1976年以来，美元作为国际货币的角色一直在缓慢减弱。国际上用美元作为外汇储备、为金融交易计价、结算贸易以及货币市场载体的程度还不如1945—1971年布雷顿森林时代的鼎盛期。但大部分人会对最新数字所揭示的东西感到震惊。
对于这一衰落趋势，解释层出不穷。自越战以来，美国的预算赤字、货币创造和经常项目赤字总是非常高。美元相对其他主要货币的价值或者美元的购买力有 所损失也不足为奇。与此同时，美国站全球产出的份额也有所下降。而在最近，美国国会的一些议员有一种危险的意图——追求将导致财政部对其法定债务违约的战略，这影响了全球对美元特权地位的信心。
此外，一些新兴市场货币正在首次进入国际货币俱乐部。事实上，一些分析师指出，到这个十年结束时，人民币可能挑战美元作为领先国际货币的地位。
但美元作为国际货币的地位并没有一路下降。有趣的是，公众最担心这一问题的时期往往并不是美元在国际交易中的份额下降的时期。
以作为各央行储备货币的国际使用以及作为外汇市场载体的标准看，美元坠落速度最快的阶段是1978—1991年和2001—2010年。在这两个时期之间，即1992—2000年，美元的衰落之势出现了显而易见的反转，尽管在这个十年中间美元衰落论甚嚣尘上。1992年，在各国央行所持有的外汇储备中，大概只有46%是美元，但在2000年这一比例上升到约70%。
接着，长期衰落之势恢复。根据一项估算，美元在央行外汇储备中所占比重从2001年的约70%下降到2010年的60%略多。在同一时期，美元占外汇市场的比重也有所下降：2001年，以美元为一方的交易占外汇交易的90%，到2010年，这一比例为85%。
国际货币基金组织(IMF)的最新数字表明，出乎意料，美元的长期衰落之势再一次停了下来。根据IMF的数据，美元占外汇储备的比重在2010年停止下降，此后一直保持稳定。2013年(到目前为止)还略有上升。类似地，国际清算银行(BIS)在其最新一期三年调查中指出美元占世界外汇交易的比重从 2010年的85%提高到2013年的87%。
考虑到美国财政政策功能失调的状况，美元的恢复力令人吃惊。也许我们本不应该吃惊。毕竟，当美国次贷市场引发2008年全球金融危机时，全球投资者的反应是逃向美国，而不是从美国出逃。他们显然仍把美国国债视为安全港，把美元视为顶级国际货币，特别是在没有出色替代品的情况下。
特别地，欧元有其自身的一目了然的问题。事实上，在最新的统计数字中，欧元在储备和外汇交易中的比重均下降了几个百分点。
要想解释最近的美元地位趋稳之势，可以把注意力放在过去三年与1992—2000年衰落之势暂时扭转期间的相似之处：美国预算赤字大幅改善。到20世纪90年代末，80年代创纪录的赤字变为创纪录的盈余；如今，联邦赤字也不到2010年水平的一半。
也许这一财政现象是一种巧合。毕竟，对两组历史数据点做过多解读是十分愚蠢的。更加愚蠢的是相信正如美国政客在过去四十年都破坏美元至高无上的地位，他们在今后几十年也无法做到。
美元永远是第一，这决非宇宙真理。十九世纪拥有顶级地位的是英镑，但在二十世纪上半叶就被美元超越。美元也有被后浪拍死在沙滩上的一天，但肯定不是今天。(杰弗里·弗兰克尔)
The Dollar and Its Rivals
21/11/2013｜Jeffrey Frankel | project & syndicate
Since 1976, the
US dollar’s role as an international currency has been slowly waning.
International use of the dollar to hold foreign-exchange reserves, denominate
financial transactions, invoice trade, and as a vehicle in currency markets is
below its level during the heyday of the Bretton Woods era, from 1945 to 1971.
But most people would be surprised by what the most recent numbers show.
There
is an abundance of explanations for the downward trend. Since the Vietnam War,
US budget deficits, money creation, and current-account deficits have often
been high. Presumably as a result, the dollar has lost value relative to other
major currencies or in terms of purchasing power. Meanwhile, the US share of
global output has declined. And, most recently, the disturbing willingness of
some members of the US Congress to pursue a strategy that would cause the
Treasury to default on legal obligations has undermined global confidence in
the dollar’s privileged status.
Moreover,
some emerging-market currencies are joining the club of international
currencies for the first time. Indeed, some analysts have suggested that the
Chinese renminbi may rival the dollar as the leading international currency by
the end of the decade.
But
the dollar’s status as an international currency has not fallen uniformly.
Interestingly, the periods when the public is most concerned about the issue do
not coincide with the periods when the dollar’s share in international
transactions is in fact falling.
By
the criteria of international use as a reserve currency among central banks and
as a vehicle in foreign-exchange markets, the most rapid declines took place
from 1978 to 1991 and from 2001 to 2010. Between these two intervals, from 1992
to 2000, there was a clear reversal of the trend, notwithstanding a popular
orgy of dollar declinism around
the middle of that decade. Central banks held only an estimated 46% of their
foreign-exchange reserves in dollars in 1992, but that share rebounded to
almost 70% by 2000.
Subsequently,
the long-term downward trend resumed.
According to one estimate, the dollar’s share in central-banks’ foreign
reserves declined from about 70% in 2001 to barely 60% in 2010. During the same
decade, its share in the foreign-exchange market also declined: the dollar
constituted one side or the other in 90% of foreign-exchange trades in 2001,
but only 85% in 2010.
The
International Monetary Fund’s most recent statistics suggest, unexpectedly, another pause in
the dollar’s long-term decline. According to the IMF, the dollar’s
share in foreign-exchange reserves stopped falling in 2010 and has been flat
since then. If anything, the share is up slightly thus far in 2013. Similarly,
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reported in its recent triennial survey that the dollar’s
share in the world’s foreign-exchange trades rose from 85% in 2010 to 87% in
2013.
Given
dysfunctional US fiscal policy, the dollar’s resilience is surprising. Or maybe
we should no longer be surprised. After all, when the global financial crisis
erupted in 2008 from the bowels of the American subprime-mortgage market,
global investors responded by fleeing to the US, not from it. They obviously
still regard US Treasury bills as a safe haven and the dollar as the top
international currency, especially given the absence of good alternatives.
In
particular, the euro has its own all-too-obvious problems. Indeed, the euro’s
share in reserve holdings and foreign-exchange transactions have both declined
by several percentage points in the most recent statistics.
At
the same time, the IMF’s data indicate that the vaunted renminbi is not yet
among the top seven currencies in terms of central-bank reserve holdings. And,
according to the BIS, while the renminbi has finally broken into the top ten
currencies in foreign-exchange markets, it still accounts for only 2.2% of all
transactions, just behind the Mexican peso’s 2.5% share. Despite recent moves
by the Chinese government, the renminbi still has a long way to go.
To
try to explain the recent stabilization of the dollar’s status, one might note
something that the last three years have in common with the previous period of
temporary reversal from 1992 to 2000: striking improvements in the US budget
deficit. By the end of the 1990’s, the record deficits of the 1980’s had been
transformed into record surpluses; today, the federal deficit is less than half
its 2010 level.
Perhaps
the fiscal observation is a coincidence. After all, it would be foolish to read
too much into two historical data points. It would be even more foolish to
believe that just because American politicians have failed to dislodge the US
dollar from its paramount status over the last 40 years, they could not
accomplish the job with another few decades of effort.
It
is not an eternal law of nature that the dollar shall always be number one. The
pound sterling had the top spot in the nineteenth century, only to be surpassed
by the dollar in the first half of the twentieth century. The day may come when
the dollar, too, succumbs to a rival. But today is not that day.
