摘要:阿明认为哈特和内格里关于当前的全球资本主义政治已经发展成为“帝国”形式，反抗这种统治形式的文化为“大众”的政治文化等观点不符合历史唯物主义，也不符合当前的现实，存在理论上的巨大缺陷。
帝国还是帝国主义的新扩张
迈克尔•哈特和安东尼奥•内格里选择将当今的全球体系称为“帝国”（Empire）。他们这样的措辞选择是有意将其与“帝国主义”（imperialism）区别开来。在这种界定中，帝国主义将仅仅保留其政治含义，也就是说，一个国家的实际控制范围超越了它的国界，这样就把帝国主义和殖民主义混同了起来。那么无论是帝国主义还是殖民主义也就因此不复存在了。这一空洞的命题迎合了普通美国人的意识形态。美国人认为，和欧洲国家相比，美国从来没有为了自身利益而热衷于去建立一个殖民帝国，因此不能够算是“帝国主义”。正如布什所言，过去不是，今天自然也不会是。历史唯物主义传统基于对资本积累需求的不同，尤其是在资本占主导地位的领域，对现代世界提出了一种十分不同的分析。从全球层面看，这种分析使人们能够找到产生财富和权力的根源，并创立帝国主义的政治经济学。
哈特和内格里故意忽略已经对此做了论述的每一种学说，不管是马克思主义还是其他政治经济学学派。相反，他们吸收了莫里斯•迪韦尔热的法制主义或者盎格鲁—萨克逊经验主义中的庸俗政治学观点。因而，“帝国主义”成为了不同地域和时代不同“帝国”所共有的特征，比如古罗马帝国、奥斯曼帝国、英国或法国的殖民体系、奥匈帝国、俄罗斯以及苏联等等。然而，这些帝国又会因为一些“相似的原因”而必然走向坍塌。和任何一本严谨的历史读物相比，这种论述更像一则粗浅的新闻报道。但同时，它却迎合了当前（在“柏林墙倒塌”之后）的主流思潮。
毫无疑问，近20年来，资本主义和世界体系的演变在所有的领域中都已经发生了质的转变。认为科学和技术革命本身就能够产生全球性的经济和政治管理形式，这种管理形式最近超越了国家利益，因此，这种演变是积极的，——这种论述过于片面。资本的主导因素的确在朝世界性的资本主义方向发展，但控制这些因素的财团仍然是一些强大的“国家”（比如说，是美国、英国或者德国，但不会是还没有成为一个统一国家的“欧洲”）。此外，和过去一样，仅对经济体制进行再生产而不对“政治”领域作相应调整，那是不可思议的。资本主义经济是不能脱离“国家”而存在的，除非只是在意识形态领域和空洞的自由主义口号中。但时至今日，超越国界的“世界性”国家仍未出现。因此，关于全球化的主流话语所回避的真正问题涉及到资本主义主导因素（寡头垄断）全球积累的逻辑与这个体系中的“政治”管理之间的矛盾。
哈特和内格里的“帝国”体系源自主流话语所提出的关于全球化的幼稚的幻像。在这种幻像中，跨国化已经完全摧毁了帝国主义，取而代之的是一个中心无处不在而又无处所在的体系。这使中心与边缘的对立（对帝国主义关系的描述）已经完全被超越。哈特和内格里在此引用了传统的概念来解释，他们认为，既然“第三世界”中存在着“富有”的“第一世界”，并且第一世界中也存在贫穷的“第三世界”，那么，就没有理由再把第一世界和第三世界对立起来。当然，在印度有贫富之分，美国也是如此，因为我们仍然生活在阶级社会中，只是这个阶级社会被整合进了世界资本主义体系。但那意味着印度的社会构成和美国的是一样的吗？意味着一些推动世界变化的积极角色和其他只能“调整”以被动适应全球化体系需求的消极角色之间的差别没有意义吗？事实上，这个差别在今天比过去更有意义。1945—1980年期间，帝国主义国家与其控制下的国家之间支配与被支配关系体现为边缘的“发展”被提上议事日程，这为后者把自身界定为推动世界变革的积极力量打开了可能性。今天，这些关系已经猛然转变为对优势资本的青睐。发展的论调已经消失，并被“调整”取而代之。换句话说，当前的世界体系（“帝国”）并没有减少帝国主义的色彩，反而比过去更具帝国主义色彩。
哈特和内格里要是注意到占主导地位的资本的代理人所论述的东西，他们就会认识到这一点，可他们没有做到。美国的主要政党（民主党和共和党）对他们的计划的目的都毫不隐晦，那就是：垄断全球的自然资源，以使其奢靡的生活方式能得以延续，即使这损害了其他民族的利益；防止任何一个强大的或中等的力量成为能够挑战华盛顿意志的竞争者；通过全球性的军事控制来实现这些目标。
哈特和内格里只是简单地借用了主流思想的观点——伴随着“民族主义”和“共产主义”被彻底击败，一股全球性的自由主义浪潮的回归构成了发展的客观表现；如果这种体系有“不足之处”，也只能从其内在的逻辑联系中去加以修正，而不能横加抨击。因此，要理解内格里加入到欧洲大西洋主义者的行列并且为一个服务于华盛顿的极端自由主义体制的计划而鼓噪就非常容易了。但是，“民族主义”和“共产主义”的真实历史与自由主义者所宣传的内容相去甚远。由民族主义和共产主义所推动的西方社会民主主义福利国家、现实存在的社会主义国家和第三世界激进的民粹民族主义中的社会转型迫使资本对自身统治逻辑所引起的社会需求作出调整，并打击了帝国主义的野心。这些转型是巨大和十分积极的。由于那些事业从当代早期就开始有所偏离并且最后走向了失败，因此自由主义能够暂时卷土重来，但这不是一个“进步”，而是一条死路。
只有屏弃哈特和内格里的自由主义学说，当代世界的真正问题才能够被清楚地阐释。在这些问题上现在已经出现了一些重要并且互不相同的观点，尤其是在被哈特和内格里所忽略的新历史唯物主义学派中。在此我很乐意引用我对此问题的相关论述。在过去，帝国主义表现为帝国主义势力间的长期对抗。现在，垄断资本集中的增长已经使一个由美国、欧洲和日本组成的帝国主义“联合体”开始浮现。因此，在这个新的帝国主义体系中占主导地位的资本成分将在攫取利益的过程中共同进退。但是，这种体系单一的政治管理模式却是和国家的多样性相对立的。三合一（美国、欧洲和日本）中的内部矛盾并不是由垄断资本之间利益分歧产生的，而是与国家利益所代表的多样性有关。对此矛盾，一言以蔽之，那就是：经济使帝国主义体系中的不同国家联合起来，政治却使各国之间相互区隔。
大众——建设民主还是重塑资本的霸权
资本主义的自由主义意识形态崇尚个人优先的原则。在启蒙运动时期，所谓的个人必须是受过教育、拥有财产的个人，因此，资产阶级能够自由地运用理性。这可是一个不可磨灭的进步。但作为比资本主义更先进的运动，社会主义不能简单地被认为是一种对个人的否定。尽管被资本主义牢牢把持而显得狭隘，但资产阶级民主并不是“形式上的”，而是十分现实的，虽然它仍然不够完善。社会主义是民主的，也可能不是。我对此要作一点必要的补充：民主和社会进步不可分割。过去现实存在的社会主义国家对这一需求的确还不够尊重，并且它们认为没有民主或者像资本主义一样在内部实行狭隘的民主也可以实现社会进步。但是，也必须注意到，今天绝大多数民主的拥护者几乎没有更多的要求，并且他们认为，民主并不必然伴随着明显的社会进步，没有必要去质疑资本主义的法则。哈特和内格里有没有超越这种类型的自由主义民主呢？
把个人作为历史的主体是自由主义意识形态的一条根本原则。这种说法与史实是不相符合的，不管是对于早期的体系（启蒙运动时期并不关注个人）还是对于建立在阶级斗争基础上的资本主义体系来说，阶级才是历史的真正主体。但是个人有可能在今后更高级的社会主义社会成为历史的主体。
哈特和内格里认为我们已经走到了历史的转折点，此时阶级（和国家、民族一起）已经不再是历史的主体了。它们已经或正在被个人取而代之。在此转折点上就产生了他们所谓的“大众”，后者是根据“生产和创造的主体的总和”来加以界定的。
这个转折点为什么会出现以及会以何种方式出现？在这些问题上，哈特和内格里的表述十分含糊，并转而讨论其发展方向是“智型资本主义”还是“非物质生产”，是新兴的“网络化”社会还是“去疆域化”社会，并以福柯关于从规训社会向控制型社会转变的主张为引证。他们把过去30年中各种各样的观点都杂揉在一起，这使我们质疑：在这种思想的大杂烩中，究竟什么是新颖的并且重要的？
因此，我将提出另一个假设来说明“大众”这个创造。在我们所处的时代，许多20世纪兴起的关于工人、社会主义和民族解放的声势浩大的社会和政治运动都遭到了挫败。任何挫折所造成的信心的丧失，都将导致暂时的不安和仿理论的主张的大量出现，这种主张不仅可以使不安的状态合理化，而且可以使人相信这种不安是“世界大转型”的有效途径。
哈特和内格里对“大众”的论述，即便是非常精炼的概括，所体现的主张恰好证明他们已经陷入了思想困境。他们的第一个论断是关于民主的，按照他们的推测，民主政治在全球范围内成为了一种现实可能性，这在历史上还是第一次。此外，大众被他们界定为民主的“建构性”力量。这是一个极为幼稚的论断。我们是处在这样的一种趋势中吗？除了一些可以让自由主义势力（尤其是华盛顿）感到较为明显地满足的表面现象（这里或那里的一些选举）外，既是必需也是可能的民主正处于危机之中。宗教和原教旨主义的威胁使民主的合法性不断丧失，以一群恶棍代替另一群恶棍的选举所体现的究竟是民主进步还是一场人为操纵的闹剧？难道那些旨在控制全球的帝国主义计划的实践不是损害美国国内基本民主权利的根源吗？难道欧洲左右两派政治势力因之联合起来的自由主义共识不是在使选举程序非法化吗？哈特和内格里在这些问题上都选择了沉默。
他们的第二个论断是关于“大众的多样性”。他们对界定大众多样性构成的形式和内容既没有详细指明，也没有指出导致这种多样性产生或减少的动力。因此，在哈特和内格里的文章中充斥着很多矛盾。比如，根据他们的说法，当前的全球化进程可以减少中心和边缘之间的差异（但同时认为，全球化将仍然是帝国主义性质的）。但事实与他们的说法南辕北辙，现实世界的发展过程中格外强调“差异”，并且在全球范围内构建了对立。哈特和内格里所引证的体系内（事实上只存在于北美和西欧社会）的差异性的构成只是“差异”的一种：有种族或跨种族的“社区”（在美国偶见），有不同的宗教信仰或语言区域，同样也有阶级——或许应当在社会现实转变的基础上对其进行重新界定！即使把这些差异全部罗列出来，也不能说明什么问题。在社会制度的生产、再生产和转型的过程中，这些差异之间是如何相互联接起来的？在没有弄清楚所谓的“政治文化”概念之前，我们无法回答这些基本问题。在这些方面也有一些积极并且重要的研究成果。当然，它们存在争议，但不能被忽视。而哈特和内格里丝毫没有提出任何可以支持他们的论点的有力论证。
把个人当成历史的主体，而将大众视为民主事业的建构性力量，这种颠倒是一种“唯心主义”的发明。在现实的社会关系没有变化的前提下，它就假设这种颠倒在观念世界已经发生了。我并不认为意识总是客观世界被动的反映。基于上层建筑的某种自主性，我也认为意识可以超越它们的时代。这里的问题与此一般法则无关，它涉及到一些时下正流行的后现代主义观念（也包含哈特和内格里他们自己的观点）：他们是否走在时代前列？他们是否只是幼稚、糊涂的，在失败的时刻对现实妄言？在此条件下，“大众”也许就变成了多种多样、非决定性和杂乱无章的“差异”的实体构成。它表面上可以扮演着“现实力量”（比如成为选举的大多数）的角色。但是，从历史经验看，由于它注定要屈从于矛盾的相互联接的结构，所以只能是短暂的。和20世纪70年代工人主义兴起的原因类似，也像阿蒂略•波隆在《帝国与帝国主义》（2005）一书中所指出的那样，由于过于执着于片面的和暂时的因素，可以预见，在未来的几年，“大众”将会成为过眼烟云。
哈特和内格里的论述中所凸显的政治文化是美式的自由主义。这种政治文化把美国独立战争和当时制定的宪法视为现代性早期具有决定性意义的事件。作为哈特和内格里的灵感源泉，阿伦特这样叙述：独立战争开启了“不断追求政治自由”的新纪元。今天，“第一次在世界范围内”作为民主政治建构性力量的大众的出现，显示了“世界美国化”的胜利。
正如阿伦特在把美国独立战争和被她贬低为“对贫穷和不平等斗争不彻底”的法国革命对立起来时所清楚阐释的那样，对美式自由主义的推崇必然伴随着对其他国家发展道路的贬低。在冷战时期，所有像法国、俄罗斯、中国那样的声势浩大的现代革命都遭到了诋毁。根据已经在“二战”后成为了反革命利器的美国自由主义思想，这些革命因其“集权主义的倾向”从一开始就受到了损害。由于其早期的革命和宪法对资本主义发展的必要性没有丝毫怀疑，“美国模式”的惟一幸存实际上已经暗示：那些质疑资本主义生存的革命的遗产都会遭到清除。对法国大革命的谴责、一贯地反对苏维埃制度和对毛泽东思想的指责构成了政治文化中的反革命思想的主要成分。
现在，在这一领域，哈特和内格里仍然保持绝对沉默。他们有意忽视那些批评美国独立战争的文献，尽管其中大部分来自于美国。因为那些文献认为，由美国独立战争所确立的美国宪法早就系统性地对所有因“民众”因素而带来的威胁做了防范。这种防范措施是成功的，使得那些欧洲的反动分子十分羡慕。
被视为未来建构性力量的大众所“渴望的东西”已经变得非常少了，只剩下自由（尤其是对移民而言）以及获得一份有保障的社会收入的权利。为尽量避免超出美国自由主义所容许的范围，他们故意忽视工人运动和社会主义运动的历史遗产，尤其是美国的政治文化所排斥的平等。当执行的政策已经从根本上剥夺了公民权利的效力时，再鼓吹新出现的世界（和欧洲）民众有推动改革的力量就很难让人相信了。
建构一种替代当前全球自由资本主义体系的制度包含其他一些必要条件，特别是认识到世界各地民众阶级需求的巨大差异性。事实上，哈特和内格里也觉得要设想一个占总人口85％的边缘社会是非常困难的。如何在世界不同国家和地区的各种具体而特殊的条件下建立一个民主和进步的替代策略和方法，他们从来就没有对这些讨论表示出任何兴趣。打比方说，难道由美国干涉而推动形成的“民主”能够超越像乌克兰那样的选举闹剧吗？有谁能剥夺全世界的“穷人”、“移民”到富裕的西方的权利吗？一份有保障的社会收入也许才是合理的需要。但谁又会天真到相信一旦那样做就会破坏资本借以雇用、剥削和压迫劳动的资本主义生产关系，从而使工人能够自由使用资本并使其创造性潜能得到实现呢？
把历史主体缩减为“个人”，并且又把许多个人结合成为“大众”，这错置了重新界定历史主体这一划时代问题。我们能够拿出许多重要的文献去对抗哈特和内格里在此主题上的沉默。的确，历史上的社会主义和共产主义运动曾经有把现代史的主体缩减为“工人阶级”的倾向。这就成了工人主义的内格里的谴责对象。相应地，我已经提出了对形成于特殊社会团体中的历史主体的分析，这种历史主体在持续的民众抗争阶段能够有效地转变社会力量关系，使其有益于受压迫的阶级和民族。
目前，应对这一挑战意味着我们正在迈向一个民主的、大众的、民族的霸权集团行列，这一集团能战胜霸权帝国主义集团和霸权买办集团。行列中的这些集团都是在一些具体环境中产生的，各国之间差异很大，以至于不存在一个真正意义上的通用模式（不管是“大众”的形式还是其他）。因此，就像对民族、国家和人民的自治的强调有可能建构一种得到多方认可的全球化，以取代由占统治地位的资本强加的单极的全球化，并会逐渐瓦解当前的帝国主义体系一样，民主发展和社会进步的结合也将成为向世界社会主义长期转变过程中的一部分。毫无疑问，对这些问题的深入研究将远比讨论“大众”究竟是什么更有意义。
帝国和大众这两种政治文化谁将胜出
今天流行的是“文化主义”。这是人们基于想像中的一些文化因素，尤其是宗教和种族因素而萌生的关于人类多样性的图景。“社群主义”的发展和对“多元文化主义”的认同都是这一历史图景的产物。这一图景不属于历史唯物主义的传统，后者试图将现代的阶级斗争和全球资本主义条件下民众参与的形式和条件结合起来。这些分析能够使我们明白各国所选择的道路的差异，并分清在不同社会和全球体系层面存在着的矛盾的特殊性。这些分析的核心就是我所说的现代世界中民族政治文化的形成。
我在此提出的问题涉及哈特和内格里著作中提到的政治文化。它属于历史唯物主义传统或者文化主义吗？对此，我曾经在我撰写的《自由主义的病毒》（2004）一书中做过论述，那是一本探讨“欧洲”和美国两种民族政治文化形成途径的书。在此，我只能扼要地阐述一下我的看法。
欧洲大陆的政治文化的形成是一系列重大事件的产物：启蒙运动和现代性的发明、法国大革命、工人运动和社会主义运动的发展、马克思主义的出现以及俄国革命。这一系列事件的发展当然不能保证由这些重大事件所催生并延续下来的“左翼”势力将在欧洲社会掌握政权。但它的确在欧洲大陆造成了左右两派对立的政治格局。在法国和俄国革命后，反革命势力复辟了，它们从世俗主义中撤出，与贵族和宗教势力达成妥协，向自由主义民主发起挑战。它成功地诱使民众关注和支持以垄断资本为核心的帝国主义计划，激发了民族沙文主义意识形态，这种情况在1914年前夕达到了巅峰。
促使美国政治文化格局形成的一系列重大事件与欧洲相比差别很大，这些事件包括：反启蒙运动的新教教派在新英格兰地区的确立、殖民地的资产阶级特别是有统治权的奴隶主阶层对美国独立战争的操控、民众和资产阶级联盟为了开疆扩土所导致的对北美印第安人的大屠杀以及大批追捧“社群主义”并以此阻挠社会主义政治意识成熟的移民潮的涌入。这些重大事件发展的显著特征是右翼的长期统治，这使美国成为“最坚定”的发展资本主义的国家。
今天，决定人类未来的主要战役之一围绕欧洲的“美国化”而展开。它的目标是废黜欧洲的文化和政治传统，并用美国的那一套取而代之。这一极端反动的做法正是今日欧洲占统治地位的政治力量作出的选择，并且在欧盟宪法中已经有了完美的体现。其他战役在资本占主导地位的“北方”与受帝国主义侵害的占世界总人口85％的“南方”之间展开。哈特和内格里忽视了这两场战役中的利害关系。
他们对美国“民主”盲目的鼓吹与那些被他们以“反美主义”为由而预先排除掉的北美社会评论家的著述形成了鲜明对比。我在此只推荐阿纳托尔•列文（Anatol Lieven）的一本书：《是对是错：美国民族主义剖析》（2004）。尽管我们的意识形态和理论的出发点不同，但主要结论却一致。列文分析了美国的政治传统的根源。在这方面，美国社会和巴基斯坦而不是英国相似。此外，美国的政治文化是征服西部的产物。这就导致它们把所有其他民族都视为“红皮肤人”——后者的生存必须不损害美国的利益。美国统治阶级的新帝国主义计划需要进一步加强侵略性的民族主义，使其成为主导的意识形态，同时唤起欧洲1914年的情景而不是现在的情景。因此，美国并不是在每一个层面都比“老欧洲”“超前”，相反还落后一个世纪。这就是为什么“美国模式”受到右翼以及包括哈特和内格里在内的左翼人士青睐的原因，后者目前已经被自由主义同化了。
在帝国（帝国主义已经过时）和大众（个人已经成为历史主体）这两个论点之外，哈特和内格里的著述还透露出一种消极放任的腔调。他们认为，在现阶段资本主义发展的紧要关头，除了屈从以外，没有其他的选择。我们只有完全融入资本主义，才能战胜它毁灭性的后果。这是对一个失利的历史时刻的阐释，这一时刻还没有被超越。这同时也是自由主义派战胜社会民主派、大西洋派战胜亲欧派的话语。左翼的复兴需要与这类型的话语作彻底的决裂。
［段欣毅：数据通信科学技术研究所］
11/2005| Samir Amin | Monthly Review 2005, Volume 57, Issue 06 (Norvember)
Post-Imperialist Empire or Renewed Expansion of Imperialism?
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have chosen to call the current global system “Empire.”* Their choice of that term is intended to distinguish its essential constituent characteristics from those that define “imperialism.” Imperialism in this definition is reduced to its strictly political dimension, i.e., the extension of the formal power of a state beyond its own borders, thereby confusing imperialism with colonialism. Colonialism therefore no longer exists, neither does imperialism. This hollow proposition panders to the common American ideological discourse according to which the United States, in contrast to the European states, never aspired to form a colonial empire for its own benefit and thus could never have been “imperialist” (and thus is not today anymore than yesterday, as Bush reminds us). The historical materialist tradition proposes a very different analysis of the modern world, centered on identification of the requirements for the accumulation of capital, particularly of its dominant segments. Taken to the global level, this analysis thus makes it possible to discover the mechanisms that produce the polarization of wealth and power and construct the political economy of imperialism.
Hardt and Negri studiously ignore every analysis that has been written in this regard, not only by Marxists but also by other schools of political economy. Instead, they take up the legalism of a Maruice Duverger or the vulgar political science of Anglo-Saxon empiricism. Thus “imperialism” becomes a common characteristic shared across space and time by various “Empires,” such as the Roman, Ottoman, British or French colonial, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Soviet. The inevitable collapse of these empires is related to “analogous causes.” This is much closer to a superficial journalism than to any serious reading of history. But again, they pander to the current fashion (after “the fall of the Berlin Wall”).
There is no question that the evolution of capitalism and the world system in the course of the last twenty years has involved qualitative transformations in all areas. It is another thing to subscribe to the dominant discourse according to which the “scientific and technological” revolution will, by itself, produce forms of economic and political management of the planet that “surpass” those associated, until recently, with the defense of “national interests” and, further, that this evolution would be “positive.” This discourse proceeds on the basis of serious simplifications. The dominant segments of capital indeed operate in the transnational space of world capitalism, but control of these segments remains in the hands of financial groups still strongly “national” (i.e., based in the United States or Great Britain or Germany, but not yet in a “Europe” that does not exist as such on this level). Moreover, the economic reproduction of the system is, today as yesterday, unthinkable without the parallel implementation of the “politics” that modulate its variants. The capitalist economy does not exist without a “state,” except in the ideological and empty vulgate of liberalism. There is still no transnational, “world” state. The true questions, evaded by the dominant discourse of globalization, concern the contradictions between the logics of the globalized accumulation of central capitalism’s dominant segments (the “oligopolies”) and those governing the “politics” of the system.
Hardt and Negri’s system, presented under the pleasant-sounding term “Empire,” proceeds, then, from the naïve vision of globalization offered by the dominant discourse. In this vision, transnationalization has already abolished imperialism (and imperialism in conflict), replacing it with a system in which the center is both nowhere and everywhere. The center/periphery opposition (that defines the imperialist relation) is already “surpassed.” Hardt and Negri here take up the commonplace discourse in which, since there is a “first world” of “wealth” in the “third world” and a “third world” of poverty in the first, there is no point in opposing the first and third worlds to each other. Certainly there are wealthy and poor in India, just as in the United States, since we all still live in class divided societies integrated into world capitalism. Does that mean that the social formations of India and the United States are identical? Does the distinction between the active role of some in shaping the world and the passive role of others, who can only “adjust” to the requirements of the globalized system, have no meaning? In reality, this distinction is more pertinent today than ever. In the earlier phase of contemporary history (1945–1980), the relations of force between the imperialist countries and the dominated countries were such that the “development” of the peripheries was on the agenda, leaving open the possibility for the latter to assert themselves as active agents in the transformation of the world. Today these relations have changed dramatically in favor of dominant capital. The discourse of development has disappeared and been replaced by that of “adjustment.” In other words, the current world system (the “Empire”) is not less imperialist but more imperialist than its predecessor!
Hardt and Negri would have realized this if they had only taken note of what the representatives of dominant capital have written. As incredible as it may appear, they have not done that at all. However, all major parts of the U.S. establishment (Democrats and Republicans) make no secret of the objectives of their plan: to monopolize access to the planet’s natural resources in order to continue their wasteful mode of life, even if this is to the detriment of other peoples; to prevent any large or mid-sized power from becoming a competitor capable of resisting Washington’s orders; and to achieve these aims by military control of the planet.
Hardt and Negri have simply taken up the current discourse in which, “nationalism” and “communism” having been definitively defeated, the return of a globalized liberalism constitutes objective progress. The “insufficiencies” of the system, if there are any, can only be corrected from within the logic of the system itself and not by combating it. Thus it is easy to understand the reasons why Negri has joined the ranks of Atlanticist Europe and called for supporting its project of an ultra-liberal constitution subservient to Washington. But the real history of “nationalism” and “communism” has nothing in common with what liberal propaganda says about it. The social transformations inspired by nationalism and communism across three decades in the welfare state of the western social democracies, in the countries of really existing socialism, and in the experiences of radical national populism in the third world forced capital to make adjustments to the social demands arising from the logic of its own domination and pushed back the ambitions of imperialism. These transformations were huge and largely positive despite the limits imposed by the insufficiently radical character of the projects in question. The (provisional) return of liberalism made possible by the erosion and then collapse of the projects from the preceding period of contemporary history is not a “step forward,” but a dead end.
The true questions concerning the contemporary world can only be formulated by abandoning Hardt and Negri’s liberal discourse. Important and, of course, diverse theses have been produced on these questions, among others from the perspective of a renewed historical materialism, which Hardt and Negri ignore. I will be satisfied here with recalling the broad outlines of the theses I have proposed on the subject. In the past, imperialism appeared as the permanent conflict among the imperialist powers (in the plural). The growing centralization of oligopolistic capital has now given rise to the emergence of a “collective” imperialism of the triad (the United States, Europe, and Japan). In this respect, the dominant segments of capital share common interests in the management of their profit from this new imperialist system. But the unified political management of this system comes up against the plurality of states. The contradictions within the triad have to do not with the divergence of interests among the dominant oligopolistic capitals but with the diversity of interests represented by the states. I have summarized this contradiction in a phrase: the economy unites the partners of the imperialist system, politics divide the nations concerned.
The Multitude—Constituting Democracy or Reproducing Capital’s Hegemony?
The liberal ideology specific to capitalism places the individual in the forefront. It does not matter that in its historical construction during the Enlightenment the individual in question had to be an educated and property-owning man, a bourgeois capable, as a result, of making free use of Reason. This was an indestructible liberating advance. As a movement beyond capitalism, socialism cannot be conceived of as a return to the past, as a negation of the individual. Bourgeois democracy, despite the narrow limits in which capitalism encloses it, is not “formal,” but quite real, even if it remains incomplete. Socialism will be democratic or it will not be. But I add to this phrase its necessary complement: there will be no more democratic progress without calling capitalism into question. Democracy and social progress are inseparable. The really existing socialisms of the past certainly did not respect this requirement and thought they could achieve progress without democracy or with as little democracy as in capitalism itself. But it is also necessary to add that the great majority of democracy’s defenders today are hardly more demanding and think that democracy is possible without any visible social progress, let alone calling into question the principles of capitalism. Do Hardt and Negri leave this category of liberal democracy behind?
The individualist basis of liberal ideology establishes the individual as the subject of history in the last resort. That assertion is not true, neither for the history of earlier systems (which by the Enlightenment definition were unaware of the individual) nor even for the history of capitalism, which is a system based on the conflict between classes, the true subjects of this chapter of history. But the individual would be able to become the subject of history in a future advanced socialism.
Hardt and Negri think that we have arrived at this historical turning point, that classes (along with nations or peoples) are no longer the subjects of history. Instead the individual has become such (or is in the process of becoming such). This turning point gives rise to the formation of what they call the “multitude,” defined in terms of the “totality of productive and creative subjectivities.”
Why and how would this turning point occur? Hardt and Negri’s texts are quite vague on these questions. They talk about the transition to “cognitive capitalism” or the emergence of “immaterial production,” the new “networked” society or “deterritorialization.” They make reference to Foucault’s propositions concerning the transition from the disciplinary society to the society of control. Everything that has been said over the past thirty years, whether good or bad, depending on one’s viewpoint, whether indisputable because platitudinous or strongly debatable, is thrown pell-mell into a great pot in preparation for the future. A compendium of current fashions does not easily lead to conviction. The similarity to the theses formulated by Manuel Castells concerning the “networked society” and to the ideas popularized by Jeremy Rifkin, Robert B. Reich, and other American popularizers is such that one is entitled to pose the question: what is new and important in all this hodgepodge of ideas?
I will propose then another hypothesis to account for the invention of the “multitude” in question. Our moment is one of defeat for the powerful social and political movements that shaped the twentieth century (workers’, socialist, and national liberation movements). The loss of perspective that any defeat involves leads to ephemeral unrest and the profusion of para-theoretical propositions that both legitimate that unrest and give rise to the belief that it constitutes an “effective” means for “transforming the world” (even without wanting to), in the good sense of the term moreover. One can only gradually solidify new formulations that are both coherent and effective by distancing oneself from the past, rather than proposing a “remake” of it, and by effectively integrating new realities produced by social evolution in all its dimensions. Such contributions, both debatable and diverse, certainly exist. I do not include Hardt and Negri’s discourse among them.
The propositions that Hardt and Negri draw from their discourse on the “multitude” bear witness, even in their very formulation, to the impasse in which they are trapped. The first of these propositions concerns democracy that, for the first time in history, is supposedly on the verge of becoming a real possibility on the global scale. Moreover, the multitude is defined as the “constitutive” force of democracy. This is a wonderfully naïve proposition. Are we moving in this direction? Beyond a few superficial appearances (some elections here or there), which obviously satisfy the liberal powers (particularly Washington), democracy—both necessary and possible—is in crisis. It is threatened with losing its legitimacy to the advantage of religious or ethnic fundamentalisms (I do not consider the ethnocratic regimes of the former Yugoslavia as democratic progress!). Do elections that overturn the power of one criminal gang (for example, one in the service of the Russian autocracy) to replace it with another one (financed by the CIA!) constitute progress for democracy or a manipulated farce? Is not the unfolding of the imperialist project for control of the planet at the origin of the frontal attacks that are reducing basic democratic rights in the United States? Is not the liberal consensus in Europe, around which the major political forces of right and left have united, in the process of delegitimizing electoral procedures? Hardt and Negri are silent on all these questions.
The second proposition concerns the “diversity of the multitude.” But the forms and contents that define the (diverse) components of the multitude are barely specified any more than are the forces that produce and/or reduce this diversity. Major contradictions consequently traverse all of Hardt and Negri’s texts. For example, the current globalization, according to them, is supposed to reduce the “differences” between centers and peripheries (otherwise this globalization would remain imperialist). The real world is evolving in the exact opposite direction by accentuating “differences” and constructing apartheid on a world scale. The diversity within the local components of the system cited by Hardt and Negri (in fact only in North American and Western European societies) is itself of a “diverse” nature: there are (sometimes, as in the United States) ethnic or para-ethnic “communities,” there are diverse religious or linguistic regions, there are also classes, perhaps (!), that it would be good to redefine on the basis of the transformation of social realities! Even when all these diversities have been lined up, nothing much has been said. How are they articulated with one another in the production, reproduction, and transformation of social systems? It is impossible to respond to these fundamental questions without conceptualizing what I call “political cultures.” There are serious and positive contributions in these areas also. Certainly, they are debatable, but they cannot be ignored. Hardt and Negri have contributed nothing here that one can mention in support of their thesis.
The reversal establishing the individual as the subject of history and the multitude as the constitutive force of its democratic project is an “idealist” invention. It supposes that a reversal has occured in the world of ideas without a transformation of real social relations. I am not suggesting here that ideas are always only passive reflections of reality. I have developed the opposite point of view, founded on the recognition of the autonomy of “instances.” Ideas can be in advance of their time. The question here does not concern this general proposition. It concerns postmodernist ideas in vogue today (inclusive of the ideas of Hardt and Negri themselves): are they in advance of their time? Or are they only the naïve, confused, and contradictory expression of the reality of the moment, a moment of defeat not yet surpassed? In these conditions the “multitude” may become a constitutive reality of indecisive, various, and disjointed “diversities.” It can take on the appearance of acting as a “real force” (a strong electoral majority, for example). But this is no more than ephemeral, destined to give way to a contradictory articulated structure, as always in history. In several years, the page of the “multitude” will probably have turned, as happened with the workerism (opéraïsme) of the 1970s and for the same reason: the fixation on the partial and the ephemeral, as noted by Atilio Boron in Empire and Imperialism (Zed Books, 2005).
The political culture that stands out behind Hardt and Negri’s discourse is that of American liberalism. This political culture considers the American Revolution and the Constitution adopted at that time as the decisive event in the opening of modernity. Hannah Arendt, the inspiration for Hardt and Negri, writes that this revolution opens the era of the “unlimited quest for political liberty.” Today, the emergence of the multitude, the constitutive force of a democracy “possible for the first time on the world scale,” crowns the (positive) victory of the “Americanization of the world.”
The rallying to American liberalism is necessarily accompanied by the devaluation of the different paths of other nations, in particular of “old Europe,” as formulated by Hannah Arendt when she counterposed the American Revolution to the “limited struggle against poverty and inequality” to which she reduces the French Revolution. In the Cold War era, all the great revolutions of modern times (French, Russian, and Chinese) had to be denigrated. They were vitiated from the beginning by their “totalitarian tendency,” according to the American liberal discourse that became the spearhead of the counterrevolution after the Second World War. The exclusive survival of the “American model,” whose pioneering revolution and constitution did not question any of the necessities of capitalist development, implied that the heritage of those revolutions that had indeed questioned capitalist exigencies (as was the case beginning with the Jacobin radicalization of the French Revolution) was repudiated. The denunciation of the French Revolution (François Furet), banal anti-Sovietism, and the charges brought against Maoism constitute some of the major planks of this counterrevolution in political culture.
Now in this area Hardt and Negri remain utterly silent. They systematically ignore all the critical literature (a large part of it from the United States, moreover) on the American Revolution that established a long time ago that the Constitution of the United States was systematically constructed to rule out all danger of a “popular” deviation. The success in this sense is real, arousing the envy of all the European reactionaries who never succeeded in doing it (Giscard d’Estaing said that the constitution of the ultra-liberal European project was “as good” as the U.S. Constitution!).
The “aspirations” of the multitude established as the constitutive force of the future are reduced to very little: freedom, particularly to emigrate, and the right to a socially guaranteed income. In the undoubted care not to venture outside what is permitted by American liberalism, the project deliberately ignores everything that could be qualified as the heritage of the workers’ and socialist movement, in particular the equality rejected by the political culture of the United States. It is difficult to believe in the transformative power of an emerging global (and European) citizenship while the policies implemented fundamentally deprive citizenship of its effectiveness.
The construction of a real alternative to the contemporary system of globalized liberal capitalism involves other requirements, in particular the recognition of the gigantic variety of needs and aspirations of the popular classes throughout the world. In fact, Hardt and Negri experience much difficulty in imagining the societies of the periphery (85 percent of the human population). The debates concerning the tactics and strategy of building a democratic and progressive alternative that would be effective in the concrete and specific conditions of the different countries and regions of the world never appear to have interested them. Would the “democracy” promoted by the intervention of the United States permit going beyond an electoral farce like the one in the Ukraine, for example? Can one reduce the rights of the “poor” who people the planet to the right to “emigrate” to the opulent West? A socially guaranteed income may be a justifiable demand. But can one have the naiveté to believe that its adoption would abolish the capitalist relation, which allows capital to employ labor (and, consequently, to exploit and oppress it), to the advantage of the worker who would from that point on be in a position to use capital freely and so be able to affirm the potential of his or her creativity?
The reduction of the subject of history to the “individual” and the uniting of such individuals into a “multitude” dispose of the true questions concerning the reconstruction of subjects of history equal to the challenges of our era. One could point to many other important contributions to oppose to the silence of Hardt and Negri on this subject. Undoubtedly, historic socialisms and communisms had a tendency to reduce the major subject of modern history to the “working class.” Moreover, this is a reproach that could be leveled at the Negri of workerism. In counterpoint, I have proposed an analysis of the subject of history as formed from particular social blocs capable, in successive phases of popular struggle, of effectively transforming the social relations of force to the advantage of the dominated classes and peoples.
At the present time, to take up the challenge implies that one is moving forward in the formation of democratic, popular, and national hegemonic blocs capable of overcoming the powers exercised by both the hegemonic imperialist blocs and the hegemonic comprador blocs. The formation of such blocs takes place in concrete conditions that are very different from one country to another so that no general model (whether in the style of the “multitude” or some other) makes sense. In this perspective, the combination of democratic advances and social progress will be part of the long transition to world socialism, just as the affirmation of the autonomy of peoples, nations, and states will make it possible to substitute a negotiated globalization for the unilateral globalization imposed by dominant capital (which Empirepraises!) and thus gradually deconstruct the current imperialist system. The deepening of debates on these real questions is, without a doubt, far more promising than pursuing the examination of what the “multitude” could be.
Is the Political Culture of Empire and Multitude Equal to the Challenge?
The fashion today is “culturalism,” a vision of human plurality founded on some supposed cultural invariants, particularly religious and ethnic. The development of “communitarianism” and the invitation to recognize “multiculturalism” are the products of this vision of history. Such a vision is not that of the historical materialist tradition, which attempts to articulate the class struggles of modern times with the forms and conditions of the participation of peoples affected by the system of globalized capitalism. The analyses produced within the context of these questions make it possible to understand the variety of paths traveled by different nations and to identify the specificity of the contradictions that exist within the societies in question and at the level of the global system. These analyses, then, revolve around what I call the formation of the political cultures of the peoples of the modern world.
The question I pose here concerns the political culture underlying the writings of Hardt and Negri. Does it lie within the historical materialist tradition or in that of culturalism? I proposed in my book The Liberal Virus (Monthly Review Press, 2004) a reading of two itineraries “European,” on the one hand, and American, on the other, forming the political cultures of the peoples in question. I will only very briefly recall the broad outlines of my argument here.
The formation of the political culture of the European continent is the product of a succession of formative great moments: the Enlightenment and invention of modernity; the French Revolution; the development of the workers’ and socialist movement and the emergence of Marxism; and the Russian Revolution. This succession of advances certainly did not ensure that the successive “lefts” produced by these moments would assume the political management of European societies. But it did form the right/left contrast on the continent. The triumphant counterrevolution imposed restorations (after the French and Russian Revolutions), a retreat from secularism, compromises with aristocracies and churches, and challenges to liberal democracy. It successfully induced the peoples concerned to support the imperialist projects of dominant capital and, to this end, mobilized the chauvinistic nationalist ideologies that experienced their greatest glory on the eve of 1914.
The succession of moments constitutive of the political culture of the United States is quite different. These moments are: the establishment in New England of anti-Enlightenment Protestant sects; control of the American Revolution by the colonial bourgeoisie, in particular by its dominant slave-holding faction; the alliance of the people with that bourgeoisie, founded on the expansion of the frontiers that, in turn, led to the genocide of the Indians; and the succession of waves of immigrants that frustrated the maturation of a socialist political consciousness and substituted “communitarianism” for it. This succession of events is strongly marked by the permanent dominance of the right, which made the United States the “surest” country for the unfolding of capitalism.
Today one of the major battles that will decide the future of humanity turns around the “Americanization” of Europe. Its objective is to destroy the European cultural and political heritage and substitute for it the one that is dominant in the United States. This ultra-reactionary option is that of the dominant political forces in Europe today and has found a perfect translation in the project of the European constitution. The other battle is that between the “North” of dominant capital and the “South,” the 85 percent of humanity who are the victims of the imperialist project of the triad. Hardt and Negri ignore the stakes in these two decisive battles.
The ill-considered praise that they make of American “democracy” strongly contrasts with the writings of analysts critical of North American society, rejected up front because their “anti-Americanism” disqualifies them (in the eyes of whom? the American establishment?). I will cite here only Anatol Lieven’s America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism(Oxford University Press, 2004) whose conclusions largely coincide with mine despite our different ideological and scientific starting points. Lieven links the American democratic tradition (the reality of which no one would contest) to the obscurantist origins of the country (which is perpetuated and reproduced by successive waves of immigrants). U.S. society in this respect ends up resembling Pakistan much more than Great Britain. Further, the political culture of the United States is a product of the conquest of the West (which leads to considering all other peoples as “redskins” who have the right to live only on condition of not hindering the United States). The new imperialist project of the U.S. ruling class requires a redoubling of an aggressive nationalism, which henceforth becomes the dominant ideology and recalls the Europe of 1914 rather than the Europe of today. On every level, the United States is not “in advance” of “old Europe,” but a century behind. This is why the “American model” is favored by the right and unfortunately by segments of the left, including Hardt and Negri, who have been won over to liberalism at the present time.
Beyond the two theses of Empire (“imperialism is outmoded”) and Multitude (“the individual has become the subject of history”), Hardt and Negri’s discourse exhibits a tone of resignation. There is no alternative to submission to the exigencies of the current phase of capitalist development. One will only be able to combat its damaging consequences by becoming integrated into it. This is the discourse of our moment of defeat, a moment that has not yet been surpassed. This is the discourse of social democracy won over to liberalism, of pro-Europeans won over to Atlanticism. The renaissance of a left worthy of the name, capable of inspiring and implementing progress for the benefit of the people, requires a radical rupture with discourses of this type.
Notes
*Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) andMultitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004). These authors do not directly take up a great number of fundamental issues of “what is new” in capitalism, such as those concerning “cognitive” or financial capitalism, the organization of work and production, and geopolitics. I want to make clear that I do not reproach them for that, but only for having drawn unwarranted conclusions in support of their ideas from these unexamined new developments. Very different readings of the transformations in question exist that I will discuss on other occasions. Empire was written before September 11, 2001, which does not justify in any way Hardt and Negri’s acceptance of Washington’s vulgar propaganda discourse, claiming that it intervenes only at popular request, for humanitarian reasons, for the defense of democracy—without the least consideration of self-serving material interests!
