CANBERRA, Australia — For 40 years American leadership has kept Asia stable and fostered economic growth, especially in China. But today China’s growing power is undermining that old order and posing big questions about America’s future role in the region.
Those questions loom in the ongoing dispute
between China and Japan over a chain of tiny uninhabited islands in the East
China Sea that could easily spark an armed clash between the two rivals. Such a
conflict would escalate fast, and the United States would have to quickly take
action to support Japan militarily against China — or not.
Washington remains neutral on who owns the
islands, while criticizing China for using displays of force to challenge
Japan’s de facto control of them. As Secretary of State John Kerry has said:
“The United States, as everybody knows, does not take a position on the
ultimate sovereignty of the islands. But we do recognize that they are under
the administration of Japan.”
American officials have also affirmed
support for Japan as an ally under the United States-Japan defense treaty. But
it’s clear that Beijing doesn’t buy that. Instead, China has concluded America
would stand back in an armed conflict, which is why it increasingly courts
confrontation with Japan so brazenly. China’s ships and aircraft regularly
patrol in areas claimed by Japan. Beijing’s declaration late last year of an
air defense zone covering the islands took the confrontation to a new level.
Only a formal and explicit statement from
President Obama laying out a new American policy will reduce the risk of a
crisis in the East China Sea. What should Mr. Obama say?
If America makes it clear it would not
support Japan in a fight with China, Tokyo’s confidence in the alliance will be
shattered. Japan would then face its own choice: Rearm to defend itself against
China without American help or submit to Chinese pre-eminence in Asia. Other
American allies would also reconsider their options. American leadership in
Asia would never be the same again. This is what China hopes will happen.
But a statement of unconditional support for
Japan would commit America to a potential war that it could not control and
probably would not win. We cannot assume China would simply back down: It has
too much at stake. China does not want a war with America, but Beijing probably
believes it could force a favorable draw. Ultimately, China is just as willing
to fight to change the Asian order as America is to preserve it, and perhaps
more willing.
Of course there are doves as well as hawks
in Beijing, but even the doves believe China should be reclaiming its place as
a great power in Asia. Beijing no longer thinks that American primacy is
essential for the stability that China itself needs. No one in China, not even
the more liberal-minded officials, believes that it’s their destiny to submit
to American leadership indefinitely.
When both of America’s options are so bad,
it is not surprising that the Obama administration finds it hard to articulate
a clear policy. That is why Washington’s signals have been mixed, with the
president remaining silent.
The fact is that, for America, these East
China Sea islands, called Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese, are not
worth a fight with China. Still, preserving the American alliance with Japan,
its regional leadership role and the whole Asian status quo are vital United
States interests.
There is a third way. An American policy
not to fight for the status quo does not have to lead inevitably to Chinese
hegemony in Asia. A new Asian security arrangement could be forged in which
America concedes a larger share of leadership to China but remains engaged to
balance and limit Chinese power and help uphold key norms — including the
all-important norm against the use or threat of force to settle disputes.
Ultimately this norm is more important than
any particular alliance. It is the foundation of America’s post-1945 vision of
international order. Washington should worry more about China’s willingness to
defy this norm in the East China Sea than about its determination to challenge
the United States-Japan alliance and change the regional order. America should
be willing to fight China to protect that norm. This makes Washington’s choice
a little clearer.
Mr. Obama should say that he is willing to
negotiate a new security arrangement in Asia that accords China a bigger share
of regional leadership, but only if China forgoes the use or threat of force to
compel such changes.
If China persists in threatening the use of
force, then America should be willing to fight, and must say so clearly. If
China is prepared to desist, then America should be willing to talk about
sharing power, and it should say that clearly, too.
We cannot know exactly how this kind of
regional power-sharing would work. It would have to be negotiated with China
and with the region’s other great powers. The best historical template
might be the Concert of Europe that kept the peace in Europe for the 100 years
until 1914 — based on principles of equality and power-sharing among
the big players.
Like Europe then, Asia today needs a new
arrangement in which no country has a unique leading role, and all the great
powers agree not to seek primacy over the others. All the big regional
questions would then have to be settled by negotiation between equals.
It would mean a lot of give and take. For
example, America might accept that China will eventually assert control over
Taiwan, and in return China could accept that it cannot make a territorial
claim over the whole South China Sea.
Proposing to share power in the Pacific
would not be easy for Mr. Obama (or for any American president). He’d face
tremendous resistance at home. But American hawks who would oppose negotiating
with China need to realize what’s at stake: The problem of China’s growing
ambitions can be solved through war or pre-emptive diplomacy.
This third way offers a realist solution.
And most important, addressing these issues now would be a lot easier than
confronting the choice that America could face any day if Chinese and Japanese
forces clash in the East China Sea.
Hugh White is professor of strategic
studies at the Australian National University and the author of “The China
Choice: Why We Should Share Power.”
