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中国崛起与西方世界的未来(The Rise of China and the Future of the West )

 January/February/2008 | G. John Ikenberry  |Foreign Affairs 

The Rise of China and the Future of the West

-Can the Liberal System Survive?

Summary: China's rise will inevitably bring the United States' unipolar moment to an end. But that does not necessarily mean a violent power struggle or the overthrow of the Western system. The U.S.-led international order can remain dominant even while integrating a more powerful China -- but only if Washington sets about strengthening that liberal order now. 

G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and the author of After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars.

The rise of China will undoubtedly be one of the great dramas of the twenty-first century. China's extraordinary economic growth and active diplomacy are already transforming East Asia, and future decades will see even greater increases in Chinese power and influence. But exactly how this drama will play out is an open question. Will China overthrow the existing order or become a part of it? And what, if anything, can the United States do to maintain its position as China rises?
Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon --will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order. 

That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely -- eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. 

This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order --if managed properly -- will live on. 
As it faces an ascendant China, the United States should remember that its leadership of the Western order allows it to shape the environment in which China will make critical strategic choices. If it wants to preserve this leadership, Washington must work to strengthen the rules and institutions that underpin that order -- making it even easier to join and harder to overturn. U.S. grand strategy should be built around the motto "The road to the East runs through the West." It must sink the roots of this order as deeply as possible, giving China greater incentives for integration than for opposition and increasing the chances that the system will survive even after U.S. relative power has declined. 
The United States' "unipolar moment" will inevitably end. If the defining struggle of the twenty-first century is between China and the United States, China will have the advantage. If the defining struggle is between China and a revived Western system, the West will triumph.


China is well on its way to becoming a formidable global power. The size of its economy has quadrupled since the launch of market reforms in the late 1970s and, by some estimates, will double again over the next decade. It has become one of the world's major manufacturing centers and consumes roughly a third of the global supply of iron, steel, and coal. It has accumulated massive foreign reserves, worth more than $1 trillion at the end of 2006. China's military spending has increased at an inflation-adjusted rate of over 18 percent a year, and its diplomacy has extended its reach not just in Asia but also in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Indeed, whereas the Soviet Union rivaled the United States as a military competitor only, China is emerging as both a military and an economic rival -- heralding a profound shift in the distribution of global power.

Power transitions are a recurring problem in international relations. As scholars such as Paul Kennedy and Robert Gilpin have described it, world politics has been marked by a succession of powerful states rising up to organize the international system. A powerful state can create and enforce the rules and institutions of a stable global order in which to pursue its interests and security. But nothing lasts forever: long-term changes in the distribution of power give rise to new challenger states, who set off a struggle over the terms of that international order. Rising states want to translate their newly acquired power into greater authority in the global system --to reshape the rules and institutions in accordance with their own interests. Declining states, in turn, fear their loss of control and worry about the security implications of their weakened position. 

These moments are fraught with danger. When a state occupies a commanding position in the international system, neither it nor weaker states have an incentive to change the existing order. But when the power of a challenger state grows and the power of the leading state weakens, a strategic rivalry ensues, and conflict -- perhaps leading to war -­becomes likely. The danger of power transitions is captured most dramatically in the case of late-nineteenth-century Germany. In 1870, the United Kingdom had a three-to-one advantage in economic power over Germany and a significant military advantage as well; by 1903, Germany had pulled ahead in terms of both economic and military power. As Germany unified and grew, so, too, did its dissatisfactions and demands, and as it grew more powerful, it increasingly appeared as a threat to other great powers in Europe, and security competition began. In the strategic realignments that followed, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, formerly enemies, banded together to confront an emerging Germany. The result was a European war. Many observers see this dynamic emerging in U.S.-Chinese relations. "If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades," the realist scholar John Mearsheimer has written, "the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war."

But not all power transitions generate war or overturn the old order. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the United Kingdom ceded authority to the United States without great conflict or even a rupture in relations. From the late 1940s to the early 1990s, Japan's economy grew from the equivalent of five percent of U.S. GDP to the equivalent of over 60 percent of U.S. GDP, and yet Japan never challenged the existing international order.

Clearly, there are different types of power transitions. Some states have seen their economic and geopolitical power grow dramatically and have still accommodated themselves to the existing order. Others have risen up and sought to change it. Some power transitions have led to the breakdown of the old order and the establishment of a new international hierarchy. Others have brought about only limited adjustments in the regional and global system.

A variety of factors determine the way in which power transitions unfold. The nature of the rising state's regime and the degree of its dissatisfaction with the old order are critical: at the end of the nineteenth century, the United States, a liberal country an ocean away from Europe, was better able to embrace the British-centered international order than Germany was. But even more decisive is the character of the international order itself -- for it is the nature of the international order that shapes a rising state's choice between challenging that order and integrating into it. 


The postwar Western order is historically unique. Any international order dominated by a powerful state is based on a mix of coercion and consent, but the U.S.-led order is distinctive in that it has been more liberal than imperial -- and so unusually accessible, legitimate, and durable. Its rules and institutions are rooted in, and thus reinforced by, the evolving global forces of democracy and capitalism. It is expansive, with a wide and widening array of participants and stakeholders. It is capable of generating tremendous economic growth and power while also signaling restraint --all of which make it hard to overturn and easy to join.

It was the explicit intention of the Western order's architects in the 1940s to make that order integrative and expansive. Before the Cold War split the world into competing camps, Franklin Roosevelt sought to create a one-world system managed by cooperative great powers that would rebuild war-ravaged Europe, integrate the defeated states, and establish mechanisms for security cooperation and expansive economic growth. In fact, it was Roosevelt who urged -­over the opposition of Winston Churchill -- that China be included as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The then Australian ambassador to the United States wrote in his diary after his first meeting with Roosevelt during the war, "He said that he had numerous discussions with Winston about China and that he felt that Winston was 40 years behind the times on China and he continually referred to the Chinese as 'Chinks' and 'Chinamen' and he felt that this was very dangerous. He wanted to keep China as a friend because in 40 or 50 years' time China might easily become a very powerful military nation." 

Over the next half century, the United States used the system of rules and institutions it had built to good effect. West Germany was bound to its democratic Western European neighbors through the European Coal and Steel Community (and, later, the European Community) and to the United States through the Atlantic security pact; Japan was bound to the United States through an alliance partnership and expanding economic ties. The Bretton Woods meeting in 1944 laid down the monetary and trade rules that facilitated the opening and subsequent flourishing of the world economy -­an astonishing achievement given the ravages of war and the competing interests of the great powers. Additional agreements between the United States, Western Europe, and Japan solidified the open and multilateral character of the postwar world economy. After the onset of the Cold War, the Marshall Plan in Europe and the 1951 security pact between the United States and Japan further integrated the defeated Axis powers into the Western order.

In the final days of the Cold War, this system once again proved remarkably successful. As the Soviet Union declined, the Western order offered a set of rules and institutions that provided Soviet leaders with both reassurances and points of access --effectively encouraging them to become a part of the system. Moreover, the shared leadership of the order ensured accommodation of the Soviet Union. As the Reagan administration pursued a hard-line policy toward Moscow, the Europeans pursued détente and engagement. For every hard-line "push," there was a moderating "pull," allowing Mikhail Gorbachev to pursue high-risk reforms. On the eve of German unification, the fact that a united Germany would be embedded in European and Atlantic institutions --rather than becoming an independent great power --helped reassure Gorbachev that neither German nor Western intentions were hostile. After the Cold War, the Western order once again managed the integration of a new wave of countries, this time from the formerly communist world. Three particular features of the Western order have been critical to this success and longevity. 

First, unlike the imperial systems of the past, the Western order is built around rules and norms of nondiscrimination and market openness, creating conditions for rising states to advance their expanding economic and political goals within it. Across history, international orders have varied widely in terms of whether the material benefits that are generated accrue disproportionately to the leading state or are widely shared. In the Western system, the barriers to economic participation are low, and the potential benefits are high. China has already discovered the massive economic returns that are possible by operating within this open-market system. 

Second is the coalition-based character of its leadership. Past orders have tended to be dominated by one state. The stakeholders of the current Western order include a coalition of powers arrayed around the United States --an important distinction. These leading states, most of them advanced liberal democracies, do not always agree, but they are engaged in a continuous process of give-and-take over economics, politics, and security. Power transitions are typically seen as being played out between two countries, a rising state and a declining hegemon, and the order falls as soon as the power balance shifts. But in the current order, the larger aggregation of democratic capitalist states -- and the resulting accumulation of geopolitical power --shifts the balance in the order's favor. 

Third, the postwar Western order has an unusually dense, encompassing, and broadly endorsed system of rules and institutions. Whatever its shortcomings, it is more open and rule-based than any previous order. State sovereignty and the rule of law are not just norms enshrined in the United Nations Charter. They are part of the deep operating logic of the order. To be sure, these norms are evolving, and the United States itself has historically been ambivalent about binding itself to international law and institutions -- and at no time more so than today. But the overall system is dense with multilateral rules and institutions -- global and regional, economic, political, and security-related. These represent one of the great breakthroughs of the postwar era. They have laid the basis for unprecedented levels of cooperation and shared authority over the global system. 

The incentives these features create for China to integrate into the liberal international order are reinforced by the changed nature of the international economic environment -- especially the new interdependence driven by technology. The most farsighted Chinese leaders understand that globalization has changed the game and that China accordingly needs strong, prosperous partners around the world. From the United States' perspective, a healthy Chinese economy is vital to the United States and the rest of the world. Technology and the global economic revolution have created a logic of economic relations that is different from the past --making the political and institutional logic of the current order all the more powerful. 


The most important benefit of these features today is that they give the Western order a remarkable capacity to accommodate rising powers. New entrants into the system have ways of gaining status and authority and opportunities to play a role in governing the order. The fact that the United States, China, and other great powers have nuclear weapons also limits the ability of a rising power to overturn the existing order. In the age of nuclear deterrence, great-power war is, thankfully, no longer a mechanism of historical change. War-driven change has been abolished as a historical process.

The Western order's strong framework of rules and institutions is already starting to facilitate Chinese integration. At first, China embraced certain rules and institutions for defensive purposes: protecting its sovereignty and economic interests while seeking to reassure other states of its peaceful intentions by getting involved in regional and global groupings. But as the scholar Marc Lanteigne argues, "What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers, is that not only is it 'growing up' within a milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country's development of global power status." China, in short, is increasingly working within, rather than outside of, the Western order.

China is already a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a legacy of Roosevelt's determination to build the universal body around diverse great-power leadership. This gives China the same authority and advantages of "great­power exceptionalism" as the other permanent members. The existing global trading system is also valuable to China, and increasingly so. Chinese economic interests are quite congruent with the current global economic system --a system that is open and loosely institutionalized and that China has enthusiastically embraced and thrived in. State power today is ultimately based on sustained economic growth, and China is well aware that no major state can modernize without integrating into the globalized capitalist system; if a country wants to be a world power, it has no choice but to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). The road to global power, in effect, runs through the Western order and its multilateral economic institutions.

China not only needs continued access to the global capitalist system; it also wants the protections that the system's rules and institutions provide. The WTO's multilateral trade principles and dispute-settlement mechanisms, for example, offer China tools to defend against the threats of discrimination and protectionism that rising economic powers often confront. The evolution of China's policy suggests that Chinese leaders recognize these advantages: as Beijing's growing commitment to economic liberalization has increased the foreign investment and trade China has enjoyed, so has Beijing increasingly embraced global trade rules. It is possible that as China comes to champion the WTO, the support of the more mature Western economies for the WTO will wane. But it is more likely that both the rising and the declining countries will find value in the quasi-legal mechanisms that allow conflicts to be settled or at least diffused.

The existing international economic institutions also offer opportunities for new powers to rise up through their hierarchies. In the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, governance is based on economic shares, which growing countries can translate into greater institutional voice. To be sure, the process of adjustment has been slow. The United States and Europe still dominate the IMF. Washington has a 17 percent voting share (down from 30 percent) --a controlling amount, because 85 percent approval is needed for action --and the European Union has a major say in the appointment of ten of the 24 members of the board. But there are growing pressures, notably the need for resources and the need to maintain relevance, that will likely persuade the Western states to admit China into the inner circle of these economic governance institutions. The IMF's existing shareholders, for example, see a bigger role for rising developing countries as necessary to renew the institution and get it through its current crisis of mission. At the IMF's meeting in Singapore in September 2006, they agreed on reforms that will give China, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey a greater voice.

As China sheds its status as a developing country (and therefore as a client of these institutions), it will increasingly be able to act as a patron and stakeholder instead. Leadership in these organizations is not simply a reflection of economic size (the United States has retained its voting share in the IMF even as its economic weight has declined); nonetheless, incremental advancement within them will create important opportunities for China.


Seen in this light, the rise of China need not lead to a volcanic struggle with the United States over global rules and leadership. The Western order has the potential to turn the coming power shift into a peaceful change on terms favorable to the United States. But that will only happen if the United States sets about strengthening the existing order. Today, with Washington preoccupied with terrorism and war in the Middle East, rebuilding Western rules and institutions might to some seem to be of only marginal relevance. Many Bush administration officials have been outright hostile to the multilateral, rule-based system that the United States has shaped and led. Such hostility is foolish and dangerous. China will become powerful: it is already on the rise, and the United States' most powerful strategic weapon is the ability to decide what sort of international order will be in place to receive it.

The United States must reinvest in the Western order, reinforcing the features of that order that encourage engagement, integration, and restraint. The more this order binds together capitalist democratic states in deeply rooted institutions; the more open, consensual, and rule-based it is; and the more widely spread its benefits, the more likely it will be that rising powers can and will secure their interests through integration and accommodation rather than through war. And if the Western system offers rules and institutions that benefit the full range of states -- rising and falling, weak and strong, emerging and mature --its dominance as an international order is all but certain.

The first thing the United States must do is reestablish itself as the foremost supporter of the global system of governance that underpins the Western order. Doing so will first of all facilitate the kind of collective problem solving that makes all countries better off. At the same time, when other countries see the United States using its power to strengthen existing rules and institutions, that power is rendered more legitimate --and U.S. authority is strengthened. Countries within the West become more inclined to work with, rather than resist, U.S. power, which reinforces the centrality and dominance of the West itself. 

Renewing Western rules and institutions will require, among other things, updating the old bargains that underpinned key postwar security pacts. The strategic understanding behind both NATO and Washington's East Asian alliances is that the United States will work with its allies to provide security and bring them in on decisions over the use of force, and U.S. allies, in return, will operate within the U.S.-led Western order. Security cooperation in the West remains extensive today, but with the main security threats less obvious than they were during the Cold War, the purposes and responsibilities of these alliances are under dispute. Accordingly, the United States needs to reaffirm the political value of these alliances --recognizing that they are part of a wider Western institutional architecture that allows states to do business with one another.

The United States should also renew its support for wide-ranging multilateral institutions. On the economic front, this would include building on the agreements and architecture of the WTO, including pursuing efforts to conclude the current Doha Round of trade talks, which seeks to extend market opportunities and trade liberalization to developing countries. The WTO is at a critical stage. The basic standard of nondiscrimination is at risk thanks to the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements. Meanwhile, there are growing doubts over whether the WTO can in fact carry out trade liberalization, particularly in agriculture, that benefits developing countries. These issues may seem narrow, but the fundamental character of the liberal international order -- its commitment to universal rules of openness that spread gains widely -- is at stake. Similar doubts haunt a host of other multilateral agreements --on global warming and nuclear nonproliferation, among others -- and they thus also demand renewed U.S. leadership.

The strategy here is not simply to ensure that the Western order is open and rule-based. It is also to make sure that the order does not fragment into an array of bilateral and "minilateral" arrangements, causing the United States to find itself tied to only a few key states in various regions. Under such a scenario, China would have an opportunity to build its own set of bilateral and "minilateral" pacts. As a result, the world would be broken into competing U.S. and Chinese spheres. The more security and economic relations are multilateral and all-encompassing, the more the global system retains its coherence.

In addition to maintaining the openness and durability of the order, the United States must redouble its efforts to integrate rising developing countries into key global institutions. Bringing emerging countries into the governance of the international order will give it new life. The United States and Europe must find room at the table not only for China but also for countries such as Brazil, India, and South Africa. A Goldman Sachs report on the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) noted that by 2050 these countries' economies could together be larger than those of the original G-6 countries (Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) combined. Each international institution presents its own challenges. The UN Security Council is perhaps the hardest to deal with, but its reform would also bring the greatest returns. Less formal bodies --the so-called G-20 and various other intergovernmental networks --can provide alternative avenues for voice and representation. 


The key thing for U.S. leaders to remember is that it may be possible for China to overtake the United States alone, but it is much less likely that China will ever manage to overtake the Western order. In terms of economic weight, for example, China will surpass the United States as the largest state in the global system sometime around 2020. (Because of its population, China needs a level of productivity only one-fifth that of the United States to become the world's biggest economy.) But when the economic capacity of the Western system as a whole is considered, China's economic advances look much less significant; the Chinese economy will be much smaller than the combined economies of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development far into the future. This is even truer of military might: China cannot hope to come anywhere close to total OECD military expenditures anytime soon. The capitalist democratic world is a powerful constituency for the preservation --and, indeed, extension --of the existing international order. If China intends to rise up and challenge the existing order, it has a much more daunting task than simply confronting the United States. 

The "unipolar moment" will eventually pass. U.S. dominance will eventually end. U.S. grand strategy, accordingly, should be driven by one key question: What kind of international order would the United States like to see in place when it is less powerful?

This might be called the neo-Rawlsian question of the current era. The political philosopher John Rawls argued that political institutions should be conceived behind a "veil of ignorance" -- that is, the architects should design institutions as if they do not know precisely where they will be within a socioeconomic system. The result would be a system that safeguards a person's interests regardless of whether he is rich or poor, weak or strong. The United States needs to take that approach to its leadership of the international order today. It must put in place institutions and fortify rules that will safeguard its interests regardless of where exactly in the hierarchy it is or how exactly power is distributed in 10, 50, or 100 years.

Fortunately, such an order is in place already. The task now is to make it so expansive and so institutionalized that China has no choice but to become a full-fledged member of it. The United States cannot thwart China's rise, but it can help ensure that China's power is exercised within the rules and institutions that the United States and its partners have crafted over the last century, rules and institutions that can protect the interests of all states in the more crowded world of the future. The United States' global position may be weakening, but the international system the United States leads can remain the dominant order of the twenty-first century. 



 January/February/2008 | G. John Ikenberry  |Foreign Affairs 

  西方秩序强大的制度框架已经开始帮助中国融入其中。一开始,中国出于防御目的,接受了一些规则制度以保护主权和经济利益。同时它又加入一些地区性和全球性组织,以确定其他国家对其的善意。但就如学者马克·兰滕(Marc Lanteigne)所描述的那样:“中国与之前大国的不同之处在于,它不仅仅在这样一个前所未有的国际体系下高速增长,更重要的是在其增长的同时还主动利用这些制度推进其在国际大国中地位的上升。”简而言之,中国正逐渐学会在西方秩序内而不是秩序外谋求发展。


中国崛起与西方世界的未来(The Rise of China and the Future of the West )
12/2008| G.约翰·伊肯贝瑞/ 云南师范大学马克思主义研究中心译中| 国外理论动态2008年第12期

  中国的崛起无疑是20世纪的重大事件之一。然而,这出戏到底将如何上演,则前景未卜。中国要推翻现存国际秩序,还是要成为现存国际秩序的一部分?不论前景如何,当中国崛起时,美国在保持其国际地位方面还能有所作为吗?   有些观察家认为,由于西方主导的世界秩序被日益由东方主导的世界秩序所取代,所以美国时代正在终结。现实主义者一直认为,由于中国变得更加强大,而美国地位衰退,如下两件事情都可能发生:中国会努力利用其不断增强的影响来改造国际体系的规则和制度,以更好地为中国的利益服务,而体系中的其他国家,尤其是正在衰退的世界霸权国家,将把中国视为正在增长的安全威胁。现实主义者预言,这些发展的结果将是紧张、不信任和冲突,这是霸权更替的典型特征。按照这种看法,中国崛起这一事件的特征将表现为日益强大的中国和正在衰败的美国陷入关于国际体系规则和领导权的大规模战争中。并且由于世界最强大的国家并不是来自二战后建立的国际秩序,而是在它之外产生的,因此,这一事件的最终结果将是中国取得巨大优势以及以亚洲为中心的世界秩序开始形成。   然而,这一过程并非不可避免。中国的崛起不一定会引起扭转性的霸权更替。因为中国面对的国际秩序与过去崛起的国家面对的国际秩序根本不同,所以,美中力量的更替不同于过去的力量更替。中国不只面对美国,中国还面对着一个开放的、一体的、以规则为基础的西方中心体系,这一体系有着广泛而深刻的政治基础。同时,原子能革命使得大国之间不太可能发生战争——这消除了新兴力量用来瓦解衰退中的霸权国家所维护的国际体系的主要手段。简言之,今日的西方秩序推翻难,加入易。   这一异常持久和具有扩张性的秩序本身是卓有远见的美国领导层的创造物。二战后,美国不仅仅把自己打造成领导世界的力量,而且引领了引发全球成员资格,使民主政治与市场社会紧密结合在一起的普遍机制的形成过程。美国建立的是有利于已有大国和新独立国家都参与其中、融入其中的秩序。(人们常常忘记,设计这种战后秩序,主要是要将战败的轴心国和联合起来的同盟国重新融入统一的国际体系中。)今天,中国能够全面进入这一国际体系,并在其中发展壮大。如果中国这样做,中国将会崛起,而西方体系——如果得到恰当的管理——也将存在下去。   面对发展中的中国,美国应该记住,美国在西方体系中的领导地位使它能够决定中国将在其中作出关键的战略选择的环境。如果美国想保持这种领导地位,华盛顿必须采取行动来强化支撑西方体系的规则和制度——使其易于参与,难于推翻。美国的大战略应该围绕立足西方,走向东方的铭言来建立。一定要把这一体系的根基尽可能扎深,更多地激励中国融入该体系,而不是反对该体系,并增加该国际体系在美国相关力量衰败后存活的机会。   美国单极时代的终结不可避免。如果20世纪的泾渭分明的斗争在中美之间发生,那么,中国将占优。如果21世纪界限明确的斗争发生在中国与复兴了的西方体系之间,那么,西方将获胜。      一、过渡期的担忧      中国在成为世界强国的道路上进展顺利。中国的经济规模从20世纪70年代后期启动市场改革以来已翻了两番,据估计,未来十年还要再翻一番。中国已成为世界主要的制造业中心之一,大概消费世界钢、铁、煤供应量的三分之一。中国积累了雄厚的外汇储备,到2006年底其外汇储备超过一万亿美元。中国的军费开支每年以18%以上的速度膨胀,中国的外交触角不仅影响亚洲,而且伸向了非洲、拉美以及中东。苏联只是在军事上成为美国的竞争对手,与此不同,中国作为美国军事和经济两方面的对手正在崛起——这预示着全球力量分布的深刻变化。   力量的更替是国际关系中反复出现的问题。保罗·肯尼迪和罗伯特·吉尔平一类的学者已描述过这一状况,世界政治的特征就是实力国家连续不断地兴起并建立国际体系。强大的国家能够创立并强制推行一种稳定的全球体系的规则和制度,并在其中实现它的利益和安全。但是,没有永远不变的事物:力量分布中的长期变化产生出新的挑战国家,它们就原有国际秩序的协定发起斗争。新兴国家要让它们新获得的力量转变为全球体系中更大的权力——根据它自己的利益来重构国际规则和体制。相反,正在衰退的国家害怕失去支配权,担心它们的弱势地位所带来的安全隐患。   这时,危机四伏。当一国在国际体系中占据支配地位时,该国和较弱的国家都没有改变现存国际秩序的动机。但是,当挑战国的力量发展起来并且现在的支配国的力量弱化时,战略竞争就接踵而至,冲突——或许引起战争的冲突——就可能出现。19世纪晚期的德国戏剧般地体现了力量更替产生的危机。许多观察家看到这种事态变化也出现在美中关系中。一位现实主义学派学者,约翰·米尔斯海默写道:假如中国在未来数十年内继续其令人瞩目的经济增长,美国与中国可能陷于激烈的安全竞争中,其导致战争的可能性相当大。”   但不是所有的力量更替都引发战争,或者都推翻原有的国际秩序。20世纪上半叶,英国将霸权拱手让给美国,没有发生大的冲突,甚至没有造成双方关系的破裂。从20世纪40年代末到90年代初,日本经济从相当于美国GDP5%发展到相当于美国GDP60%,日本也没有向现存的国际秩序发起挑战。   显然,存在着不同的力量更替类型。一些国家看到它们经济和地缘政治的力量取得了令人瞩目的发展,还照样让自己适应现存的国际秩序。而另外一些国家发展起来后,就试图改变现存国际秩序。有些力量更替会导致旧国际秩序的瓦解和新国际关系的建立。还有一些力量更替仅仅引发地区体系和全球体系作出有限的调整。   多种因素决定着力量更替的方式。新兴国家政治体制的性质以及其对国际政治旧秩序不满的程度是关键所在:19世纪末,美国——一个与欧洲隔海相望的自由国家,比德国能更好地支持以英国为中心的国际秩序。但更具决定性的因素是国际体系本身的性质——因为国际体系的性质决定了新兴国家是选择挑战还是选择融入国际秩序。      二、开放的秩序      战后的西方体系是历史上独一无二的。由强国所主导的国际体系的基础是胁迫和顺从的混合体,但以美国为首的体系是独特的,因为它比帝国体系更加自由——并且很容易进入,是合理而又持久的。其规则和制度植根于不断发展的全球民主政治和资本主义的力量中,因而也被这种力量所强化。这一秩序是扩张性的,拥有广泛和不断扩大的参与者队伍和利益相关者。它能够在带来巨大的经济增长和实力的同时,又释放出约束力——所有这些让这一制度难于推翻而易于参与。   使国际体系具有一体性和扩张性是20世纪40年代西方体系的设计者的明确意图。在冷战把世界分裂成两大敌对阵营之前,弗兰克林·罗斯福试图创造一个由彼此合作的大国共同控制的世界一统的国际体系——各合作大国将重建受战争破坏的欧洲,整合战败国,建立安全合作与扩大经济增长的机制。事实上,是罗斯福不顾持反对意见的温斯顿·丘吉尔,主张中国应成为联合国安理会常任理事国。二战期间,澳大利亚驻美大使在与罗斯福第一次会晤后在日记中写道:他(罗斯福)说他与温斯顿就中国问题进行了多次商谈,而且,他认为温斯顿对中国的了解落后了四十年,温斯顿时常把中国人讲成中国佬(Chinks and China men),罗斯福认为这是非常危险的。因为四十或五十年后中国很可能成为一个军事强国,罗斯福想和中国保持友好。”   
在接下来的半个世纪里,美国用它建立的体系中的规则与制度取得了满意的效果。西德通过欧洲煤钢共同体(之后,建立了欧洲共同体)使自己融入民主的西欧邻邦中,又通过大西洋安全公约与美国建立了稳定的关系;日本通过联盟伙伴关系和发展经济联系与美国紧密联系在一起。1944年,布雷顿森林会议制定了推动世界经济开放和繁荣的货币体制和贸易规则——考虑到战争的破坏和大国之间的利益角逐,这是惊人的成就。美、欧、日之间的附加协定巩固了战后世界经济开放的、多边的特征。冷战开始后,欧洲的马歇尔计划和1951年美日之间的安保条约,进一步把战败的轴心国整合到西方体系中。   冷战的最后日子里,西方体系再次被证明是非常成功的。随着苏联的衰落,西方体系所提供的一整套规则和制度让苏联领导人感到放心和可以融入——这有效地鼓励了他们成为这一体系的一部分。该体系的共同领导权保证了苏联的融入。由于里根政府对莫斯科推行强硬政策,欧洲人则实行有限制的接触政策。对于每一项强硬路线的推行,都有一个缓和的回调”——这使得米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫能够实行有高风险的改革。在德国统一前夕,德国会融入欧洲与大西洋的体系中,而不会成为一个独立的强国这一事实,有助于使戈尔巴乔夫相信德国和西方的意图没有敌意。冷战后,西方体系又一次应对了来自先前共产主义世界的许多新浪潮国家的一体化。西方体系的三个特征对其成就和生命力是至关重要的。   首先,与过去的帝国体系不同,围绕各种非歧视的和市场开放的规则和原则建立起来的西方体系,创造出让新崛起的国家在西方体系框架内发展经济、实现政治目标的条件。历史上,各种国际体系存在广泛差异,其区分的根据是它所产生的物质利益是不成比例地集中到了占主导地位的国家手中,还是被广泛共享了。在西方体系中,经济参与壁垒低,潜在利益高。中国已认识到,在这种开放的市场体系中运行,可能获得巨大的经济回报。   其次,西方体系的领导权的特点表现为以联合为基础。过去的体系趋向于由一个国家来支配。现在的西方体系参与者包括美国阵营中各种力量的联合——这是个重大的差别。这些为首的国家,大多数发展了自由民主,虽然不能在所有问题上达成一致,但它们在经济、政治以及安全上不断相互妥协。力量更替通常被认为发生在两个国家之间——正在崛起的国家与正在衰退的霸权国家之间,一旦力量平衡发生变化,体系就会失灵。但在现时的体系中,民主资本主义国家在更大程度上的一体化——以及地缘政治力量的积聚——使得这种平衡的改变符合西方体系的利益。   再次,战后的西方体系其规则和制度非常严密,具有包容性,并得到广泛的认可。尽管它不完美,但它比先前的体系更加开放,也更加以规则为基础。国家主权和法治不仅仅是写在联合国宪章中的原则规范,而且是战后西方体系内在的操作逻辑的组成部分。可以相信,这些规范正在完善,从历史上看,美国本身对遵守国际法和国际制度的态度模棱两可——今天最为突出。但整个战后西方体系在多边规则和机制上是严密的——这些规则和机制有全球性的,也有区域的,涉及经济、政治以及安全。这些表现出战后时代的巨大突破。它们为全球体系范围内空前的合作和权利共享奠定了基础。   国际经济环境性质的变化——尤其是科技进步产生的新的相互依赖,强化了这些特征所创造的中国融入自由的国际体系的动机。最有远见的中国领导人认识到,全球化已经改变了游戏规则,因此,中国需要全世界范围内的强大和繁荣的伙伴。从美国的观点看,健康发展的中国经济对美国和世界至关重要。科技和全球经济变革创造出不同于过去的经济关系的内在逻辑——使目前体系的政治和制度逻辑更强大。      三、接纳崛起的国家      今天这些特征最大的好处是,提供了西方体系接纳崛起国家的巨大能力。进入这个体系的新成员,有获得地位、权力的途径以及在管理该体系时发挥作用的机会。美国、中国和其他大国拥有核武器这一现实也限制了新崛起国家推翻现存体系的能力。在核威胁时代,大国战争不再是历史变迁的机制。由战争推动的变革不再是历史的进程。   西方体系中强大的规则和制度框架已开始促进中国的一体化。首先,中国出于自我保护的目的支持某些规则和制度:保护中国的主权和经济利益,同时通过参与全球和地区性的组织,努力让别的国家对中国的和平意愿安心。但正如学者马可·兰泰恩所认为的那样:中国不同于世界上其他国家,因而也不同于以前的全球力量之处在于,中国不仅在前所未有的发达国际体系环境中实现了迅猛发展,而且,更为重要的是,中国在发展的同时,积极利用这些制度来提高中国的国际地位。简言之,中国在西方体系中,而不是在西方体系之外,日益发挥着更大的作用。   中国已经是联合国安理会常任理事国,这是罗斯福围绕多变的强国领导权,建立世界性组织的决定的产物。这让中国拥有与其他常任理事国一样的权力以及强国专有greatpower exceptionalism)的优势。现存的国际贸易体系也有利于中国,而且这种好处正日益增长。中国的经济利益与目前的世界经济体系是很一致的——一种开放的、制度松散的、中国热衷于融入并在其中繁荣发展的体系。今天国力在根本上是以经济的可持续发展为基础的,中国已清楚地意识到,不参与到全球化的资本主义体系中,任何大国都不能实现现代化;如果要想成为世界性的强国,一国别无选择,而只有加入世界贸易组织。事实上,这条通向世界强国的道路是通过西方体系及多边经济制度而展开的。   中国不仅需要继续融入到全球资本主义体系中,它也想获得这一体系的规则和制度所提供的保护。例如,WTO的多边贸易原则和争端解决机制,为中国提供了防御新兴的经济力量常常面临的贸易歧视和保护主义威胁的工具。中国的政策变化让人感到中国领导人认识到了如下好处:北京一边通过扩大对经济自由化的承诺来增加自己想要的外国投资和贸易,一边日益适应世界贸易规则。有可能出现如下情况,即因为中国支持WTO,更为成熟的西方经济体对WTO的支持度将衰减。但更大的可能是,新崛起的国家和衰退的国家都将能够使冲突得到解决或者至少使其淡化准法律机制的价值。   现存的国际经济制度还提供了让新的力量通过它们的平台崛起的各种机会。在国际货币基金组织和世界银行中,管理是以经济份额为基础的,发展中国家可以把这种经济份额转变成国际体系中更大的发言权。可以肯定,调整的步伐已经放缓。美国和欧洲还控制着国际货币基金组织。但是压力也在不断增加,特别是对资源的需求和维持关系的需要,这有可能会说服西方国家接纳中国进入这些经济管理制度的核心集团。例如,国际货币基金组织的现有股东意识到崛起的发展中国家对于更新制度并渡过其目前的使命危机是必不可少的。   随着中国摆脱其作为发展中国家(因此是这些制度的委托人)的地位,它将日益能够作为赞助人而不是作为受益人来行动。在这些组织中,领导力不仅仅是经济规模的反映(即使美国的经济比重下降,它仍然保持其在国际货币基金组织中的选举权份额);而且,它们内部的不断发展将给中国创造出重要的机会。      四、力量更替与和平变革      按这种看法,中国的崛起不需要引起同美国就全球规则和领导权的激烈斗争。西方体系有能力将即将发生的力量更替转变为对美国有利的和平变革。但是,这种情况只有在美国着手强化现存体系的条件下才会发生。今天,由于华盛顿集中精力对付恐怖主义和中东战争,重建西方规则和制度的重要性似乎在某种程度上并不突出。布什政府的许多官员直接敌视美国制定和领导的、基于规则的多边制度。这种敌对情绪是愚蠢和危险的。中国将变得强大:它正在崛起,美国最有力的战略武器是,它有能力决定哪种国际体系将会恰当地应对中国的崛起。 

美国必须重新投入西方体系中,强化西方体系鼓励参与、整合以及遏制的特征。西方体系越是在根深蒂固的制度中把资本主义民主国家联系在一起,它就越开放、越融合、越以规则为基础;并且西方体系的好处越广泛传播,新崛起的国家就越可能通过整合和融入,而该体系不需要通过战争来保护资本主义民主国家的利益。假如西方体系提供的规则和制度对各种发展层次的国家——崛起的和衰退的,弱小的和强大的,刚兴起的和发展成熟的——都有益,那么,作为国际体系其支配地位毋庸置疑。   美国首先要做的是将自己重塑为支撑西方秩序的全球统治体系的最大支持者。这样做,首先会有利于使所有国家经济转好的各种共同问题的解决。同时,当其他国家看到美国运用其力量来加强现存的规则和制度时,这种力量将获得更大的合法性——这就会加强美国的权威。西方国家会更倾向于与美国力量合作,而不是对抗,这会加强西方本身的中心地位和统治地位。   西方规则和制度的革新,首先要求修订支撑战后重要安全公约的旧协定。北大西洋公约组织以及华盛顿与东亚的联盟背后的战略互信就是,美国将会在提供安全、带领盟国就使用武装力量作出决定方面与其盟国合作,反之,美国的盟国将在美国为首的西方体系内运转。虽然西方的安全合作今天仍在扩大,但是由于其主要安全威胁明显小于冷战时期,这些联盟的目标和职责仍然处在争论中。因此,美国需要重申这些联盟的政治价值——承认这些联盟是允许国家之间进行经济交往的、更加广泛的西方制度构架的组成部分。   美国还应更新其对广泛的多边体制的支持。就经济领域而论,这种变更应该涉及WTO的协定和体制结构的建设,包括努力达成目前的多哈回合贸易谈判,这一贸易谈判寻求向发展中国家扩大市场机会和贸易自由化。WTO正处在一个关键阶段。由于双边和区域贸易协定剧增,非歧视的基本标准处在危险中。与此同时,对WTO事实上是否能够实现贸易自由化,特别在农业中,是否有利于发展中国家,出现了日益增多的疑虑。虽然这些问题似乎范围狭窄,但自由的国际秩序的基本特征——其对使收益广泛传播的普遍开放规则的承诺——正处在危险中。类似的疑惑缠绕着许多多边协定——关于全球变暖、核不扩散以及其他的多边协定——因此它们还要求革新美国的领导能力。   这一战略不仅要确保西方体系是开放的和以规则为基础的,也要确保西方体系不被一批批双边和小双边(“minilateral”)的协议肢解,从而导致美国发现自己只是与不同地区的几个关键国家维持着联系。在这种情况下,中国就会有机会建立它自己的一套双边和小双边协定。结果,世界会被分裂为美中相互竞争的不同区域。安全和经济关系越多边化,越全面,全球体系就越能保持和谐一致。   除了保持西方体系的开放性和持久性,美国必须加倍努力把崛起的发展中国家整合到重要的全球制度中。让新兴的国家进入国际体系的控制之中,国际体系将会获得新生。美国和欧洲在谈判桌前不仅要为中国,而且要为巴西、印度和南非这样的国家找到空间。戈德曼·莎科斯关于所谓BRICs(巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国)的报告谈到,到2050年这些国家的经济加起来要超过最早的六国集团(德国、法国、意大利、日本、英国和美国)经济的总和。每一种国际制度面临着自己特有的挑战。联合国安理会也许是最难处理的问题,但是它的改革也会带来最大的转变。非正式组织——所谓20国集团以及各种其他政府间网络组织——能够为争取发言权和代表提供可选择的其他方法。      五、自由制度的胜利      美国领导人要记住的重要事情是,中国仅仅是战胜美国是很可能的,但是中国要想战胜西方体系,其可能性极小。例如,在经济比重方面,2020年前后,中国将超过美国成为全球体制中最大的国家(因为中国的人口,中国要成为世界最大的经济体,只需要美国生产力水平的五分之一)。但是,当把西方体系的经济容量当作一个整体来考虑时,看起来中国的经济发展意义甚微;在可预见的将来,中国经济的规模仍将大大小于经济合作与发展组织国家联合起来的规模。军事力量也与此相应:中国不能企求短期内接近经济合作与发展组织国家的军费总支出。资本主义的民主世界是现存国际体系得以保存、甚至扩大的强有力的支柱。如果中国想要崛起并挑战现存体制,那么,它将遇到比仅仅对抗美国要艰难得多的任务。   单极时代终将过去,美国的支配地位终将结束,因此,推动美国大战略的一个关键问题是:当美国不再那么强大时,美国会认为哪一种国际体系合理?这可以被称为当代的新罗尔斯问题。政治哲学家约翰·罗尔斯坚持认为,政治制度应该在无知之幕之后来构思——即政治建构者构思制度,仿佛他们完全不知道他们在社会经济制度中所处的位置。建构的结果应该是一种保障个人利益的制度,不论这个人是贫还是富、强还是弱。美国今天需要采取上述方法实现其在国际体系中的领导地位,必须恰当地作出各种制度安排,强化各种规则,这将保障美国的利益,而无论美国在层级结构中处于何种位置,也无论在10年、50年或者100年内力量以何种方式分布。   幸运的是,这一体系已经就绪。现在的任务是要使这一体系扩张和制度化,以使中国别无选择而只能成为这一体系中的一个全权代表。虽然美国不能阻止中国的崛起,但美国能有助于确保,中国的力量在美国和其伙伴上个世纪精心设置的规则和制度之内发挥作用,这些规则和制度能够保护将来更加拥挤的世界中各国的利益。美国的全球地位可能正在变弱,但美国领导的国际制度能够继续成为21世纪占主导地位的体系。
  (责任编辑 周守吾)   


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