作者：Kurt Campbell 2013年3月25日金融時報
有一幅關於美國“重返亞洲”戰略的諷刺畫，大意如下：中東和南亞是美國權力和威望的墓地，華盛頓必須盡快在這些不知感恩的國家止損，並將全部註意力轉向21世紀的頂梁柱——更加和平、更有利可圖的亞太地區。這種“重返亞洲”的理念，被描繪成不僅符合美國利益，也理應受到大多數亞洲國家的歡迎。
但亞洲的事情不像其他地方那樣簡單明瞭。上述理念的前提假設首先是，不管怎樣，亞洲的商業價值比較大，而發生沖突的可能性比較小。這種假設有許多問題。事實上，在市場欣欣向榮的背後，這一地區的各種緊張關系正逐漸升溫——從朝鮮各種極具挑釁性的行動、地區主要大國不斷增長的國防預算，到中國南海和東海海域令人煩惱的爭端（這些爭端導致相關國家交惡）。因此，即便美國最終能夠向亞洲投入更多資源和關註（這一天正在臨近），美國的外交任務也不會輕松。
但那幅諷刺畫中錯得最離譜的一點是，認為亞洲各國翹首期盼美國迅速撤離中東、將註意力重新投向亞洲事務。可以證明，這一點是錯的，並且誤判了幾個關鍵趨勢及現實。
比如說，過去十年來，一些亞洲國家已悄然成為幫助中東和南亞加強和平與穩定的重要利益相關者。大多數亞洲國家一度只關心家門口發生的事情。別處的問題是別人的問題。小布什政府亞洲政策的一大貢獻就是，促使東亞一些正在興起的國家更加積極地參與中東和南亞難題的解決。許多亞洲國家破天荒地開始將眼光投向“本地區之外”，並開始以積極得多的姿態參與中東和南亞的外交事務、發展難題和安全事務。
這種轉變產生了非常明顯的效果，盡管可能並不廣為人知。日本是阿富汗建設公民社會的最大支持者，投入了數十億美元為阿富汗建設學校、資助公務員和提供培訓。阿拉伯之春(Arab spring)後，韓國一直利用其新建的援助部門提供的資源，支持中東各國的發展。馬來西亞、印尼、泰國等多個東南亞國家已向伊拉克和阿富汗提供物質援助。澳大利亞和新西蘭等國已向阿富汗派遣特別部隊。就連中國也開始以積極得多的姿態，參與旨在抑制伊朗核野心的幕後外交。
在十幾年的時間里，這些亞洲國家已向中東和南亞地區投入巨大政治資本和資金援助，在某些情況下還派出了兵力。這些國家都不希望看到自己的投資打水漂，也不希望採取匆忙撤離的戰略，因為這種戰略可能讓以往的所有努力付諸東流。許多亞洲國家在決定參與中東和南亞事務之初，在國內就面臨諸多反對，如果這個決定被視為結局糟糕，那麽國內的反對聲音會變得更大。
還有一個問題，就是亞洲越來越依賴海灣國家的能源。亞洲每一個石油和天然氣進口國（即所有東北亞國家），對於南亞穩定局面的維持和增強，都有不可妥協的要求。美國匆忙撤離會給能源安全帶來不可接受的風險。
最後一點事關美國的權力和威望。美國要想成為穩定亞洲的一支力量，關鍵在於其承諾的可靠性。在局面變得棘手時，亞洲國家能否指望美國扮演堅定盟友的角色？如果美國過早草率拋棄自己在中東長期投入的利益，可能只會讓整個亞洲想起美國過去是如何對待越南的。
國將繼續推行“重返亞洲”政策，甚至更進一步，推行戰略權益向亞洲再平衡。但美國應以負責任的態度推進這一進程，這既符合美國的長遠利益，也符合亞洲的長遠利益。因此，“重返亞洲”政策面臨一個悖論：美國在撤出中東的過程中如何照顧美國和亞洲的利益，將成為人們評判美國在亞洲提高權力和威望的努力是否成功的部分依據。
本文作者是亞洲集團(The Asia Group)主席兼首席執行官、新美國安全中心(Center for a New American Security)董事。2009年至2013年擔任美國東亞及太平洋事務助理國務卿。
作者：Kurt Campbell 2013年3月25日金融時報
There is a caricature of America’s “pivot” to Asia and
it goes something like this: the Middle East and south Asia are the graveyard
of US power and prestige and Washington must cut its losses to these ungrateful
nations as quickly as possible and turn its full attention to the21st century
that is playing out on more peaceful and profitable shores in the Asia-Pacific
region. This concept of the pivot is posited not only to be in American
interests but is also the supposed preference of most Asian nations.
But things are not so cut and dried in
Asia, as elsewhere. There are many problems with the premise abstracted above
beginning with the notion that Asia is somehow more about commerce than
conflict. Indeed, just beneath the booming markets, the region is simmering
with tensions, ranging from the deeply provocative
actions of North Korea and, the growing defence budgets of leading
nations in the region, to the vexing maritime disputes that
are roiling relations in the South and East China Seas. So even when the US is
finally able to devote more resources and attention to Asia – and that day is
coming – it will be no picnic for American diplomacy.
Yet the most important fallacy in the
caricature has Asian nations hankering for a rapid US withdrawal from the
Middle East and a refocusing of American attention on Asian pursuits. This
notion is demonstrably wrong and misunderstands several critical trends and
realities.
For instance, Asian nations have quietly
built a substantial stake in the furthering peace and stability across the
Middle East and south Asia in the past decade. At one time, most Asian nations
were primarily concerned by developments playing out in their immediate region.
Problems elsewhere were someone else’s. One of the more important contributions
of the Bush administration’s Asia policy was to recruit the rising players of
the east to play a more active role in helping to address the challenges to
their west. For really the first time, many Asian nations developed an “out of
area” perspective and became much more actively engaged in the diplomacy,
development challenges and security matters of the Middle East and south Asia.
The results have been remarkable if less
well-known. Japan is the largest supporter of elements of civil society in Afghanistan, committing
billions of dollars to schools, civil servants and training. South Korea has
used the resources from its newly established aid agency to support development
efforts across the Middle East in the wake of theArab spring. Several
south-east Asian states such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand have provided
material assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan. Australia and New Zealand among
others have sent their special forces to fight in Afghanistan. Even China has
been much more active in the behind the scenes diplomacy aimed at constricting
Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
These Asian nations have now invested
substantial political capital, financial support and in some cases military
forces over the course of more than a decade. They have a combined interest in
seeing their investments not go to waste and to avoid a cut-and-run strategy
that would undermine all that they have worked towards. Many of these early
decisions to engage were unpopular on Asian home fronts and would become even
more so if they are perceived to have ended badly.
Then there is the matter of the growing
energy reliance of Asia on the nations of the Gulf. There is an uncompromising
need on the part of every oil and gas importer in Asia (ie, all of north-east
Asia) to see stability in south Asia preserved and strengthened. A hasty
American retreat carries with it unacceptable risks in the arena of energy
security.
Finally there is the matter of American
power and prestige. A critical component of US stature as a stabilising power
in Asia is the underlying credibility of its commitments. Can the US be trusted
as a staunch ally when the going gets tough? A premature and unceremonial exit
from enduring
American interests in the Middle East would only raise Vietnam-like
memories across Asia.
The US will continue with its pivot – or
better, it’s rebalancing
of strategic equities to Asia. But it is in America’s profound interests,
as well as Asia’s, that this process be undertaken responsibly. A paradox then
of the pivot: American attempts to grow its power and prestige in Asia will be
judged in part by how it honours both American and Asian interests in
the Middle East drawdown.
The writer is chairman and chief executive
of The Asia Group and on the board of the Center for a New American Security.
From 2009-13 he served as the assistant US secretary of state for east Asian
and Pacific affairs
By Geoff Dyer in Washington
November 18, 2011
President Barack Obama has pledged that
planned cuts in defence spending will not affect America’s military presence in
east Asia, as the US seeks to play alarger rolein shaping
the region’s future.
Speaking to the Australian parliament in
Canberra, Mr Obama said Washington hoped to improve co-operation with Beijing,
but stressed that the US was “here to stay” as a Pacific power despite China’s
dramatic economic and military advances. The Asia Pacific region, he added, was
now a “top priority”.
The speech, one of the most significant
foreign policy statements of Mr Obama’s presidency, brought together several
important shifts in US strategy that have been taking shape over the past two
years and are aimed at addressing the rise of China. These include the winding
down of the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and increased attention onsouth-east Asia and
the South China Sea.
The president also emphasised Washington’s
desire for India to play a larger role in regional issues.
“Here is what the region must know. As we
end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make our
presence and missions in the Asia Pacific a top priority,” said Mr Obama. “The
United States is a Pacific power and we are here to stay.”
He was speaking a day after he formally
announced2,500 US marines would be
based in northern Australianext year, along with more aircraft and naval
vessels, providing the American military with a new platform for intervening in
the region. “We are deepening our alliance and this is the perfect place to do
it,” he said later in the day in Darwin.
While the Pentagon is planning at least
$450bn of spending cuts over the next decade, Mr Obama said Asia would be
exempt from such pressures: “Reductions in US defence spending will not – I
repeat, will not – come at the expense of the Asia Pacific. We will preserve
our unique ability to project power and preserve peace.”
The new agreement with Australia was
criticised by Chinese officials, who fear that the US is bent on trying to
contain their country’s rise.
“It may not be quite appropriate to
intensify and expand military alliances and may not be in the interest of
countries within this region,” Liu Weimin, a Chinese foreign ministry
spokesman, said.
Mr Obama used a regional summit last
weekend in Hawaii to promote the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade pact that at
the moment does not include China. It is expected that he will use another
regional summit this weekend in Indonesia to raise the issue of maritime
security in the South China Sea, despite Beijing’s opposition.
During his first year in office, Mr Obama sought
to avoid confrontation with China and even appeared to offer a strong
partnership with Beijing to manage a host of global issues.
However, over the past year his
administration has appeared increasingly sceptical about China’s ambitions.
Unnerved by what some see as more aggressive behaviour by China, Japan, South
Korea, Singapore, Vietnam and several other countries have encouraged the US to
increase its engagement with the region.
Mr Obama said Washington was not looking to
contain China and hoped to improve collaboration with the People’s Liberation
Army.
“We’ll seek more opportunities for
co-operation with Beijing, including greater communication between our
militaries to promote understanding and avoid miscalculation,” he said. “All
our nations have a profound interest in the rise of a peaceful and prosperous
China.”
