That China has the right to establish an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea is indubitable, and has not been authoritatively challenged. That security threats to China, particularly the escalating Diaoyu/Senkaku island dispute with Japan, made the establishment necessary is also self-evident.
The calculation and timing of China’s move may also evidence a reluctant realization that military-to-military dialogue with the United States was proving fruitless in achieving any reduction in provocative U.S. surveillance operations in the East China Sea and that the “Sunnylands Summit” promise of progress toward a “new model of great power relations” has been unfulfilled.
At the strategic level, China’s establishment of a clear ADIZ has been made necessary by the Obama administration’s military power focused “rebalance” (or “pivot”) to Asia. Respected Asian scholar, Dr. Mel Gurtov, emeritus professor of political science at Portland State University and editor in chief of the journal Asian Perspective, points out in my “Whither Japan” blog in Forbes.com, that the rebalance “may seem innocent to some…But in fact the U.S. military already has overwhelming strength in Asia relative to China, and China is in no position to catch up.”
After last June’s Sunnylands Summit, and the elaboration by President Xi Jinping of the basic premises of a constructive, “win-win” “new great power relationship,” hopes ran high that renewed high level U.S.-China military dialogue would lead to a re-examination in the Pentagon and the White House of the “pivot.” Optimism seemed particularly justified after the August visit of China’s Minister of Defense General Chang Wanquan to the U.S. and the long meeting in the Pentagon with U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel which Hagel described as “very productive.”
General Chang, referring at the August 19 press conference to the administration’s “rebalancing” strategy, and certainly reiterating what he said to Hagel privately, noted that “the military aspect has been highlighted in this comprehensive strategy, including to strengthen military deployments in the region, enhancing U.S. alignments in this region by conducting military cooperation and joint military exercises….the frequency and intensity of such kind of joint military exercises are increasing…further complicat[ing] the situation in the region.”
General Chang continued, “It is our hope that this rebalancing strategy is a constructive one that could help peace and stability in the region…on the other hand, we would like this rebalance strategy balanced…because the essence of rebalancing is balance.”
Invited by Hagel to describe China’s concept of a “new model of military relationship,” Chang replied first with the three tenets proposed by President Xi at the Sunnylands Summit: “no confrontation, no antagonism, and respect for each other towards win-win cooperation.” Chang then elaborated some essential “do’s” and “don’ts” within the concept, among the former of which: “Both sides respect the other’s vital interests and major concerns, pay attention to the other’s comfort level, not forcefully imposing one’s will on the other, and not gaining one’s own interests at the expense of the other.”
Both before and since the Hagel-Chang meeting, almost all the evidence of Pentagon and U.S. administration actions seems to be not of “paying attention to the other’s comfort level,” but of the Pentagon digging in and hardening positions on Diaoyu/Senkaku and U.S. surveillance (including the USS Cowpens incident) which, to China, have been and remain unacceptable provocations that violate the spirit of a “new model of military relationship” and the Sunnylands Summit.
The latest evidence comes from the commander of the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, Vice Admiral Robert Thomas. In a videotaped January 11 interview with Japan’s NHK, Thomas said that the 7th Fleet has increased surveillance operations in China’s ADIZ using state-of-the-art P8 patrol planes flown from the U.S. Kadena Air Base in Okinawa. The planes were deployed to Okinawa in December, the first deployment of these aircraft outside the U.S. Thomas said the deployment “sends a clear message about strengthening the U.S. alliance with Japan.”
Last year maximum pressure was brought on the Abe government to obtain the consent (duly given last month) of Okinawa governor Nakaima for work to build a large new military base on the island. The new base is ostensibly to relocate the Futenma Marine Air Station; the Pentagon has refused any restrictions on how or by which forces it will be used.
Last November, the U.S. government rejected Japan’s appeal to call for the withdrawal of China’s ADIZ. To have agreed would have been the height of hypocrisy as well as illogic, since Japan’s ADIZ—initially established earlier by the U.S.—has been in place in the region since 1969.
Covering airspace above the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, claimed by China, Japan’s ADIZ is a violation of China’s sovereignty. China, correctly, refuses to recognize Japan’s ADIZ in this area, and is completely within its rights to establish its own ADIZ.
The purpose of an ADIZ is to defend against security threats. Clearly, the airspace above the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, like the seas around them, now requires constant vigilance against such threats. It is highly regrettable that the U.S. military persists in its provocative surveillance off China’s coasts, which operations fully justify China’s ADIZ.
Writes Dr. Gurtov: “The Obama-Xi summit’s success has been greatly exaggerated. A positive face has been put on small achievements.” This, I believe, is the biggest problem.
While China was certainly justified in establishing its ADIZ, that it did so abruptly with little consultation with the concerned countries, particularly the United States, is evidence that the promise of last June’s Sunnylands Summit remains unfulfilled.
The Obama administration continues to implement a “rebalance” (“pivot”) that is, in fact, exacerbating a dangerous and threatening imbalance in the region. Only a reversal of the “pivot” can reduce tensions and clear the way to a “win-win” “new model of great power relations.” In the meantime, China’s ADIZ has a critical role to play.
Stephen M. Harner is a former U.S. State Department official (FSO), banker, and consultant in China and Japan. He is a graduate of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
香港中美聚焦网站1月14日刊登题为《为何中国的防空识别区是必要的》一文，作者为前美国国务院官员斯蒂芬·哈纳。文章指出，中国有权在东海设立防空识别区，这是不容置疑的，而且也没有受到有权威性的挑战。
文章认为，中国面临的安全威胁，尤其是日益激化的与日本的钓鱼岛争端，使得设立防空识别区成为必要也是不证自明的。
中国考虑设立防空识别区以及对宣布时间的选择可能也证明，中国不太情愿地意识到，事实证明，中美两军对话在让美国减少在东海的挑衅性监视行动方面是毫无成果的;而且在“阳光之乡峰会”上作出的关于朝着建立“新型大国关系”取得进展的承诺也没有实现。
文章指出，从战略层面看，奥巴马政府的亚洲再平衡战略导致中国有必要划设明确的防空识别区。备受尊重的亚洲问题学者、州立波特兰大学政治学荣誉退休教授、《亚洲展望》杂志主编梅尔·格托夫博士在《福布斯》网站上笔者的博客中指出，再平衡战略“对某些人来说或许看似无辜……但与中国相比，实际上美国军队已在亚洲拥有压倒性力量，而中国不可能追赶上来。”
2013年6月中美两国在“阳光之乡”庄园举行了峰会，习近平主席详细阐述了建设性的、“双赢的”“新型大国关系”的基本前提，在那之后，外界纷纷寄希望于中美军方重启高层对话会促使五角大楼和白宫重新审视亚洲再平衡战略。中国国防部长常万全将军8月访美并在五角大楼与美国国防部长查克·哈格尔举行“卓有成效”的会谈(哈格尔语)后，人们似乎格外有理由保持乐观。
文章称，日本的防空识别区包括了钓鱼岛上方中国拥有主权的空域，侵犯了中国的主权。中国拒绝承认日本在该地区的防空识别区是正当的，而且中国完全有权建立自己的防空识别区。
文章指出，防空识别区的目的是为了防范安全威胁。很明显，现在钓鱼岛上方的空域，就像周围的海域一样，需要不断地对此类威胁保持警惕。非常遗憾的是美国军方坚持在中国的沿海进行挑衅性的监视行动，这些行动充分证明中国设立防空识别区是有道理的。
格托夫写道：“奥巴马与习近平峰会的成功被大大夸大了。本来很小的成就却被赋予了积极的意义。”笔者认为，这一点是最大的问题。
文章认为，尽管中国划设防空识别区无疑是合理的，但它在不与相关国家(尤其是美国)协商的情况下突然这么做，表明2013年6月“阳光之乡峰会”的承诺没有兑现。
文章指出，奥巴马政府继续实施“重返亚洲”政策，实际上加剧了该地区的危险失衡。只有废除这种政策才能缓和紧张局势，为“双赢的”“新型大国关系”扫清道路。中国的防空识别区能发挥重要作用。
