视了非核心利益”。韩教授建议，北京公布中国核心利益清单的时候，应采取分阶段、有步骤的做法。“中国正在变得强大，我 们可以逐步公布我们国家可以有效保护的那一部分核心利益。”韩补充说（《瞭望周刊》，7月25日；新华社，7月25日）。
更重要的是，中国现代国际关系研究院的高级研究员达巍警告：不要“任意放大”中国的国家核心利益。达巍提倡有一个核心利益“最低限度的定义”，他说，“在中国国力不断增强的时候，我们必须防止对中国核心利益的任意扩大。”这位在美国事务方面的高级专家指出，一个国家应当使用一个“宽泛”而不是“狭隘”的核心利益定义。
他以领土完整的问题举例。对于大多数国家来说领土完整是核心利益。“当处理领土争端的时候，许多国家经常采取让步的办法，比如交换（争议）领土，或者承认现状”，他指出。“通常，一些强国也许会‘放弃’一些争议地区。但是这并不意味着它们就抛弃了它们的核心利益”（人民日报网，7月27日；《环球时报》，7月27日）。
当然，韩和达的观点都回避了这个问题：构成北京的“核心利益”的完整内容究竟是什么？比如，考虑到中共领导人强烈反对8月16日在黄海公海举行的外国军演，这块位于中韩之间的水域也是中国的核心利益吗？也难怪南韩媒体最近一直在炮轰北京把整个朝鲜半岛纳入自己的影响范围（《韩国时报》，8月7日；《环球时报》8月9日）。
中国当局不大可能公布它所有的核心利益，但是重要的是，有相当多的强硬派在推动建立尽可能广泛的——并不断扩大的——核心利益的定义。然而，无论是哪一种情况，这实际上意味着，在中国变得强大的时候——而且需要更多的资源以维持它进军超级大国地位——它的核心利益的名单将会相应地拉长。
《解放军报》的评论员黄昆仑在去年刊登的一篇名为《国家利益的边界》的文章中指出，中国的国家利益已经超过了它的领土，领海和领空，它已经包括中国油轮需要经过的广大海域——还有外太空。“国家利益拓展到哪里，人民军队的使命就延伸到哪里”，黄写道。“考虑到新的历史使命，我们不仅要保护国家的‘领土边界’，还要保护‘国家利益边界’；我们不仅要保护国家安全利益，还要保护（将来）国家发展的利益，”他补充道（《解放军报》，2009年4月1日；《明报》香港，2009年4月2日）。
国防大学的韩旭东和（尤其是）中国现代国际关系研究院的达巍所发出的警告，反应出了部分温和观点论者的担忧，他们担心那些理论，比如说黄昆仑的，会点燃起“中国威胁论”的熊熊大火——并打击中国和它的邻邦的关系。
著名学者，中国人民大学经验丰富的国际关系教授庞中英建议，积极考虑多边战略，也许才是一个处理南中国海争端更实用的办法。在8月早些时候《环球时报》的一篇文章上，他争论说，“北京要维持它的‘双边’方针”来解决同它国和地区（包括越南、菲律宾、马来西亚、文莱和台湾）的领土纠纷会有相当大的困难。数十年来，有关主权的谈判，北京一直坚持使用双边模式，一边是中国，一边是个别申诉方。
中共的领导拒绝考虑包括中国-东盟协商、或者引入诸如美国作为第三方的“国际化”对话等选择。“过去20年来，中国已经在多边（外交）操作上积累了丰富的经验，”庞写道，并补充指出，南中国海问题可以通过一个引入东盟，美国，日本和联合国参与的多边平台来解决。“排除多边主义无疑将给（中国的）对手攻击中国的借口”（《环球时报》，8月5日；新浪网，8月6日）。
此外，一些外交家和学者私下里援引了“搁置争议、共同发展”的方案的例子来解决南中国海争端。2008年，胡主席和时任日本首相的福田康夫在处理中国东海主权争端的时候，这个运作模式曾经达成了理论共识。但是，北京和东京在把胡-福协议变成一个正式条约的时候功亏一篑。一个可能的原因，就是中国的民族主义者以及解放军将军们反对“共同发展”方案。（《中国日报》，8月4日；Stratfor.com，2月22日）。
很明显，在北京对美国，朝鲜半岛，日本和南中国海的外交和安全政策上，解放军将军中的鹰派观点占主导作用。军队的官员是最大限度扩大中国核心利益参数的坚定支持者。
尽管平壤继续进行自己的核武器项目，而且据说是3月底击沉南韩军舰天安号的主谋，军中的鹰派将军据信也是金正日政权最坚定的支持者，军方强硬派影响到国家政策的其它例子包括：在去年6月，国防部长罗伯特·盖茨（Robert Gates）在亚洲访问时，中国拒绝邀请盖茨访华（《纽约时报》，6月4日；《时代》亚洲版，7月22日）。
喜欢在国家媒体上露脸的两位解放军大将是强硬派的典型代表。军事科学院的学者和战略家罗援就是第一批表达了这样的观点的人。他在6月首次宣称，反对美韩将在黄海举行的联合军演的计划。“卧榻之侧岂容他人鼾睡？”表达了北京对军演的愤怒，罗将军以他朴实的表达赢得了全国性的声誉。
安排在夏末举行的黄海军演的消息传来的时候，罗将军加重了自己的修辞。他引用了毛的战斗名言——“人不犯我，我不犯人；人犯我，我必犯人”——中国军队应当采取强硬的立场来反对美国展示出的“霸权主义，单边主义和炮舰外交”。（解放军报，8月12日；明报，8月13日）
另外一位经常被引述观点的军事评论家，海军少将杨毅更进一步，他指责华盛顿在加强它对中国久负盛名的遏制政策之外，对中国采用了双重标准。杨毅在8月13日的《解放军报》上写道。“一方面要求中国在地区安全问题上发挥作用，一方面又对中国进行日渐严密的围堵，不断挑战中国的核心利益”他补充说，由美军领导的在本地区的军演，旨在挑起“敌意和亚太地区的冲突——因此，中国必须要有坚定的回应。”杨毅在《中国日报》上的另一篇文章中指出，“华盛顿将不可避免地为自己糊涂的决定付出高昂的代价”（《解放军报》8月13日；路透社，8月13日；《中国日报》，8月13日）。
当被问及在如何回击美国的挑战时军队发出了超常的声音时，另一位著名的鹰派，中国军控与裁军协会的研究员，徐光宇大将指出“在这些问题上，解放军先说话很正常。”他补充说，“捍卫中国的领土和利益是解放军的神圣天职。”
但是，中国的将军们可能已经抓住了中美关系恶化的趋势——和亚太地区的全面紧张的时机——来游说获得更多的经济和政治资源，以升级他们的军备——这也是事实。尤其考虑到在即将到来的18大会出现大规模人员变动，胡主席想提升自己的“团派”的数量（包括第六代的政治新星，比如说内蒙古自治区的总书记胡春华），就需要得到军队的支持（路透社，8月12日；《南华早报》8月4日；《苹果日报》，8月13日）。
但是，中共的领导层还是允许出现温和的声音，这似乎表明，胡在考虑一些核心问题的时候，比如说核心利益的定义的时候，既会考虑鹰派的意见，也会考虑鸽派的观点——自从奥巴马总统在去年执政以来，面对北京认为的来自美国最猛烈的攻击，怎样才是最好的防御。但是，无论是哪一种情况，这基本意味着，随着中国变得更加强大——而且要求更多的资源来支撑它向大国地位进军——它的核心利益的名单也会相应地拉长。
Hawks vs. Doves: Beijing Debates “Core
Interests” and Sino-U.S. Relations
Publication: China Brief Volume: 10 Issue:
17
August 19, 2010 05:16 PM Age: 2 yrs
By: Willy Lam
An intriguing divergence of views has been
exposed within China’s foreign-policy establishment on how to handle the
country’s worsening ties with the United States that may highlight a growing
dissonance between China’s civilian and military establishments. Sino-American
relations have taken a confrontational turn since Washington indicated last
month that the resolution of sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea was a
key American “national interest.” This overture by Washington was widely seen
as being made in response to Beijing’s assertion a few months earlier that the
whole South China Sea was a “core [Chinese] national interest” that brooked no
outside interference. At the same time, war games that began on August 16 by
the American and South Korean navies in the Yellow Sea have inadvertently
confirmed Beijing’s perception of Washington’s “anti-China containment policy.”
Up until now, hard-line elements in the upper echelons of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP)—and particularly the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—have driven
Beijing’s high-decibel response to the American challenge. Yet, perhaps
indicative of the fact that the Hu Jintao leadership is still weighing
different options, flexible and even conciliatory approaches to defusing the
diplomatic crisis are being aired in the state media.
Given that a root cause of the Sino-American row was Beijing’s decision to expand its definition of “core national interests” beyond traditional areas such as Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, it is significant that the official press has held relatively moderate viewpoints on this sensitive issue. Han Xudong, a national security expert at the National Defense University (NDU), raised eyebrows when he indicated in late July that China should adopt a cautious attitude when staking out the country’s hexin liyi or “core interests.” Han pointed out that “our [China’s] comprehensive national strength, especially military power, is not yet sufficient to safeguard all our core national interests.” Thus, prematurely publicizing all of China’s core interests might be counter-productive. Moreover, the noted strategist contended, excessive stress on “core interests” could result in China’s diplomats and military personnel “putting emphasis only on core interests and neglecting non-core interests.” Professor Han recommended that Beijing release China’s list of hexin liyi in a phased, step-by-step fashion. “As China becomes stronger, we can publicize by installments those core interests that our country can effectively safeguard,” Han added (Outlook Weekly, July 25; Xinhua News Agency, July 25).
More importantly, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) senior researcher Da Wei has warned against the “arbitrary expansion” of China’s core interests. Da advocated a “minimalist definition” of hexin liyi, adding that “we must prevent the arbitrary extension of the parameters of hexin liyi in the wake of the rise of [China’s] national power.” The ranking expert on U.S. affairs indicated that a country should adopt a “broad and rough” rather than “narrow” interpretation of its core interests. He cited the issue of territorial integrity, which is considered of core interest for most countries. “When handling territorial disputes, many countries often adopt compromises such as exchanging [disputed] territories or recognizing the status quo,” he pointed out. “Often, big powers may ‘let go of’ some disputed areas. This doesn’t mean that such countries have forsaken their core interests” (People’s Daily Net, July 27; Global Times, July 27).
The views of Han and Da, of course, beg the question of what constitutes the full array of Beijing’s “core national interests.” For example, given the CCP leadership’s vehement objection to foreign countries conducting military maneuvers in international waters in the Yellow Sea that began on August 16, is this patch of water wedged between China and the Koreas also China’s hexin liyi? It is little wonder that the South Korean media has recently been blasting Beijing for putting the entire Korean Peninsula into its sphere of influence (Korea Times, August 7; Global Times, August 9). While it is unlikely that Chinese authorities will publicize a full run-down of their core interests, it is significant that quite a few hardliners have been pushing for the broadest possible—and ever-expanding—definition of hexin liyi. In either case, however, this essentially means that as China becomes stronger—and requires more resources to sustain its march toward superpower status—its list of core interests will grow accordingly.
In an article published last year on “the boundaries of national interests,” PLA Daily commentator Huang Kunlun noted that China’s national interests had gone beyond its land, sea and air territories to include areas such as the vast oceans traversed by Chinese oil freighters—as well as outer space. “Wherever our national interests have extended, so will the mission of our armed forces,” Huang wrote. “Given our new historical mission, the forces have to not only safeguard the country’s ‘territorial boundaries’ but also its ‘boundaries of national interests’.” “We need to safeguard not only national-security interests but also interests relating to [future] national development,” he added (PLA Daily, April 1, 2009; Ming Pao [Hong Kong], April 2, 2009). Caveats given by NDU’s Ha—and particularly CICIR’s Da—reflect fears on the part of moderate opinion-makers that theories such as Huang’s will stoke the flames of the “China threat” theory—and deal a blow to the country’s relations with its neighbors.
Of perhaps more practical relevance to tackling the South China Sea imbroglio is well-known academic Pang Zhongying’s suggestion that Beijing should actively consider a duobian, or multilateralist strategy. In an early August article in Global Times, Pang, a veteran international relations professor at Beijing’s Renmin University, argued that “there will be considerable difficulty for Beijing to maintain its ‘bilateral’ approach” to ironing out territorial rows with countries and regions including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. Beijing has insisted for decades that sovereignty-related negotiations be conducted on a one-on-one basis between China on the one hand and individual claimants on the other. The CCP leadership has refused to consider options including China-ASEAN negotiations or “internationalized” talks involving third parties such as the United States. “In the past two decades, China has accumulated a lot of experience in multilateral [diplomatic] operations,” Pang wrote, adding that the South China Sea issue could be resolved on a multilateral platform that involves parties including ASEAN, the United States, Japan and the United Nations. “Ruling out multilateralism will be tantamount to giving [China’s] opponents pretexts to attack China,” he indicated (Global Times, August 5; Sina.com, August 6).
Moreover, individual diplomats and scholars have in private cited the formula of “joint development while setting aside sovereignty” for solving the South China Sea imbroglio. This modus operandi was used during the theoretical accord reached between President Hu Jintao and then-Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in 2008 for settling sovereignty disputes over the East China Sea. Yet, Beijing and Tokyo have since failed to go one step further by formalizing the Hu-Fukuda agreement into a full-fledged treaty. One possible reason is opposition to the “joint development” formula expressed by Chinese nationalists as well as PLA generals (China Daily, August 4; Stratfor.com, February 22).
It seems evident that the hawkish views of PLA generals are having a dominant influence on Beijing’s foreign and security policies toward the United States, the Korean Peninsula, Japan and the South China Sea. Military officers are vociferous supporters of the maximalist extension of the parameters of China’s hexin liyi. The generals are also believed to be adamant supporters of the Kim Jong-Il regime. This is despite Pyongyang’s continuation of its nuclear weapons program as well as its alleged role in sinking the South Korean warship Cheonan in late March. Other examples of hard-line military thinking influencing national policy include the denial of an invitation to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to visit China while the latter was in Asia last June (New York Times, June 4; Time Asia Edition, July 22).
Typical of the hardliners’ views are those of two PLA major-generals, who enjoy high exposure in the official media. Academy of Military Sciences scholar and strategist Luo Yuan was one of the first opinion-makers who spoke out against plans, first announced in June, that joint U.S.-South Korean exercises would be conducted in the Yellow Sea. The general gained national fame by using the earthy expression, “how can we let a stranger fall sound asleep just outside our bedroom?” to indicate Beijing’s indignation at the maneuvers. General Luo ratcheted up the rhetoric when reacting to news that the Yellow Sea drills have now been scheduled for late summer. He quoted Chairman Mao’s pugilistic dictum—“If people don’t offend me, I won’t offend them; if people run afoul of me, I will surely hit them back”—on the fact that Chinese military forces should take a strong stance against perceived manifestations of America’s “hegemonism, gunboat diplomacy and unilateralism” (PLA Daily, August 12; Ming Pao, August 13).
Real Admiral Yang Yi, another much-quoted military commentator, has gone one step further by accusing Washington of double-dealing in addition to exacerbating its time-honored containment policy against China. “On the one hand, it [Washington] wants China to play a role in regional security issues,” Yang wrote in the PLA Daily on August 13. “On the other hand, it is engaging in an increasingly tight encirclement of China and constantly challenging China's core interests.” General Yang added that American-led military drills in the region were aimed at provoking “enmity and confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region—and that the Chinese must make a firm response. “Washington will inevitably pay a costly price for its muddled decision,” Yang noted in another article in the official China Daily (PLA Daily, August 13; Reuters, August 13; China Daily, August 13).
When asked about the preeminence of military voices in the debate over how to beat back the American challenge, Major-General Xu Guangyu, another noted hawk, indicated that “it’s natural for the PLA to speak out first on these issues.” Xu, a researcher at the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, added, “It’s the PLA’s sacred duty to defend China’s territory and interests.” It is also true, however, that the generals may have seized upon the downward spiral in Sino-U.S. ties—and the overall tension in the Asia-Pacific Region—to lobby for more economic and political resources to upgrade their arsenal. Particularly in view of large-scale personnel changes scheduled for the upcoming 18th CCP Congress, President Hu needs the top brass’s backing for the elevation of numerous affiliates of his Communist Youth League faction, including Sixth-Generation rising stars such as Inner Mongolia Party Secretary Hu Chunhua (Reuters, August 12; South China Morning Post, August 4; Apple Daily, August 13).
That the CCP leadership has allowed moderate messages to be aired, however, seems to indicate that supremo Hu is willing to consider dovish as well as hawkish approaches to key issues such as the definition of China’s core interests—and how they may be best defended in the face of what Beijing perceives to be the toughest American onslaught since President Obama took office last year. In either case, however, this essentially means that as China becomes stronger—and requires more resources to sustain its march toward superpower status—its list of core interests will grow accordingly.
Given that a root cause of the Sino-American row was Beijing’s decision to expand its definition of “core national interests” beyond traditional areas such as Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, it is significant that the official press has held relatively moderate viewpoints on this sensitive issue. Han Xudong, a national security expert at the National Defense University (NDU), raised eyebrows when he indicated in late July that China should adopt a cautious attitude when staking out the country’s hexin liyi or “core interests.” Han pointed out that “our [China’s] comprehensive national strength, especially military power, is not yet sufficient to safeguard all our core national interests.” Thus, prematurely publicizing all of China’s core interests might be counter-productive. Moreover, the noted strategist contended, excessive stress on “core interests” could result in China’s diplomats and military personnel “putting emphasis only on core interests and neglecting non-core interests.” Professor Han recommended that Beijing release China’s list of hexin liyi in a phased, step-by-step fashion. “As China becomes stronger, we can publicize by installments those core interests that our country can effectively safeguard,” Han added (Outlook Weekly, July 25; Xinhua News Agency, July 25).
More importantly, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) senior researcher Da Wei has warned against the “arbitrary expansion” of China’s core interests. Da advocated a “minimalist definition” of hexin liyi, adding that “we must prevent the arbitrary extension of the parameters of hexin liyi in the wake of the rise of [China’s] national power.” The ranking expert on U.S. affairs indicated that a country should adopt a “broad and rough” rather than “narrow” interpretation of its core interests. He cited the issue of territorial integrity, which is considered of core interest for most countries. “When handling territorial disputes, many countries often adopt compromises such as exchanging [disputed] territories or recognizing the status quo,” he pointed out. “Often, big powers may ‘let go of’ some disputed areas. This doesn’t mean that such countries have forsaken their core interests” (People’s Daily Net, July 27; Global Times, July 27).
The views of Han and Da, of course, beg the question of what constitutes the full array of Beijing’s “core national interests.” For example, given the CCP leadership’s vehement objection to foreign countries conducting military maneuvers in international waters in the Yellow Sea that began on August 16, is this patch of water wedged between China and the Koreas also China’s hexin liyi? It is little wonder that the South Korean media has recently been blasting Beijing for putting the entire Korean Peninsula into its sphere of influence (Korea Times, August 7; Global Times, August 9). While it is unlikely that Chinese authorities will publicize a full run-down of their core interests, it is significant that quite a few hardliners have been pushing for the broadest possible—and ever-expanding—definition of hexin liyi. In either case, however, this essentially means that as China becomes stronger—and requires more resources to sustain its march toward superpower status—its list of core interests will grow accordingly.
In an article published last year on “the boundaries of national interests,” PLA Daily commentator Huang Kunlun noted that China’s national interests had gone beyond its land, sea and air territories to include areas such as the vast oceans traversed by Chinese oil freighters—as well as outer space. “Wherever our national interests have extended, so will the mission of our armed forces,” Huang wrote. “Given our new historical mission, the forces have to not only safeguard the country’s ‘territorial boundaries’ but also its ‘boundaries of national interests’.” “We need to safeguard not only national-security interests but also interests relating to [future] national development,” he added (PLA Daily, April 1, 2009; Ming Pao [Hong Kong], April 2, 2009). Caveats given by NDU’s Ha—and particularly CICIR’s Da—reflect fears on the part of moderate opinion-makers that theories such as Huang’s will stoke the flames of the “China threat” theory—and deal a blow to the country’s relations with its neighbors.
Of perhaps more practical relevance to tackling the South China Sea imbroglio is well-known academic Pang Zhongying’s suggestion that Beijing should actively consider a duobian, or multilateralist strategy. In an early August article in Global Times, Pang, a veteran international relations professor at Beijing’s Renmin University, argued that “there will be considerable difficulty for Beijing to maintain its ‘bilateral’ approach” to ironing out territorial rows with countries and regions including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. Beijing has insisted for decades that sovereignty-related negotiations be conducted on a one-on-one basis between China on the one hand and individual claimants on the other. The CCP leadership has refused to consider options including China-ASEAN negotiations or “internationalized” talks involving third parties such as the United States. “In the past two decades, China has accumulated a lot of experience in multilateral [diplomatic] operations,” Pang wrote, adding that the South China Sea issue could be resolved on a multilateral platform that involves parties including ASEAN, the United States, Japan and the United Nations. “Ruling out multilateralism will be tantamount to giving [China’s] opponents pretexts to attack China,” he indicated (Global Times, August 5; Sina.com, August 6).
Moreover, individual diplomats and scholars have in private cited the formula of “joint development while setting aside sovereignty” for solving the South China Sea imbroglio. This modus operandi was used during the theoretical accord reached between President Hu Jintao and then-Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in 2008 for settling sovereignty disputes over the East China Sea. Yet, Beijing and Tokyo have since failed to go one step further by formalizing the Hu-Fukuda agreement into a full-fledged treaty. One possible reason is opposition to the “joint development” formula expressed by Chinese nationalists as well as PLA generals (China Daily, August 4; Stratfor.com, February 22).
It seems evident that the hawkish views of PLA generals are having a dominant influence on Beijing’s foreign and security policies toward the United States, the Korean Peninsula, Japan and the South China Sea. Military officers are vociferous supporters of the maximalist extension of the parameters of China’s hexin liyi. The generals are also believed to be adamant supporters of the Kim Jong-Il regime. This is despite Pyongyang’s continuation of its nuclear weapons program as well as its alleged role in sinking the South Korean warship Cheonan in late March. Other examples of hard-line military thinking influencing national policy include the denial of an invitation to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to visit China while the latter was in Asia last June (New York Times, June 4; Time Asia Edition, July 22).
Typical of the hardliners’ views are those of two PLA major-generals, who enjoy high exposure in the official media. Academy of Military Sciences scholar and strategist Luo Yuan was one of the first opinion-makers who spoke out against plans, first announced in June, that joint U.S.-South Korean exercises would be conducted in the Yellow Sea. The general gained national fame by using the earthy expression, “how can we let a stranger fall sound asleep just outside our bedroom?” to indicate Beijing’s indignation at the maneuvers. General Luo ratcheted up the rhetoric when reacting to news that the Yellow Sea drills have now been scheduled for late summer. He quoted Chairman Mao’s pugilistic dictum—“If people don’t offend me, I won’t offend them; if people run afoul of me, I will surely hit them back”—on the fact that Chinese military forces should take a strong stance against perceived manifestations of America’s “hegemonism, gunboat diplomacy and unilateralism” (PLA Daily, August 12; Ming Pao, August 13).
Real Admiral Yang Yi, another much-quoted military commentator, has gone one step further by accusing Washington of double-dealing in addition to exacerbating its time-honored containment policy against China. “On the one hand, it [Washington] wants China to play a role in regional security issues,” Yang wrote in the PLA Daily on August 13. “On the other hand, it is engaging in an increasingly tight encirclement of China and constantly challenging China's core interests.” General Yang added that American-led military drills in the region were aimed at provoking “enmity and confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region—and that the Chinese must make a firm response. “Washington will inevitably pay a costly price for its muddled decision,” Yang noted in another article in the official China Daily (PLA Daily, August 13; Reuters, August 13; China Daily, August 13).
When asked about the preeminence of military voices in the debate over how to beat back the American challenge, Major-General Xu Guangyu, another noted hawk, indicated that “it’s natural for the PLA to speak out first on these issues.” Xu, a researcher at the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, added, “It’s the PLA’s sacred duty to defend China’s territory and interests.” It is also true, however, that the generals may have seized upon the downward spiral in Sino-U.S. ties—and the overall tension in the Asia-Pacific Region—to lobby for more economic and political resources to upgrade their arsenal. Particularly in view of large-scale personnel changes scheduled for the upcoming 18th CCP Congress, President Hu needs the top brass’s backing for the elevation of numerous affiliates of his Communist Youth League faction, including Sixth-Generation rising stars such as Inner Mongolia Party Secretary Hu Chunhua (Reuters, August 12; South China Morning Post, August 4; Apple Daily, August 13).
That the CCP leadership has allowed moderate messages to be aired, however, seems to indicate that supremo Hu is willing to consider dovish as well as hawkish approaches to key issues such as the definition of China’s core interests—and how they may be best defended in the face of what Beijing perceives to be the toughest American onslaught since President Obama took office last year. In either case, however, this essentially means that as China becomes stronger—and requires more resources to sustain its march toward superpower status—its list of core interests will grow accordingly.
