北京-最近，我和芝加哥大学政治学者约翰•米尔斯海默就“中国能否和平崛起”一题展开辩论。在新领导人习近平带领下，中国的外交政策似乎变得更加自信果断，国际国内对此评论不断。我们的辩论就是在这样的情况下展开的。
确实，太平洋地区并非一切都好。中日在东海和钓鱼岛的局势正紧；中菲南海争端已经持续两年，仍不见尽头。很多中国人怀疑是否遭超级大国遏制，美国的“重返亚太”战略给了他们确切答案，并且鼓动中国周边敌对国家扩大紧张形势。最近，中国宣布划设东海防空识别区，部分国家称之为挑衅行为。
米尔斯海默因其“进攻性现实主义”理论闻名。他提出了一个假设：中国这个大国继续崛起，将有可能（若不是必然）产生军事冲突。他的预测基于历史先例。他认为，在这个没有最高统治者的无序世界，没有一个国家能够保证不对其他国家心存企图，唯一的生存之道就是最大化一个国家自身的相对实力。
美国先取得了地区霸权，由此再崛起为超级大国。门罗宣言首先描述了这一战略。这个年轻的国家逐渐强大，并通过军事手段实行其外交政策，针对的是周边所有国家，从加拿大到墨西哥，以至整个拉美甚至更大的区域。
接着是不断击败全球挑战者，从德国、日本，到苏联。美国走向世界主导地位的道路是由数不清的战争铺就的。为了保持全球霸权，美国必将阻止中国主导亚太。而另一方面，中国必然要将美国逐出后院，寻求区域霸权。
在这样分析中，简单地定义美国是主导性超级大国、中国是挑战者，这会使国际关系面向战争，即结果的最终决定性因素。
阎学通和米尔斯海默就“中国能否和平崛起”展开辩论
我同意米尔斯海默的理论假说，但不同意他的预测。就像美国崛起没有走英法的殖民扩张老路那样，中国也会利用不同的战略以获取全球领导地位。在核武器和全球化时代，中国不得不在崛起战略上有所创新。
习近平主席已经向世界传递信息，中国会在未来外交政策上作出战略性变化。1990年代初以来，两个主要原则引领着中国外交政策。一个是邓小平的“韬光养晦”，另一个是以美国为重中之重。
中国对美国及其邻国之间的矛盾持中立态度，甚至有时站在美国一边。这意味着，在过去二十年左右的时间里，中国独立于世界舞台之上，是一个没有盟友的完全中立的国家，努力避免制造敌对国家，在美国主导全球体系的阴影下专注于国内发展。
在近期的几次讲话中，习近平描绘了一个不同的战略方向。中国“奋发有为”的外交政策将吸引周边国家，慢慢地，他们的利益将于中国的崛起相一致。习近平特别强调了中国和周边国家的友谊。这种变化比它听起来更重要。
在无敌无友的外交政策框架下，中国走了二十多年。中国的经济发展是首要的，凡是对于中国维持一个有利于经济发展的外部环境有所助益的国家，除了几个例外，其他所有国家基本上都受到了同等对待。这样的情况再也无法实现。
在习近平领导下，中国将开始区别对待盟友和敌国。对于那些愿意在中国崛起中起建设性作用的国家，中国会让他们从其发展中得到更大的实际利益。
通过将某些国家的激励和中国的发展捆绑在一起，中国将寻求同一些重要周边国家建立命运共同体。我们应当期待，这些倡议能够包含经济利益之外的更广的战略性因素。强大的政治维度是必需的。最终，甚至会延伸到给某些国家提供安全保障。
新的领导集体特别提出三个战略集中领域：中亚“新丝绸之路”，东南亚海上丝绸之路，以及连接印度、缅甸和孟加拉国的经济走廊。在这些区域的国家应该期待看到，中国有更大的意愿用实质性的经济、安全及其他利益来保证周边国家的政治支持。
二十多年来，甚至连那些支持中国的国家也不指望和中国成为盟友，以备不时之需，因为中国不会做出任何结盟承诺。未来，中国会果断在经济和安全领域帮助那些支持它的国家。相反，那些敌对国家则将面临更多制裁和孤立政策。
中国的区域新外交政策将提供更多的战略选择和足够的机会，避免像一个世纪前的美国那样，通过武力获取区域主导权。
当然，还有最重要的中美关系。很多人说，当今世界事务的主要风险在于，国与国之间完全缺乏互信。我认为，信任不是相对和平环境的先决条件。
自1989年以来，中美就没有相互信任过，并且未来也不太可能互信。但是利益会是中美关系的形成基础。中国已经有了很大发展，世界也有了巨大变化，复杂的利益网络将两个国家连结在一起，虽然不是盟友，但也不会是敌人。
虽然中国和美国是两个战略竞争对手，但他们之间仍有共同利益、互补利益，当然还有冲突性利益。这样的复杂性给两国提供了利益一致时积极合作的空间，以及利益相悖时防御性合作的尺度。
中国的崛起也许是现代世界最重要的事。没有人能够准确预测其长远影响。军事冲突的风险无疑存在。但至少对下一代来说，和平的战略选择足够了。习近平的新外交政策虽然更加自信果断了，但会让中国走上一条更有利于和平的道路。
（观察者网张苗凤/译。翻页请看英文原文）
China's New Foreign Policy: Not
Conflict But Convergence Of Interests
Posted: 01/28/2014 8:16 am
This article is an extract from the Chinese version published by Guancha.cn.
Yan Xuetong is Dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University and the Chief Editor of The Chinese Journal of International Politics. Yan's views are considered to closely reflect those of the Chinese leadership.
BEIJING -- Recently, I debated the University of Chicago political theorist John Mearsheimer on the question of "Can China Rise Peacefully?" That debate took place amid torrents of international and domestic commentaries on China's seemingly more assertive foreign policy approach under the nation's new leader Xi Jinping.
Indeed, all is not well in the Pacific. Tensions are intensifying between China and Japan in the East China Sea over Diaoyu Island. Confrontations with the Philippines in the South China Sea have been two years in the running with no end in sight. America's "pivot" to Asia Pacific has confirmed to many Chinese their suspicion of containment by the superpower and emboldened China's adversaries in the region to escalate tensions. The most recent incident was China's declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone, which some have called provocative.
Mearsheimer, known for his "offensive realism" theory, put forth a hypothesis that, as China continues its rise as a great power, military conflicts are probable if not inevitable. He based his predictions on historic precedents. In a disorderly world without a supreme ruler, the theory goes, no nation can be sure of the intentions of other nations and the only way of survival is to maximize a nation's own relative strength.
The United States rose to superpower status by first achieving regional hegemony. This strategy was first articulated by the Monroe doctrine. As the young nation grew in strength the strategy was implemented by military conquests against virtually all of its neighbors from Canada to Mexico to almost all of Latin America and beyond.
It was followed by continuously defeating global challengers from Germany to Imperial Japan to the Soviet Union. America's path to world dominance was paved by countless wars. To maintain its global hegemony, America will necessarily seek to prevent China from dominating the Asia Pacific. China, on the other hand, will necessarily seek regional hegemony by driving the United States out of its backyard.
In this analysis, a single defining fault line that divides the United States as the reigning super power and China as its challenger will drive international relations for the world with war as the eventual determinant of the outcome.
While I agreed with Mearsheimer's theoretical assumptions I disagree with his predictions. Just as America's rise to dominance did not follow the path of colonial expansion taken by its predecessors Britain and France, China will also make use of alternative strategic options to achieve global leadership. In the age of nuclear weapons and globalization China has to invent new strategy for its rise.
President Xi has already signaled to the world China's strategic shift in its foreign policy outlook. Two core principles have guided Chinese foreign policy since the early 1990s. One was Deng's famous dictum of Tao Guang Yang Hui (keeping a low profile) for economic development. The other was to give the first priority to the relations with the United States.
The implications of these principles have been that China avoided confrontations at all costs and that China would never oppose the United States in any international conflicts which were not related to China.
Regarding those conflicts between the U.S. and its neighbors, China took neutral stance or even align itself with the U.S. This means for the last 20 years or so China has stood alone on the world stage, a completely neutral power without allies and assiduously avoiding making enemies, insularly focused on its internal development in the shadow of the U.S.-led global system.
Through several recent speeches, Xi has articulated a different strategic direction. China's new foreign policy outlook indicates an approach known as Fen Fa You Wei (striving for achievement) to engage its neighboring countries and to over time align their interests with China's rise. Xi specifically stressed friendship and loyalty between China and its neighbors. This shift is more significant than it sounds.
For more than twenty years, China has operated under a foreign policy framework within which it has neither friends nor enemies. With a few exceptions, all other countries were essentially treated as the same with the maintenance of an external environment most conducive to China's own economic development the paramount priority. Such a position is no longer attainable.
Under Xi, China will begin to treat friends and enemies differently. For those who are willing to play a constructive role in China's rise, China will seek ways for them to gain greater actual benefits from China's development.
By tying up certain nations' incentives along with China's development China will seek to build communities of common destinies with some of its key neighbors. We should expect these initiatives to cover much wider range of strategic elements beyond mere economic interests. A strong political dimension will be a must. Eventually this may even extend to providing security guarantees to select countries.
Specifically, the new leadership has named three strategic areas of focus: the "new silk road" with Central Asia, a maritime silk road with South East Asia, and the economic corridor through India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. Nations in these regions should expect to see much increased willingness by China to underwrite substantive economic, security, and other benefits in exchange for political support for China's regional objectives.
For more than twenty years, even those nations that were generally supportive of China could not count on China to be a friend in times of need because China would make no commitments of alliance. In the future, China will decisively favor those who side with it with economic benefits and even security protections. On the contrary, those who are hostile to China will face much more sustained policies of sanctions and isolation.
China's new foreign policy outlook in the region will provide an expanded set of strategic options and ample chances to avoid using military conquests to achieve regional dominance, as America did more than a century ago.
Then, of course, there is the all important relationship with the United States. Many say the key risk in today's world affairs is the complete lack of trust between the two countries. I would argue that trust is not a prerequisite to a relatively peaceful accommodation.
China and the U.S. have not trusted each other since 1989 and are not likely to in the future. But interests will form the cornerstone of this relationship. China has risen far enough and the world has changed substantially enough that a complex web of interests bind the two countries together, not as friends but not necessarily as enemies.
Although China and the U.S. are strategic competitors, there are common interests, complementary interests and, of course, conflicting interests between them. Such complexity provides the two countries the room for active cooperation when interests converge and a degree of preventive cooperation where interests conflict.
China's rise is perhaps the most significant event for the world since the dawn of the modern era. No one can predict with precision its long-term implications. The risk of military conflict no doubt exists. But at least for the next generation, sufficient strategic options exist for peace. And Xi Jinping's new foreign policy outlook, though seemingly more assertive, puts China on a path more conducive to peace.
