汉译者注释：
al-Adly 即 Habib al-Adly 穆巴拉克时代内政部长 哈比卜·阿德利el-Sisi 即 Abdel Fattah el-Sisi 阿卜杜勒-法塔赫·塞西，坦塔维的继任者，推翻了穆尔西政权Muslim Brotherhood 穆斯林兄弟会，译文简称"穆兄会"ElBaradei 埃尔巴拉迪feloul 余孽。这个词是埃及民众用来形容军部、抗议军部的标语口号 （人文与社会注：此注释有误差，见内文）National Salvation Front 全国拯救阵线Revolutionary Socialists of Egypt(RS) 埃及革命社会主义者（组织名）Supreme Council of the Armed Forces(SCAF)武装部队最高委员会Tantawi 即 Muhammad Tantawi 穆罕默德·坦塔维，前军部最高层，推翻了穆巴拉克政权
英译者注释：
在6月30日的大规模示威游行的余波中，穆罕默德·穆尔西总统和穆兄会被军部剥夺了执政地位，这次大规模示威游行确认了穆尔西所谓的合法性和广泛支持的破产。
如今，正像埃及革命社会主义者(Revolutionary Socialists of Egypt)在声明中表述的那样，始于2011年1月推翻穆巴拉克运动的埃及革命，业已翻开新的篇章--革命分子应挺身而出，直面挑战开辟新出路，以实现"面包、自由、社会正义及人类尊严"的革命任务。
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6月30日所发生的，是埃及新一波革命浪潮无可置疑的历史性开端，潮头胜过2011年1月以来一切。估计超过1700万的埃及人民在传奇的日子里涌上街头，这在历史上前所未有。
这一点要比前政权残余的种种介入更显著、要比军部和警察的公开支持更瞩目。数百万人的大规模示威活动为人类历史所罕见，这些活动对唤起人民意识、对自身的力量和自己改变历史的力量之自信的影响，超越了提出的口号和被给定的政治选择的局限性。
是的，资产阶级的自由派精英想利用这股强大群众动力来推翻穆斯林精英的统治，以使自己在军方的认可和支持下染指权力。同样属实的还有，余孽们（旧政权的残余--人文与社会注：feloul在阿拉伯语中指败军的残兵剩将，现在被用来特指穆巴拉克政府的残余）想踩着这新的一波革命浪潮重返政治舞台。但大众革命有其特殊逻辑，它不会屈服于自由派或余孽们抛出的幻象或计谋--哪怕部分群众暂时被精英们的口号或允诺所俘虏，就像他们之前被穆斯林精英的口号和允诺所迷惑的那般。
是的，统治阶级中反穆兄会的部分所掀起的巨大媒体和宣传攻势所造成的影响不容小觑。什么军方和警察同人民站在一起，什么他们秉持中立、富有爱国主义精神--甚至吹嘘他们的"天然革命性"！然而这种影响是短暂的、肤浅的，无法抹去群众对无论是军方机构还是安全部门的反革命角色、反大众立场的切身感受和记忆。
这种影响的暂时性之真正原因是由于自由派反对者（以全国拯救阵线为代表）的背叛。他们亵渎埃及革命的目标和烈士的鲜血，只为了缩短他们染指权力的征程。真正原因是在于缺乏一个联合的革命政治选择--这个选择应能揭露全国拯救路线、以确实的革命计划赢得大众；它应该足以超越自由派和穆斯林两种精英，深化推进埃及革命运动，扫荡所有旧政权机构、包括反革命的核心--军方和安全机构。
群众们再次反抗，决非出于对军方的企盼，也并非出于对余孽们以自由化替代穆兄会秩序的热爱。他们重新反叛是因为穆尔西和穆兄会背叛了革命。穆兄会连一个当初埃及革命的诉求都未实现：社会正义、自由、人类尊严、为革命烈士索取社会公正--无论这些烈士是陨落在穆巴拉克和哈比卜·阿德利手中，或是武装部队最高委员会(SCAF)手中，还是穆兄会和穆兄会统治时代的内政部手中。
事实上，穆兄会秩序是对穆巴拉克政权在同一政策取向上的深化--贫穷、腐败、以及一意孤行地充当大财团的捍卫者，以服侍美国和犹太复国主义的利益。
穆兄会并未彻底清理腐败的国家机器或是手上沾了烈士鲜血的人--不管这些人身在内政部、军方还是秘密警察，穆兄会都会保持与他们讨价还价，只图跻身国家机关与余孽们和穆巴拉克余党分享权力。
因此，穆兄会秩序在各个层次上都仅是穆巴拉克政权的延伸，而这个政权恰是人民奋起反抗的。
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这就是新革命的本质，它爆发在6月30日这具有历史意义的一天。穆兄会不理解这一本质，因此他们所受的广泛支持在数月内蒸发殆尽。这也是军方领袖所不理解的--同样不理解的还有军方的民间掩护者--为首的就是自由派和全国拯救阵线的余孽们。因为他们并没有被枪口胁迫着去遵循穆巴拉克、军事委员会和穆尔西所前赴后继的道路--一样的新自由主义经济政策，一样的与波斯湾压迫性君主统治的战略同盟，以及一样的对美国和犹太复国主义的屈辱从属。
欧美资产阶级的政府和新闻媒体试图歪曲埃及发生的事情：似乎那里只有一场军事政变推翻了民选总统、败坏了形式民主的"合法性"。但实情的进步性远远地将形式民主连同它的投票箱甩在后头。它的合法性来自于人民革命的民主--直接民主创造出革命合法性。它让人们睁眼看到群众力量的新形式，反衬着投票箱式暂时民主的渺小可笑。除了维系资产阶级不同派别统治外，票箱民主里走不出任何东西。
暂时民主的投票箱保证的只有资产阶级国家机器在权力上的延续。它保障的是人民的错觉--他们以为自己在治理，因为他们有权每隔几年做出选择，挑个其实是通过对投票箱的操纵来统治、剥削他们的资产阶级精英；他们接近不了国家机器，或是受庇护的资本主义企业。
埃及所发生的一切是民主的高潮，一场数百万人参与的革命直接推翻了一个统治者。当军方目睹群众在埃及的街道和广场上摆平了穆尔西，军方撵走他便是水到渠成的结果而非其他什么原因。
塞西在2013年7月3日发动了政变，如同之前坦塔维在2011年2月11日所做的那样；他默许了反叛民众的意愿，并非出于什么爱国主义或革命热忱，但是出于惧怕革命。因为如果塞西没有介入劫驱逐穆尔西的运动，革命就不会止步于推翻穆尔西和穆兄会，而将发挥--目前仍保持着--转变为一个彻底的社会革命的潜质。那将取代整个资产阶级国家，包括军方领导人。
军方一向敌视革命。为从革命的火线下亡命，它甩开了穆巴拉克。如今，出于对革命地震逼近它自身的恐惧，军方正在甩开它昔日的盟友，穆兄会和穆尔西。正如武装部队最高委员会(SCAF)的统治初期，群众中的广泛阶层轻信军队中立性及其对革命效忠的幻象一般，他们今天被欺骗性的宣传所打动，相信塞西和他麾下将军们的英雄情怀与革命忠诚。
但正如群众借助斗争和经验而迅疾地将坦塔维时代施加的精神枷锁抛诸脑后一般，在未来数月或数周内，他们将再次逾越"军民一家"的幻象。
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埃及群众已经成功在30个月内推翻了两位总统。这股强大的力量不仅反映在数百万人掷地有声的抗议中，也投射在由罢工、游行所掀起的后续浪潮上。政治上的自信能转变为争取社会及经济权益上的自信，反之亦然。
在第一次革命浪潮后，军方曾押宝穆兄会，希望其组织和民粹主义性质能吸收、遏止革命冲击波。但是这局的赌注在6月30日落了空。如今，军方故技重施，押宝自由派反对者。后者在深重经济危机中给群众开出的社会经济药方，远在革命群众热望的十万八千里之外。这之间一览无余的差距将迅速曝光他们的来意、曝光他们背靠的埃及军方与安全机构--这帮真正的统治者。
我们在未来数周甚至数月内将面对的一个危险是：压制穆兄会和伊斯兰运动的运动浪潮，将被自由派（用作宣传攻势）和军方和警察（作为安保需要）以"非常时期"维护稳定为借口，用来打击工人运动及群众示威活动。安全机器通过抑制伊斯兰主义者而恢复的自信，无疑将在资产阶级媒体的重重烟雾遮盖下，转变为针对罢工和静坐的重拳出击。
正因如此，我们必须始终如一地反对伊斯兰主义者所面临的拘捕及卫星频道和报纸上的封禁、反对任何形式的虐待和压迫。因为今朝发生在伊斯兰主义者身上的，明日也会落在工人和左派分子头上。
革命势力信奉继续革命的必要性，并以社会改良作为核心。今日埃及革命的进退维谷，反映了他们在政治上的弱小。对于这些力量来说，投票箱不足以敷衍他们，他们也不会容忍为资本主义政策所延续的穷愁潦倒。他们不会放弃为革命烈士们血债血偿的要求。他们将继续坚持推翻穆巴拉克的国家机器，包括其安全、军事和司法机构。这些机构依然控制着国家、依然捍卫着大财团主们和穆巴拉克余孽们的利益。他们维系着一个巨大的泥沼，其中充斥着掠夺、腐败和独裁。
团结各自人马、向着成为一个令群众信服的革命选择而不断前进，对当今的革命诸势力而言义不容辞--革命出路应成为那依赖军部肩膀不断攀升的自由派力量的替代选择，应成为那数十年来风靡人口多数的穆斯林政治集团的替代选择。我们必须架设一个平台，将工人和劳苦大众展开的经济权益斗争及社会权益斗争联合，并团结社会上所有的被压迫群体。因为正是这些人执着于继续革命，执着于颠覆政权的心脏而非其代理人--不论是俱往矣的穆巴拉克或穆尔西，或是不久将来可能登基的埃尔巴拉迪。
因此，我们从此刻起为埃及那不可避免的第三次革命而准备，为引导这场革命直达最终的胜利而酝酿。因为普罗大众已经再次证明了他们革命能量的无穷无尽、证明了他们的革命是一次不断革命（permanent revolution）。让我们起身肩负起这个历史责任，让我们一道为革命成功而努力。
英译者 杰西·马丁 中译者 姜晴信 校订 人文与社会 http:wen.org.cn
译者注：这是一篇 埃及革命社会主义者(RS)在2013.07.05发表的声明原文链接：http://socialistworker.org/2013/07/05 ... days-that-shook-the-world
Four days that shook the world
July 5, 2013
President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood have been removed from power by the military establishment in the wake of massive demonstrations on June 30 that proved to everyone that Morsi had lost all claim to legitimacy and popular support.
Now, as the Revolutionary Socialists of Egypt argue in their statement, the next phase of the Egyptian revolution that started in January 2011 with the movement that toppled Mubarak has started--and revolutionaries must rise to the challenge of offering an alternative that meets the demands of that revolution for bread, freedom, social justice and human dignity.
Protesters rejoice as Mohamed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood government are toppled
WHAT HAPPENED on June 30 was, without the slightest doubt, the historic beginning of a new wave of the Egyptian revolution, the largest since January 2011. The number of people who demonstrated on that legendary day is estimated to exceed 17 million citizens, something unprecedented in history.
The significance of this surpasses any participation by old regime remnants, or the apparent support of the army and police. Mass demonstrations of millions are exceedingly rare events in human history, and their effect on the consciousness and confidence of the populace in themselves, and in their power to change the course of history, transcend the limitations of the slogans raised and the political alternatives put forward.
Yes, the liberal bourgeois elite wanted to use this mass impetus to overthrow the rule of the Islamist elite, in order to themselves reach power with the endorsement and support of the military establishment. And it is true that the feloul [remnants of the old regime] wanted to return to the political scene by way of this new revolutionary tide. But there is a special logic to popular revolutions that will not submit to the illusions or schemes of the liberals or feloul, even if sections of the masses were temporarily affected by the slogans and promises of that elite, just as they were affected before by the slogans and promises of the Islamist elite.
Yes, there is the influence of the huge media and propaganda campaigns, undertaken by sections of the ruling class opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, about how the army and police are standing with the people, about their neutrality and patriotism--even their "revolutionary nature"! But this influence is momentary and superficial, and cannot erase the memory and direct experience of the people of the counterrevolutionary character and opposition to the masses, whether it be the institutions of the military or the security services.
The true reason for this temporary influence is the betrayal of the liberal opposition, as represented by the National Salvation Front, of the goals of the Egyptian revolution and the blood of the martyrs, in order to shorten their path to power. The true reason is the absence of a united revolutionary political alternative capable of exposing the Front and winning the masses to a concrete revolutionary program; a project that can surpass both the liberal and Islamist elite and proceed forward to deepen the Egyptian revolution, sweeping away all of the institutions of the old regime, including the military and security institutions, which are the heart of the counterrevolution.
The masses have not revolted anew out of a desire for military rule or love for the feloul liberal alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood. They have revolted anew because Morsi and the Brotherhood betrayed the revolution. The Brotherhood did not implement even one of the demands of the revolution for social justice, freedom, human dignity or retribution for the martyrs of the revolution, whether they fell at the hands of Mubarak and al-Adly, or the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), or the Brotherhood and the Interior Ministry during the period of Brotherhood rule.
In fact, Brotherhood rule deepened the same policies pursued by the Mubarak regime--of impoverishment and corruption, and the desperate defense of big business in the service of American and Zionist interests.
Rather than purging the state apparatus of corruption and of those who smeared their hands with the blood of the martyrs, whether in the Interior Ministry or the military apparatus or secret police, the Brotherhood held to its bargains with them, hoping for the participation in the state administration alongside the feloul and Mubarak's men.
Thus, Brotherhood rule became merely an extension on all levels of the Mubarak regime against which the Egyptian people had revolted.
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THIS IS the essence of the new revolutionary explosion which began on historic June 30. The Brotherhood did not understand this essence, so their popularity evaporated within months. And this is what the leaders of the military do not understand--nor their civilian cover represented by the liberals and feloul of the National Salvation Front. For they are not being forced at gunpoint to pursue the same policies pursued by Morsi, the military council and Mubarak before them--the same neoliberal economic policies, the same strategic alliances with the oppressive monarchies of the Persian Gulf, the same humiliating dependency on American and Zionist colonialism.
The governments and media outlets of the American and European bourgeoisie are trying to describe what has happened in Egypt as if it were only a military coup against a democratically elected president, or a coup against the "legitimacy" of formal democracy. But what has happened in reality far surpasses formal democracy, with its ballot boxes. It is legitimacy via the democracy of the popular revolution--direct democracy creating revolutionary legitimacy. It opens the horizons to new forms of popular power, which dwarf the temporary democracy of the ballot box that results in nothing but sustaining bourgeois rule with its different wings.
The temporary democracy of the ballot box ensures only the continuance of power of the capitalist state apparatus. It ensures the delusions of the people who believe they rule because they choose once every few years who among the bourgeois elite will rule and exploit them--without, of course, getting near to the state apparatus or the sheltered capitalist corporations through the manipulation of the ballot box.
What has happened in Egypt is the height of democracy, a revolution of millions of people to directly topple a ruler. As for the military displacement of Morsi, this was nothing but a foregone conclusion once the military institution saw that the masses had already settled the issue in the streets and squares of Egypt.
El-Sisi did on July 3, 2013, what Tantawi did before him on February 11, 2011; he acquiesced to the will of the rebelling populace, not out of any patriotism or revolutionary fervor, but out of fear of the revolution. For if El-Sisi had not intervened to dislodge Morsi, the revolution would not have stopped with the overthrow of Morsi and the Brotherhood, but was--and still remains--competent to transform into a complete social revolution which would oust the entire capitalist state, including the leaders of the military establishment.
The military establishment is hostile to the Egyptian revolution. It got rid of Mubarak to save itself from the crossfire of the revolution. The military is now getting rid of the Brotherhood and Morsi, its erstwhile allies, in fear of the time when the earthquake of the revolution will reach it. Just as broad sections of the populace were affected by the illusion of army neutrality and its stand with the revolution at the beginning of SCAF rule, they are affected today by the lying propaganda about the heroism and revolutionary allegiance of El-Sisi and his generals.
But just as the masses quickly left behind that propaganda in the days of Tantawi through experience and struggle, they will pass anew through the illusion that "the army and the people are one hand" in the weeks and months to come.
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THE EGYPTIAN masses have managed to overthrow two presidents in 30 months. This mighty power is not reflected only in millions-strong protests, but also in the subsequent waves of labor strikes and popular demonstrations. For political confidence will transform into confidence in the social and economic struggle, and vice versa.
After the first revolutionary wave, the army had wagered on the organizational and populist capabilities of the Brotherhood to assimilate and abort the revolution. But this gamble failed on June 30. Now, the army is gambling on the liberal opposition for the same goal. But the vast field between the expectations of the revolutionary masses and what the liberal forces are offering them in terms of economic and social policies amid a deep economic crisis will quickly lead to the exposure of these forces, and behind them, the true rulers of Egypt, the military and security institutions.
One of the hazards that we will face in the coming weeks and months is that the wave of repression directed at the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamist movement will be used as propaganda by the liberals and for security purposes by the army and the police to strike at the labor movement and popular demonstrations, on the pretext of maintaining stability during "this critical period." Restoring the security apparatus to confidence in facing the Islamists will be translated without doubt into waves of repression against strikes and sit-ins under thick cover by the bourgeois media.
Because of this, we must be consistent in opposing all forms of abuse and repression to which the Islamists will be exposed in the form of arrests and closures of satellite channels and newspapers, for what happens today to the Islamists will happen tomorrow to the workers and the leftists.
The dilemma of the Egyptian revolution today is the political weakness of revolutionary forces espousing the demand of continuing the revolution, with the social demands at its heart. For these forces, the ballot box will not suffice, and they will not accept the continuance of capitalist policies of impoverishment. They will not abandon the demand for retribution for the blood of the revolutionary martyrs. They will continue to insist upon the overthrow of Mubarak's state, including its security, military and judiciary institutions. These institutions still control the country and still protect the interests of the big businessmen and Mubarak's feloul. They remain a great swamp of corruption, plunder and despotism.
It is incumbent upon the revolutionary forces today to unite their ranks and put themselves forward as a convincing revolutionary alternative for the masses--an alternative to the liberal forces who are ascendant today on the shoulders of the military, and to the forces of political Islam which have dominated over broad swaths of the population for decades. We must create a platform to unite the economic and social struggle among the ranks of the workers and the poor, to unite all of the oppressed sections of society. For it is these people who have an interest in continuing the revolution, an interest in toppling the heart of the regime and not just its representatives, whether that be Mubarak or Morsi in the past, or perhaps ElBaradei in the near future.
So we begin from this moment preparations for the third Egyptian revolution inevitably to come, to be ready to lead this revolution to final victory. For the masses have proven anew that their revolutionary energy is endless, that their revolution is truly a permanent revolution. Let us rise to the task of this historical responsibility, and let us work together for the success of the revolution.
Translation by Jess Martin
人文与社会穆斯林兄弟会窃取革命果实
04/07/2013 |殷罡 | 凤凰网
凤凰网资讯：民选总统穆尔西为何会遭民众反对？
殷罡：埃及总统穆尔西会遭到民众反对的原因很多，本质原因是穆斯林兄弟会政权先天不足。
穆尔西能够上台，得益于埃及反穆巴拉克国民运动，而倒穆国民运动的主要组织者和参与者是埃及的世俗力量，是埃及青年运动发动起来的，不是穆斯林兄弟会，在这场运动中，穆兄会只是以普通公民身份出现，没有提出任何政治口号。
只是由于穆兄会组织系统完善，社会救助功能很强，因此在快速推出穆尔西这个大学教授当总统候选人后，得到了相对多数的支持。所以，虽然穆尔西是民选总统，但是参看当时的投票率和得票率，埃及实际上只有22%的选民真正把票投给了他。
第二，由于政治上的先天不足，尽管穆尔西想实现政治稳定、经济发展等等，还是力不从心。
第三，穆尔西政权在施政上也犯下了严重失误。当选后，穆斯林兄弟会过度利用了埃及国民的信任，将这个国家引向了伊斯兰化，并试图通过全民公决、修正宪法的方式为伊斯兰化提供法理工具。过去埃及的宪法，强调伊斯兰法是埃及法律的源泉之一，而现在的宪法修改成了伊斯兰法是埃及法律的源泉，使得日后的埃及执政者可以依据伊斯兰法行事，这遭到了埃及司法界、基督教力量以及一些世俗力量非常激烈的抵制。
此外，穆尔西上台以后，执意对原穆巴拉克统治阶层的高级官员实行严厉审判，但这遭到了总检察长的拒绝，于是，穆尔西撤销了总检察长的职务，这一举动是非常严重的违宪行为。埃及总检察长的职务类似于美国的大法官，总统提名，议会批准，但总统绝对无权撤换。
总之，从一开始，穆斯林兄弟会就不应该推出总统候选人，因为这场革命也好，运动也好，跟穆斯林兄弟会没有关系；既然你推举了候选人，大家也信任你，选你当了总统，你就应该满足公众对民主政治的需求，但穆兄会却选择了伊斯兰化的集权。两方面，穆尔西和穆兄会都没有做好，在埃及，只能被认为是在窃取革命果实。按中国俗话来说就是不识时务，不识好歹。
穆尔西政权已不具事实上的合法性
凤凰网资讯：军方已宣布穆尔西下台，穆尔西总统地位是否还有合法性？
殷罡：穆尔西总统地位的合法性只在理论上存在，在目前军人接管国家政治机构的情况下，他的合法性，遭到了军方、广场国民以及反对派的否认，事实上的合法性已经不存在了。
军队扮演健康角色，干政将会常态化
凤凰网资讯：穆尔西和穆巴拉克下台有何不同？军方在其中扮演怎样角色？
殷罡：穆尔西和上一次穆巴拉克下台的模式是一样的。在中东，包括过去的土耳其，冷战时期的阿拉伯国家以及现在的埃及，军方在政治生活中发挥着重大作用。军队成为防止国家崩盘的最后一道屏障。
总体来说，军队在埃及政治运动中扮演着积极健康的角色，起到平衡和制约的作用。军方干预埃及政治将会呈现常态化趋势。
美国会默许埃及军方行动
凤凰网资讯：决定埃及未来政局走向有哪些因素？美国能发挥哪些作用？
殷罡：此前，美国在最后时刻，动用中央情报局配合埃及军方发动政变，迫使穆巴拉克下台，因为美国判断如果穆巴拉克再不下台，埃及这个国家就会失控。这一次也是这样，美国会默许埃及军方的行动。实际上，美国无需发挥任何作用，只要不干涉就可以了。
穆尔西下台后，肯定会有人以某种罪名起诉他，但法院受不受理，另当别论。
