最近，薄熙来被提起公诉。在中国共产党发动的反腐风暴中，前政治局委员薄熙来受审是一个标志性高潮。事实上，习近平总书记已指出，反腐成败攸关执政党的生死存亡。有政治分析人士断言，中国的一党执政模式必然滋生严重腐败，除非将现有的政治制度推倒重来，腐败不可能得到遏制。然而在更广阔的历史和知识视野下，这些言之凿凿的判断恐怕难以成立。
当代形式的腐败，成为全球性舆论和学术关注的热点议题其实仅20多年时间。冷战时期，腐败议题屈从于两大阵营意识形态较量的主战场。印尼的苏哈托和菲律宾的马科斯都非常腐败，但他们凭借着西方阵营盟友的身份而得到长期庇护。在苏东阵营中，情形亦然。自冷战结束以来，对腐败的研究和著作大量增加。世界在这段学术与实践的历程中学到些什么呢？
从一开始，关于腐败的鸿篇巨制就被一项先入为主的全球“共识”所劫持。尽管这项“共识”在起初阶段缺乏足够的经验数据支持，但自冷战结束以后却一直大行其道。根据这项“共识”，各个国家的腐败无不源于如下病因：没有推行彻底的经济自由化；缺乏多党竞争；没有建立独立的司法；缺少新闻自由；没有强大的公民社会。这项“共识”进而设计出一套测量腐败程度的标准化体系，大多基于单维型的指标，将腐败几乎等同于非法贿赂。根据这些衡量标准，世界各国的腐败性质同一，仅仅在程度上有区别。在这类单维的测量指标中，透明国际发布的廉洁指数（CPI）最具权威性。根据上述“共识”，既然腐败程度可以直接测量，而腐败原因千篇一律，对症的药方也必然如出一辙，即建议各国推行以下政策：经济进一步市场化，即私有化；政治开放，即多党竞争选举；司法独立；新闻自由；成熟的公民社会。这类药方林林总总，迈克尔·约翰斯顿教授在其专著《腐败征候群：财富权力和民主》中详细分析了学术界和政策界在那一时期关于对腐败的认识与判断的发展过程。
过去20年来，大批题为“反腐败秘诀”的鸿篇巨制上市，其泛滥程度不逊于传授发财秘诀的致富书。这些专著都出自那些声名卓著的机构，比如，美国国际开发总署发表了《反腐败手册》；世界银行推出了《帮助政府反腐败》；联合国开发计划署编写了《腐败与良政》。众所周知，“致富秘籍”多为骗局，“反腐败秘诀”事实上也相差无几。
以印度尼西亚为例：在苏加诺-苏哈托统治的40年里，腐败泛滥沉疴难起。1998年开始，印尼根据“反腐败秘诀”鸿篇巨制中的药方，启动改革。几乎在一夜之间，印尼涌现出60多个政党加入竞选；新闻全面自由化；司法的独立性大大提高；公共企业被私有化。但几乎所有研究都表明，改革后印尼的腐败不仅没有得到遏制，反而进一步恶化。对此，澳大利亚国立大学亚太学院院长安德鲁·麦金太尔教授下了一个结论，认为印尼的改革事实上不过是“一个苏哈托裂变成千千万万个小苏哈托”。尤其在发展中国家，此类“反腐败秘诀”的失败案例不胜枚举，而成功者却寥寥无几。
近年来，学术界开始反思这些被视为金科玉律的“共识”。学者们认识到，腐败问题极其复杂，其在各个维度和层面会有各种衍生变异。此外，在不同领域，腐败造成的不同影响也很难进行量化比较（见《贿赂的交易：全球化，经济自由化，以及腐败“问题”》Business of Bribery: Globalization, Economic Liberalization, and the 'Problem' of Corruption，詹姆斯·W·威廉姆斯James W. Williams和玛格丽特·E·比尔Margaret E. Beare合著，1999年；《政府腐败与民主》Political Corruption and Democracy，苏珊·罗斯·阿克曼Susan Rose-Ackerman著，1999年）。
关于腐败，接受度最高的定义是“滥用公信以牟取私利”。这一定义的关键是“公”和“私”的界定，但在成熟的经济体和转型的经济体中，界定方法和标准大不一样。西方发达国家是成熟的经济体，公共领域和私人领域，公共财产和私人财产之间界限十分清晰，已有几十年甚至几百年的历史。但在中国这样正快速转型的经济体，对“公”和“私”的界定也在随时调整。当下属于“公”很快就可能属于“私”。既然“公”和“私”的界限调整如此频繁，就很难准确定义腐败，更遑论精确量化。在成熟的经济体中，程度较轻的腐败就会造成严重损害；在转型经济体中，一定程度的腐败造成的损害就很难确定。
腐败还有多种维度和表现形式。比如，在发达民主国家，约翰斯顿教授定义的“权势市场腐败”就尤其泛滥成灾。但是这种腐败如政治竞选捐款，利益集团游说，“旋转门”等已被合法化，换言之就是法制化的腐败。比如说，在透明国际的廉洁指数排名上，美国相当靠前，也就是说相当廉洁。但是在美国公众的印象中，远不是这么一回事。77%的美国人相信民选官员为捐款人服务，仅有19%的美国人相信他们是为美国的根本利益服务（盖洛普）；59%的美国人认为选举不过是一场价高者得的拍卖游戏，仅有37%的美国人相信候选人的素质和能力决定胜负（盖洛普）；70%的美国人认为整个政府完全被利益集团操纵，根本不反映国民的真正意愿（《新闻周刊》民调）；93%的美国人认为政客会照顾竞选资金的捐助者（美国广播公司和《华盛顿邮报》报道）。在通常意义下，这些数字必然证明公众认为腐败严重泛滥，但是任何评级体系都不会予以收录，仅仅因为这些行为都是合法的。
现在再回头看中国的腐败问题。腐败对中国并不是什么新问题，历朝各代都曾遭遇过严重的腐败。但在世界各国中，中国腐败的根源可以说是独一无二的，一定程度上根植于儒家文官阶层——士大夫的角色困境。千百年里，士大夫一直是中国的政治精英，但其地位并非来自于等级制或世袭制，而是通过科举制的选拔晋身，出身平民，效忠皇权。士大夫的身份和地位，要求其必须恪守克己复礼、以致大同的道德理想，这一理想被北宋杰出的士大夫范仲淹提炼为“先天下之忧而忧，后天下之乐而乐”。千百年来，中国民众按照这一道德标准来要求他们视为“百姓父母”的文武百官。与此相对，儒家经典也推崇安定有序富足的家庭社会理想，即“小康”，让所有人包括官员的私欲和利益都能适得其所。不期而然，改革开放后，中国共产党宣布要在中国建成小康社会。数千年来，中国主流文化一直传承着这两种充满张力却又矛盾的理想，这也是中国式腐败千年泛滥的深层根源。
明朝御史海瑞是中国历史上的著名清官。明朝官员的俸禄很低，反腐的法律十分严酷，但腐败泛滥到极点。海瑞为官十分廉洁，合法的俸禄很低，以至于无法维持家庭的生计。据说，一年之中，海瑞只在母亲寿辰日吃一次肉，他的两任妻子相继自杀。当下中国也有类似的困境，经济蓬勃发展，牟利诱惑无孔不入，政治权力却仍要恪守无私奉献的道德理想，这种矛盾和张力可能是当前腐败的深层根源之一。王岐山是中央政治局常委，分管反腐的中纪委书记，他的月薪可能仅相当于富人一餐的花费。
中华人民共和国建国后的前30年，腐败程度相对较低，因为当时经济是公有制，几乎没有私人财产。市场化改革启动后，私人领域发展起来，腐败也随之泛滥。市场化改革导致的公共领域和私人领域之间的财富落差，成为腐败问题严重化的主要诱因。中国共产党继承了儒家士大夫的道德理想，承担着民众的道德期许，这导致党政官员陷入不为圣徒便为窃贼的尴尬困境。这种源于文化传统的深刻困境，决定了新加坡的高薪养廉政策，或美国的“旋转门”模式，都不可能获得中国民众的认同。在“反腐败秘诀”之类的大作中，根本不可能找到解决这一困境的药方。
对世界各国来说，腐败的根源千差万别，以至于很难指望依靠预先定制的，舶来的，但脱离本国现有制度和文化背景的药方来遏制腐败。对中国来说，中共自身的反腐机制依旧是遏制腐败最有效的药方，决策者应致力于强化既有的制度，而不是推倒重来，盲目求医于舶来的药方。很多专家鼓吹中国应推动政治改革，引进三权分立、制约平衡的政治体制，这一药方导致的结果可能是成倍的腐败（也许会是现在的腐败量乘个三！）。
事实上，中国反腐的前景并不悲观。当下，春夏之交的反腐风暴，正令全国上下拭目以待。从薄熙来被捕开始，已有多位省部级官员被逮捕、起诉。现身豪宴、戴名表的官员，正因被拍照上网而提心吊胆。很多专家指责说，这次风暴还会像此前的运动式反腐一样，一阵风刮过就算，治标不治本。的确，运动式反腐缺乏制度的完善性，效果也很难持久。然而这次反腐风暴如此严厉，足以在未来几年中明显遏制腐败。当然，风暴数年后腐败可能又会猖獗，到时又必须启动另一次反腐风暴。这一做法当然不是理想的，但比那些纸上谈兵的“共识类”抽象药方要强多了。
士大夫的角色困境永远无解，陷于其中的政府官员很难出淤泥而不染，这一矛盾在下滑期会导致腐败恶化。与此同时，中国共产党保有了儒家士大夫的道德理想，并从攸关政权生死存亡的自身利益出发加强反腐，形成当今遏制腐败的强大动力，正推动中国政体反腐的一个上升期。圣徒们在进攻，窃贼们在败退，让他们乘胜追击吧。
李世默是上海的风险投资家、政治学者。2013年7月，欧盟经济社会委员会在布鲁塞尔举办反腐败论坛，本文系作者讲话的摘要。
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SAINTS OR THIEVES: CORRUPTION AND THE CHINESE DILEMMA
By: Eric X. Li
At last, Bo Xilai is going on trial. The case against the former Politburo member brings to a climax the aggressive anti-corruption drive undertaken by the Chinese Communist Party. In fact, the new general secretary Xi Jinping has identified corruption as a threat to the very survival of the party-state. Many political commentators have actually proclaimed that severe corruption is inherent to China’s one-party system and cannot be contained without anything short of changing the entire political system. Perhaps it is time to examine corruption in the larger historic and intellectual context.
Corruption, in its contemporary form, has been a subject of global attention and scholarship in the last twenty years. Before that, the Cold War shielded rampant corruption behind ideologies. Marcos and Suharto were corrupt but protected by the Western alliance and the same happened on the other side. Since then the amount of research and literature on the topic has been vast. So what have we learned?
First, a global consensus on corruption was formed, without much empirical data, very early in this 20-year period. The consensus went as follows: Corruption happens because of incomplete economic liberalization, lack of political competition, no independent judiciary, no freedom of the press, and a weak civil society. Furthermore, standardized measurement systems were developed to produce single-dimension indexes where corruption is for the most part equated with illegal bribery. According to such indexes, corruption is qualitatively the same across all countries and varies only in quantity. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is the most authoritative among such indexes. Since the root causes are the same everywhere and the severity of the problem can be accurately measured, it was only natural to conclude that there was a standardized prescription, namely, economic liberalization (i.e. privatization), political opening (i.e. multi-party elections), independent judiciary, press freedom, and civil society. Professor Michael Johnston summarizes this development in his book Syndromes of Corruption.
Along with popular “how-to-get-rich” books, a myriad of “how-to” books were issued by respected institutions such as USAID’s Handbook for Fighting Corruption, World Bank’s Helping Countries Combat Corruption, UNDP’s Corruption and Good Governance. But like their commercial cousins, there is only one problem to these “how-to” books: they don’t quite work.
Take the example of Indonesia. After forty years of severe corruption during the Sukarno-Suharto eras, the country began to implement all the prescriptions in the “how-to” books in 1998. More than sixty political parties were formed to compete in elections, the press was set free, judges became independent, and companies were privatized. Yet, just about every study has shown corruption has gotten worse. In the words of Professor Andrew MacIntyre, Indonesia went from “one Suharto to hundreds of little Suhartos”. Examples like this abound, particularly in the developing world.
In recent years, many scholars have begun to re-examine the dominant consensus. The academic world has learned that corruption is a complex, multi-dimensional, and multi-faceted phenomenon. Furthermore, corruption and its effects vary qualitatively across different places and are nearly impossible to measure (Williams & Beare 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999).
The most commonly accepted definition of corruption is the abuse of public trust for private benefits. The most important two words are “public” and “private”. However, the distinction between public and private varies considerably between stable and transitioning economies. In the developed West, clear boundaries between public and private properties have been defined for decades or even centuries. In a rapidly transitioning economy like China, the line is constantly shifting. What is public today could become private tomorrow. It is very difficult to define corruption and to measure it. In a stable economy even a small quantity of corruption can be very damaging, whereas in a transitioning economy the effects are much less certain.
Corruption is also multi-dimensional and takes many shapes. One example is what Johnston refers to as “influence market corruption” – particularly rampant in developed democracies. It is corruption that has been legalized (i.e. rule of law co-opted) in the forms of political contributions, special interests lobbying, and revolving doors. The United States, for example, ranks very high in TI’s Corruption Perception Index - meaning low level of corruption. But the American people seem to disagree. Seventy-seven percent of Americans say elected officials are influenced by financial contributors vs. 19% say they are influenced by the best interests of the country (Gallap); 59% of Americans say elections are for sale vs. 37% believe they are won by the best candidates (Gallap); 70% of Americans say the political system is controlled by special interests and not responsive to the country’s real needs (Newsweek Poll); and 93% of Americans say politicians do special favors for campaign contributors (ABS News & Washington Post Poll). Under normal circumstances one would say such numbers represent rather wide perception of severe corruption. Yet they are never counted in any of the ranking systems because these acts are legal.
Now let’s consider the case of China. Corruption is not new. Every dynasty suffered from it. But the root causes of Chinese corruption are rather unique. One of them is embedded in the DNA of the Confucian Mandarin class – shi da fu – the centuries old non-hereditary and meritocratic ruling bureaucracy. The shi da fu class is defined by its moral claim that Mandarins should be selflessly devoted to the people, as Fan Zhongyan stated, “first in worrying about the world’s troubles and last in enjoying its pleasures”. Over many centuries, the cultural expectations the Chinese people have for their paternalistic rulers have conformed to this moral standard. In contrast to this claim, Confucius also used the term xiaokang to describe an orderly society with comfortable means. Here private desires and personal interests including those of bureaucrats are accommodated. And, of course, the Party proclaims to be building for China exactly that – a xiaokang society. These two concepts have been in conflict in Chinese officialdom for centuries and represent the root cause of corruption.
We can recall the story of Hai Rui, the corruption-fighting minister in the Ming dynasty during which officials’ salaries were the lowest, anti-corruption campaigns were the fiercest, yet corruption level stubbornly remained the highest. Hai Rui, so strict on himself and his government salary was so meager that he could barely support his family, was said to eat meat only once a year on his mother’s birthday. His two wives both committed suicide. This disconnect between political authority based on a selfless moral claim and economic realities is at the core of persistent official corruption. A rich Chinese citizen’s dinner could cost more than the entire monthly salary of Wang Qishan – the Party’s Politburo standing committee member in charge of fighting corruption.
During the first 30 years of the People’s Republic, the level of corruption was low because nearly everything was public. Market reforms brought about the emergence of private property and along with it the byproduct of corruption exacerbated by the growing disparity between public service and private wealth. The Party inherited the moral claims of the Confucian Mandarin class, consistent with the expectations of the people, and its officials are faced with the unenviable and mutually exclusive choice of being either saints or thieves. Given this deeply rooted cultural tradition, neither Singapore’s high-salaried bureaucracy nor America’s revolving door approach could gain legitimacy with the Chinese public. Here lies the dilemma and no “how-to” books on sale today offer a solution to this problem.
We are discovering that the causes of corruption vary across different countries and solutions should not be ready-made, imported, and applied without consideration for existing institutional characteristics and cultural backgrounds. For China, instead of scrapping existing institutions and replacing them with imported ones, the existing institution of the Party is the most viable vehicle to contain corruption and should be strengthened. If the country were to adopt the checks and balances provided by the division of political power into three branches, as advocated by some experts, the result could very well be the current quantity of corruption times three.
Back on the ground, all of China is riveted by the current spring-summer offensive. Since Bo Xilai’s arrest, many ministers and mayors have been detained and prosecuted. Many more officials live in fear of being caught on camera hosting a fancy banquet or wearing an expensive wristwatch. Some experts say the campaign style anti-corruption drive, like many before it, is unsustainable because it attacks the symptoms but does not cure the disease. True, it is not elegant institutionally and its effects might not last very long. But the current campaign is so harsh that it will most likely reduce corruption significantly in the next several years. Of course, corruption will inevitably come back and grow to a level when another campaign would be required. Not an ideal approach but sure better than theoretical solutions that flop in reality.
While the inherent shi da fu conflict can never be resolved and deepens corruption in a down cycle, the Confucian Mandarin ethos and the Party’s instinct for self-preservation could combine to effectively check corruption in an up cycle. And the country seems to be in such an up cycle now. The saints are on the march and the thieves are in retreat. Let it continue.
Eric X. Li is a venture capitalist and political scientist in Shanghai. This essay is adapted from a talk given in July 2013 at an anti-corruption conference organized by the European Economic and Social Committee in Brussels.
