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美国《防务新闻》:我们愿意为美国挡住中国子弹吗?(Do we want to take a bullet from China for America)

24/04/2013 | WENDELL MINNICK |美国《防务新闻》周刊
As the US pushes forward on the AirSea Battle doctrine and the so-called Asia Pivot, many in the Asia-Pacific are asking for clarification on a subject that could involve them in an unnecessary war with China.


Many frontline allies and partners are asking : Do we want to take a bullet from China for America, especially over policies that are still ambiguous?

Benjamin Schreer, a senior analyst for Defence Strategy at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, looks around Asia and finds a lack of consensus on who among America’s allies and friends are willing to sacrifice themselves for the benefit of a US policy formulated in far-off Washington.

Schreer’s paper, released this month, “Planning the Unthinkable War: ‘AirSea Battle’ and Its Implications for Australia,” does more than just look at Australia’s strategic position and whether it should support the new doctrine. It examines why America’s traditional allies in the region are less supportive than they might have been before the rise of China.

Schreer’s report voices cautious support for the Asia Pivot and the AirSea Battle concept, but also asks, from the perspective of a traditional ally, critical questions that have yet to be addressed by the US government.

These are questions that demand debate in Australia’s democratic society, with a healthy respect for rule of law and transparency.

AirSea Battle presents allies and partners with the classical dilemma of being caught between ‘entrapment and abandonment.’”

Despite China’s growing ability to hold US forces at risk, the Pentagon is pushing forward on a military strategy for fighting and winning a potential war against China.

China does not need to reach strategic parity with US forces, he said.

Instead, its asymmetric strategy aims to prevent or complicate US intervention in territorial disputes by making the potential costs for American forces prohibitively high.

AirSea Battle debates in Australia center on two opposing arguments: “those who see it as a dangerous instrument to ‘contain’ China and potentially drag Australia into a nuclear escalation between two great powers, and those who embrace the concept’s logic and even argue that Australia should develop long-range strike capabilities to contribute to potential offensive operations against China.”

AirSea Battle aims at defeating anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies by withstanding an initial Chinese attack, followed by a blinding campaign against Chinese command and control networks, a missile suppression campaign against China’s land-based systems, and a distant blockade against Chinese merchant ships.

Deep strikes inside China appear limited in achieving political and military objectives due to China’s immense size, he said. Attacking China would be equivalent to 21st century medieval siege warfare. American air and naval strike forces would run out of precision-guided munitions long before they ran out of targets. China’s size and depth, its authoritarian culture, and supporting institutions of internal security make the impact of mainland strikes less likely to succeed.

Importantly, it’s based on the assumption the escalation can be kept below the nuclear threshold, and that Japan and Australia will be active allies throughout the campaign, he said.

Schreer looks around Asia and sees discrepancies in support among US allies and partners. What to do about South Korea, which has little interest in fighting anyone but North Korea? There is Taiwan with complex political and economic relationships with China. Japan lacks the capabilities and perhaps the constitutional mandate needed to engage China in a war.

The AirSea Battle is flawed in that it can only be activated during a major conflict. It is “optimized for high-intensity conventional war between China and the US and its allies” and “applies only in extreme cases,” such as a Chinese attack on Taiwan, Chinese missile strike on Japan or US bases in the region, or the sinking of a US aircraft carrier.

“However, Chinese coercive military actions in territorial disputes with its neighbors (short of high levels of escalation) are much more likely.”

Therefore, AirSea Battle is “not a ‘catch-all’ solution” to America’s conventional deterrence dilemma in the Western Pacific, he said.

It is not in Australia’s interest to fully embrace the logic behind AirSea Battle or develop specific military capabilities to underpin the concept’s implementation. “Openly signing up for the concept would send a strong political message to China that the ADF [Australian Defence Force] is now actively planning and equipping for a potential war with the PLA [People’s Liberation Army].”

There is no need to do so,” he said. Australia’s decision to allow US Marines to base in Darwin has already displayed Australia’s political commitment to the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (ANZUS) alliance.

The development of long-range strike capabilities against China by Australia would be an “unnecessary provocation … let alone a very costly one.”

A serious Australian amphibious strike capability is a rather unrealistic one. A “distant blockade” of Chinese maritime shipping in Southeast Asian chokepoints, such as Malacca, Lombok and Sunda straits, is “much easier proposed than done,” Schreer said. In any event, China would consider such actions acts of war.

Australia does have an interest in making an active contribution to the US AirSea Battle plan, he said. Providing the US with greater strategic depth is one way, though rotational deployment of a US Marine Air-Ground Task Force at Darwin is “largely symbolic and not directly tied to America’s AirSea Battle planning.”

An area of possible assistance during a war would be upgrades of HMAS Sterling to host US carrier strike groups or the use of the Cocos Island airfields for US strike aircraft, in case the strategic environment deteriorates. Australia can also offer, as an option, niche capabilities, such as tanker aircraft, airborne early warning and control, and airborne electronic warfare assets.

He questions whether frontline states, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, would be willing to get involved in war between China and the US if their direct interests were not threatened. Would South Korea get involved in a Philippine scenario or a Taiwan Strait conflict involving the US?

On the one hand, they want to avoid becoming entrapped in Sino-US strategic rivalry. “Signing up for AirSea Battle at a time when there still seems ample opportunity to incorporate China into a peaceful Asian security order could be detrimental to their interests … AirSea Battle could thus have a disruptive effect in US alliance relationships.

On the other hand, their suspicion of China’s strategic trajectory has only increased over the years as they experience a decline in military power relative to China. They want to avoid being abandoned by the US if China becomes a problem, he said.

Japan’s substantial air and naval forces could augment US forces in selected mission areas, including submarine, anti-submarine warfare, and ballistic missile defense.
However, Schreer asks whether Japan can live up to US hopes.

Constitutional restrictions hamper many opportunities to augment US forces in an attack on China.

For South Korea, AirSea Battle is far more problematic. Seoul’s core strategic concern has been North Korean military aggression, and it remains more “ambivalent about the Chinese threat.” Seoul also needs Beijing’s assistance to keep North Korea’s antics under control. South Korea has publicly stated that the new maritime base on the southern resort island of Jeju, between Japan and China, will not host US forces, despite the fact that the base could be the host of 20 South Korean warships.

There are also concerns about getting too involved in Northeast Asian AirSea Battle architecture that would include South Korea’s old enemy, Japan.

Questions should also be raised on whether South Korea would allow US forces to operate strike missions into China during a war, particularly a war involving Chinese aggression against Japan or Taiwan.

Schreer makes several recommendations to the Australian government that are in many ways revelations of how ambiguous and mysterious the US AirSea Battle doctrine has become.

The Australian government should seek a “detailed, classified briefing from its US ally about the specifics of AirSea Battle,” which Schreer said would “demystify the concept.”

The government should also ask the US to release a declassified version of the AirSea Battle strategy to end speculation among allies and partners.

He said Australia should not publicly endorse AirSea Battle, because the US “itself is still in the process of determining the specifics of implementing the concept.”

Australia should also consider implications for the possible integration of the ADF into a Southeast Asian AirSea Battle framework operating alongside US forces.


26/04/2013 | 颜文德 |新华国际
在美国推动空海一体战学说和所谓战略重心向亚洲转移之际,亚太地区很多人正要求澄清一个也许会让他们卷入一场不必要发生的对华战争的问题
    很多前线盟友和伙伴在问:我们愿意舍身为美国挡住中国射来的子弹吗?尤其是为了一些仍然模糊不清的政策。澳大利亚战略政策研究所的资深分析人士本杰明·施里尔环顾亚洲,发现在“美国的哪些盟国和朋友愿意为了一项在遥远的华盛顿制定的美国政策而牺牲自己”这一问题上缺少共识。
    施里尔本月发表的论文《策划难以想像的战争:“空海一体战”及其对澳大利亚的影响》,不仅审视了澳大利亚的战略地位以及澳大利亚是否应支持这一新战略等问题,还研究了美国在这一地区的传统盟友为何对这一政策不太支持———如果是在中国崛起之前,他们本来会更支持这项政策———这一问题。
    施里尔的文章对战略重心向亚洲转移政策和空海一体战概念表示谨慎支持,但也从一个传统盟友的角度提出了一些美国政府尚未回答的关键问题。
    尽管中国让美军面临风险的能力日增,但是五角大楼正推动实施一项在一场可能爆发的对华战争中战胜中国的军事战略。
    施里尔认为,中国不需要取得与美军的战略均势。中国的不对称战略旨在通过使美军付出令人望而却步的高昂代价,防止美国干预领土争端,或使美国的干预复杂化
    在澳大利亚,对空海一体战的辩论集中于两个针锋相对的论点:一些人视之为一个以“遏制”中国为目的的危险工具,可能将澳大利亚拖入两个大国间不断升级的核冲突;另一些人接受这一概念的逻辑,甚至声称澳大利亚应发展远程打击能力、为可能对中国发动的进攻做贡献。
    施里尔认为,空海一体战概念基于以下假设:冲突能被控制在核门槛之下,日本和澳大利亚将在整个战役中充当积极盟友。
    施里尔环顾亚洲,看到美国的盟国和伙伴对这一战略的支持度不一。该如何对付没有兴趣与除朝鲜外的任何国家作战的韩国?台湾与中国有着复杂的政治和经济关系。日本缺乏与中国作战所需的能力,也许还缺乏与中国作战所需的宪法授权。
    空海一体战战略的缺陷在于,只能在重大冲突中予以运用。这一战略能“在中国与美国及其盟友间的高强度常规战争中得到最充分运用”,“仅适用于极端情况”,例如中国进攻台湾、中国对日本或美国在这一地区的基地发动导弹袭击或者中国击沉美国航母
    施里尔指出:“然而,更可能出现的情况是,中国在与其邻国的领土争端中采取强制性军事行动。”
    因此,空海一体战不是解决美国在西太平洋地区面临的常规威慑困境的“万能药”。
    完全接受空海一体战背后的逻辑或发展支持这一战略的实施所需的特定军事能力,不符合澳大利亚的利益。他说:“公开支持这一战略会向中国传递强烈的政治信号,即澳大利亚国防军正积极筹划和准备对人民解放军作战。
    他说:“不需要这样做。”


Planning the unthinkable war: 'AirSea Battle' and its implications for AustraliaExecutive Summary
15/04/2013 | Benjamin Schreer|Australian Strategic Policy Institute


Executive Summary》
As part of America's 'rebalance' towards the Asia–Pacific region, Australia's most important ally is reconsidering its military posture to deal with China's growing 'anti-access/area-denial' (A2/AD) capability, which is gradually eroding America's maritime dominance in the Western Pacific.  China's missiles can now reach large parts of the region.  In response, the Pentagon is working on an 'AirSea Battle' operational concept that aims to deter and, if necessary, to defeat the Chinese military.  While officially the concept isn't targeted against any specific country and is applicable elsewhere (for example, in the Strait of Hormuz), the US military's increased focus on China has given the concept much prominence in the strategic community.

The potential implications of AirSea Battle for Australia are far from trivial.  US policymakers consider Australia a key ally in the concept, not least because of our reliability to contribute forces to coalition operations.  We have a major interest in supporting America's rebalancing towards the Asia–Pacific region and a credible US war-fighting strategy as a deterrent against a China that's increasingly flexing its military muscles.  However, we also need to think through the potential implications of AirSea Battle. After all, this is about a potential military escalation with a major nuclear power.

The Australian strategic debate about AirSea Battle, to the degree that there's been one, has largely centred around two opposing camps: those who see it as a dangerous instrument to 'contain' China and potentially drag Australia into a nuclear escalation between the two great powers, and those who embrace the concept's logic and even argue that Australia should develop long-range strike capabilities to contribute to potential offensive operations against China.  However, it's possible to come to a more nuanced position—one that recognises the potential benefits of AirSea Battle while also identifying its shortcomings and the prospects and limitations of Australia's contribution.

The study addresses some key questions related to AirSea Battle: Is it feasible?  Does it make strategic sense?  How do key allies and partners in Northeast and Southeast Asia view the concept, and what role could they play? What could and should be Australia's specific contributions to AirSea Battle?

Chapter 1 describes China's growing military capacity to pose an increasingly sophisticated A2/AD challenge for US forward-deployed forces.  While it's important not to overstate the current power projection capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), China has already changed the military balance in its 'near seas', particularly in the Taiwan Strait.  The PLA doesn't need to reach strategic parity with US forces.  Instead, its asymmetric strategy aims to prevent or complicate US interventions in territorial disputes by making the potential costs for American forces prohibitively high.  AirSea Battle aims at defeating such A2/AD strategies by withstanding an initial Chinese attack, followed by a 'blinding campaign' against PLA command and control networks, a 'missile suppression campaign' against China's land-based systems, and a 'distant blockade' against Chinese merchant ships in the Malacca Strait and elsewhere.  Importantly, it's based on the assumptions that the escalation can be kept below the nuclear threshold, and that Japan and Australia will be active allies throughout the campaign.  Far from being just a fancy of Pentagon planners, AirSea Battle has gained institutional momentum and first steps towards its implementation are being taken.

Chapter 2 analyses the feasibility and utility of AirSea Battle.  A common criticism is that the concept might be unaffordable, given severe cuts to the US defence budget.  Moreover, interservice rivalry might obstruct major shifts of resources.  However, despite inevitable budget cuts, the US military will most likely be able to spend well over US$450 billion (in today's dollars) annually between 2013 and 2021, so significant financial resources will be available for AirSea Battle.  The US has already begun shifting some of those resources away from the US Army and towards the Navy and Air Force.  Furthermore, interservice rivalries could be mitigated by incorporating the US Marines and the US Army in a broader strategy to counter A2/AD challenges.

The biggest questions about AirSea Battle are strategic.  In principle, the initiative should be welcomed as a way to strengthen America's conventional deterrence vis-a-vis China by developing a concept for operations in maritime zones contested by the PLA.  Deterrence is based on perceptions about intentions and capabilities.  Any Chinese leader would need to calculate the possibility of a US reaction in response to a major military action designed to change the status quo in the Western Pacific.  And, contrary to conventional wisdom, states go to war over 'reputational' interests.  AirSea Battle could thus make a contribution to regional stability by promoting deterrence in Sino-US strategic affairs.

That said, AirSea Battle is optimised for high-intensity conventional war between China and the US and its allies. It applies only in extreme cases, such as a Chinese attack on Taiwan, PLA missile attacks on Japan or US bases in the region, or the sinking of an American aircraft carrier.  However, Chinese coercive military actions in territorial disputes with its neighbours (short of high levels of escalation) are much more likely.  AirSea Battle is therefore not a 'catch all' solution to America's conventional deterrence dilemma in the Western Pacific.  Moreover, it isn't clear how AirSea Battle fits within a broader US grand strategic framework to deal with China's military rise.  As a result, the concept suffers from an image problem, as many observers equate it to US attempts to militarily 'contain' China and wonder about the relationship between operational and political objectives.  Analysts have therefore called for the development of a grand strategic framework to guide US Asia–Pacific defence strategy. Allies such as Australia should press for a declassified, allied version of AirSea Battle to have a better understanding about Pentagon thinking.

AirSea Battle also faces the challenge of a potential nuclear escalation.  A central element of the concept is the deep penetration of Chinese territory to destroy and disrupt PLA command and control nodes used for conventional operations.  But such a 'blinding campaign' could increase the risk of a disproportionate Chinese response, including nuclear escalation.  Beijing might well perceive such attacks as American attempts to disarm China's nuclear deterrent and could thus be tempted to nuclear pre-emption.  Thus it's important to also consider alternatives debated among US strategists, such as 'offshore control', which refrains from direct strikes against the Chinese mainland while still retaining the capability to deny China freedom of military action in its maritime approaches.

Chapter 3 discusses the potential role of key allies and partners in Northeast and Southeast Asia in AirSea Battle. Not surprisingly, the result is mixed.  In Northeast Asia, Japan and Taiwan are the most comfortable with the premises of the concept, given that they're 'frontline' states and deeply worried about China's rise and intentions.  Japan, in particular, is moving to acquire significant air and maritime capability to support its US ally in the event of war.  Despite the fact that South Korea has also become more concerned about China and has started to shift its defence planning more towards maritime power projection, it's much more ambivalent about the concept.  Its main objective remains to defend against North Korean aggression, and its political disputes with China are of much lesser intensity.

Southeast Asian allies and partners seem even more guarded, partly because it's unclear how AirSea Battle could apply to their maritime disputes with China.  The Philippines is politically the most supportive and could bring added value as a geostrategic location for US forces.  The most potent military power in the region is Singapore, where the US has now forward deployed littoral combat ships and could potentially use naval bases for submarines and repairs.  However, Singapore doesn't have maritime disputes with China and is ambivalent about how it would react in times of war.  Vietnam and Indonesia could also play important roles in the AirSea Battle concept.  However, both Hanoi and Jakarta are also reluctant to be seen to be close to Washington .  As a result, political support for involvement in AirSea Battle planning in Southeast Asia might be low despite regional countries looking to the US to support their hedging strategies against a more assertive China.

Chapter 4 analyses the potential implications of AirSea Battle for Australia.  Our political reliability as an ally, our geostrategic position between the Pacific and Indian oceans, and the high standard of the ADF make us a preferred US partner.  In the view of some proponents, Australia's maximum contribution could include:
  • providing 'strategic depth' for the US ally (including by allowing the US access to Australian facilities), and conducting so-called 'supportive rearguard operations', by protecting forward-operating troops and allied bases in Northeast Asia, and even by developing a long-range strike capability to penetrate Chinese airspace
  • conducting 'offensive amphibious strike' operations in the Southeast Asian and South Pacific archipelagos to attack Chinese facilities and troops operating in the area
  • contributing to 'peripheral campaigns' (that is, participating in the maritime interdiction of Chinese merchant and energy vessels to threaten Beijing with a crippling 'distant blockade').

The Australian Government has an interest in making an active contribution to the US military 'rebalance'.  Providing the US with greater strategic depth is one means to do so.  While the rotational deployment of a US Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to Darwin so far has been largely symbolic and not directly tied to America's AirSea Battle planning, the MAGTF in combination with long-range American strike aircraft operating from our north could become an integral component of such an operational framework in a Southeast Asian context.  In the (however unlikely) event of a major war in Northeast Asia between the US and China, Australia would most likely allow its US ally to operate from Australian territory.  A major upgrade of HMAS Sterling to host US carrier strike groups or the use of Cocos Island airfields for US strike aircraft is also a future option should the strategic environment deteriorate significantly.  Finally, the ADF could provide niche capabilities (such as tanker aircraft, airborne early warning and control, and airborne electronic warfare assets) and 'backfill' for US assets involved in direct attacks.

That said, fully embracing the logic behind AirSea Battle or developing specific military capabilities to underpin the concept's implementation are so far not in Australia's interests.  Openly signing up for the concept would send a strong political message to China that the ADF is now actively planning and equipping for a potential war with the PLA.  There's no need to do so—the government's decision to invite the US Marines to Darwin has already displayed Australia's political commitment to the ANZUS alliance.  The development of long-range strike capabilities against China would also be an unnecessary provocation to Beijing, let alone a very costly one.  Likewise, a serious Australian amphibious strike capability is a rather unrealistic prospect.  Finally, a 'distant blockade' against China in Southeast Asian maritime chokepoints (the Malacca, Lombok and/or Sunda straits) is much easier proposed than done.  In any event, such actions would be considered by Beijing as an act of war. Still, Australia could play a role in such operations, given our proximity to maritime chokepoints and our maritime and air capabilities.

Australian governments will be able to make a noteworthy military contribution to a US AirSea Battle framework independently of any public commitment to a concept that's still in its early stages and seems designed for a strategic environment in Asia that's yet to materialise.

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