作者：Elleka Watts 2013年3月21日 The Diplomat/观察者網譯
在出任中国国家元首后的首次出访中，习近平将要访问数个非洲国家，
其中包括坦桑尼亚、刚果共和国和南非。在南非，他将要出席于德班举行的第五次金砖国家首脑会议。习近平此行体现出非洲在中国对外和经济政策中越来越重要。
其中包括坦桑尼亚、刚果共和国和南非。在南非，他将要出席于德班举行的第五次金砖国家首脑会议。习近平此行体现出非洲在中国对外和经济政策中越来越重要。
人们常常透过美中关系的更大视角来看待中国对非洲的参与，特别是在西方人眼中，因为双方在争夺对这块资源丰富的大陆的影响力。在这一背景下，习近平此行会受到美国决策者的密切关注，后者对中国在非洲不断扩大的影响力越来越警惕。的确，希拉里在出任美国国务卿期间对非洲进行过两次重要的访问，访问期间，她警告非洲领导人要警惕“新殖民主义”，虽然她未指明是中国。
虽然希拉里和美国官员显然是要推进美国的国家利益，但是许多非政府的观察家也对中国对非洲的参与抱以类似的负面看法。为证明自己的观点，许多学者依赖一些夸大之词或者是谎言。可悲的是，所有这些不实之词被频繁提及而没有受到任何质疑，从而对中非关系形成了错误的说法。
有五点这样的谬误需要澄清：
第一，中国对非洲事务的参与是一种新现象。
这是错误的。中国是非洲最大的贸易伏伴，中国实际上从1949年中华人民共和国成立起就一直在与非洲大陆进行接触，并且从上世纪60年代开始变得更加积极。例如，通过提供援助，减免债务，提供优惠的低息贷款，特别是通过商业活动，如资本投资、合资企业、商业贷款、出口信贷，以及通过建立经济区以刺激经济增长，中国一直是非洲经济发展的主要推动者。
第二，中国对非洲的投资与外援只提供给非民主国家。
不正确。西方媒体人士以中国向不受欢迎的政权提供援助为例，来表明中国在支持那些有可怕人权记录的腐败政权。此外，许多分析家认为，中国的海外发展援助仅给予资源丰富的国家。事实上，正如学者德博拉·布罗伊蒂加姆指出的那样，受援国在台湾问题上的立场，是更能说明哪些国家能获得中国外援的因素。换句话说，中国既向民主的也向非民主的政权提供援助与投资。
第三，中国政府严重插手对非洲经济区的规划。
这种说法太过夸大了。中国政府已经表示要通过在非洲建立经济、贸易和合作区(ETCZ)，发挥类似于中国国内经济特区的作用，来支持发展中的非洲国家。
中国投资者和公司与非洲领导人展开合作，努力开发专门为非洲量身定制的经济区，然而对这些经济区的规划或者如何运作，中国政府没有大量插手。虽然一些中国公司严格讲是国有公司，但这些公司仍享有高度自主权。
第四，在非洲的中国公司只雇用中国工人。
错误。劳工条例与章程通常是由非洲国家的政府负责制定，并且它们贯彻了对经济区内中国劳工与非洲劳工比例的规定。在大部分经济区，非洲工人都要远远超过中国工人。
此外，引进中国工人实际上反映出许多非洲国家缺乏技术工人。结果，中国公司经常被迫引入中国的技术工人以担当一些管理性的岗位。这虽然不幸但不能将此归罪于中国。
第五，中国公司无视非洲的劳工法。
不真实。中国公司经常受到不当用工行为以及违反劳工和环境法的指责，而实际上，在大多数情况下，开发商与公司都遵守了非洲国家政府阐明的法律。这里真正的问题在于，许多非洲国家没有足够的劳工保护法。中国公司可以通过遵守高于法律规定的标准来改善自己的形象，有某种迹象表明，中国政府正力促它们这样做。
虽然中国对非洲的参与也许并非完全没有私心，但说北京仅为追逐自己的利益而不惜损害非洲人的利益，这样说有失公允。在许多情况下，中非间的合作与互动的确是互利的，将中国描述为现代殖民者充其量是过分简单化的做法。
As Xi Jinping Visits Africa: What are China’s Intentions?
作者：Elleka Watts 2013年3月21日The Diplomat
On the second leg of his first overseas trip as China’s head of state, Xi Jinping is visiting a number of destinations in Africa, including Tanzania, the Republic of Congo, and South Africa where he will attend the 5th BRICS Leaders Summit in Durban. Xi’s trip reflects the growing importance China places on Africa in its foreign and economic policies; last year, Wei Jianguo, a former Commerce Minister, forecast that Africa would surpass the U.S. and EU as China’s largest trading partner in three to five years.
Among Western audiences especially, China’s involvement in Africa is often viewed through the larger prism of U.S.-Sino relations, as both sides compete for influence in the resource-rich continent. In this context, Xi Jinping’s trip will be watched closely by U.S. policymakers who are increasingly wary of China’s growing clout in Africa. Indeed, although she stopped short of singling China out by name, Hillary Clinton made two major trips to Africa during her time as Secretary of State, during which she warned African leaders to be wary of a “new colonialism.”
"We saw that during colonial times, it is easy to come in, take out natural resources, pay off leaders and leave. And when you leave, you don't leave much behind for the people who are there. We don't want to see a new colonialism in Africa,” Clinton said in 2011.
Although Clinton and U.S. officials are obviously intent on advancing U.S. national interests, many observers outside of government paint China’s African engagement in a similarly negative light. In order to make their case, many pundits have relied on gross exaggerations or complete falsehoods. Sadly, all too often these go unchallenged and feed a false narrative about Chinese-African relations. Five such myths are worth addressing:
Myth #1: China’s involvement in Africa is a new phenomenon.
False. China is Africa’s largest trading partner and has actually been engaged in the continent since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and became more active starting in the 1960s. For example, the PRC has been a major contributor to Africa’s economic development through providing aid, debt relief, grants, and concessional low-interest loans, and especially through business enterprises such as capital investment, joint ventures, commercial loans, exports credits, and by developing special economic zones to spur economic growth. While Chinese investment in Africa during the Mao era was aimed primarily at supporting left-wing militant groups, since the time of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” China’s investment in Africa has become more pragmatic and mutually beneficial.
Myth #2: Chinese investment and foreign aid in Africa is only given to nondemocratic states.
Not true. Western media sources cite examples of China providing aid to unpopular regimes like those in Zimbabwe, Angola, and Nigeria to show how the nation is supporting corrupt regimes with terrible track records on human rights. Additionally, many analysts argue that China’s overseas development assistance is given only to resource-rich countries. In fact, as scholar Deborah Brautigam points out, the better indicator of which countries receive Chinese foreign aid is the recipient nation’s position on Taiwan. According to Brautigam, among those countries that support the PRC’s “one-China” policy, “grants and zero-interest loans are distributed fairly evenly around the continent, while concessional loans fit a country’s ability to pay.” In other words, China provides aid and investment to both democratic and non-democratic regimes alike.
Furthermore, as Brautigam warns: “to see ‘the West’ as refusing to engage with rogue regimes, while ‘China’ actively seeks them out, misses a big part of the picture,” which is China can actually be a positive developing force in Africa. Chinese foreign aid conditionality is diplomatically (and somewhat economically) based; it does not have political conditionality at all, for better or worse.
Myth #3: The Chinese government is heavily involved in planning Africa’s economic zones
Greatly exaggerated. The Chinese government has expressively endorsed developing African states through the creation of economic, trade and cooperation zones (ETCZs) in Africa, similar to China’s own use of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) domestically.
However, Chinese investors and companies work together with African leaders to develop specially tailored zones without a lot of Chinese government involvement in how the zones are designed or operated. While some of the Chinese companies are technically state-owned, the companies still enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Eight official government endorsed zones have been built thus far (although some have not begun operating yet). Private Chinese enterprises also operate their own.
Since these zones are still new, it is hard to determine whether or not they are mutually beneficial to China and Africa, and a lot of the negative speculation on Chinese investment in Africa stems from this uncertainty. Although some of these zones are joint ventures, Chinese companies have also come under criticism for owning 100 percent of the shares in some of the ETCZs. This ignores the fact that prior experience has shown that many times the African stakeholders often inhibit the success of these kinds of projects due to rampant corruption and mismanagement. Thus, Chinese companies exercising ownership of the STCZs can actually be to the benefit of the ordinary Africans involved.
Myth #4: Chinese companies in Africa only hire Chinese workers.
False. African governments are usually responsible for labor regulations and restrictions and they have implemented rules about the ratio of Chinese to African labor in these economic zones. In most of the special economic zones there have been more African workers than Chinese ones, with ratios heavily weighted towards the former.
For example, in the first stage of the ETCZ in Egypt’s Suez region, there were merely 80 Chinese workers compared with 1,800 Egyptians. Egyptian construction companies were also hired to help construct the ETCZ. Similar African-Chinese labor ratios can be found in places like Ethiopia, Zambia, Nigeria, and Mauritius. In Zambia, for example, factories in a special economic zone employed only one Chinese for every four Zambians.
Furthermore, the importation of Chinese workers reflects the reality that many African countries lack a skilled labor force. As a result, Chinese companies are often forced to import skilled Chinese laborers for managerial positions, while hiring locals for low-skilled positions. This is unfortunate but can hardly be blamed on China. Rather, the fault belongs with African governments that have underinvested in education and technical training in their own countries for decades.
Myth #5: Chinese companies ignore African labor laws
False. Chinese companies are often blamed for poor labor practices and violating labor and environmental laws when developers and companies are actually in most cases adhering to the laws set forth by African governments. The actual issue here is that many African nations don’t have adequate labor protection laws, which leaves African workers vulnerable to African, Chinese, and Western companies alike.
That is not to completely deny that Chinese companies and investors, like those from other parts of the world, are taking advantage of the lack of legal protections with workers by using labor practices that would not be tolerated in other areas of the world. Chinese companies could improve their image by adhering to higher standards than is required by law, and there is some evidence that the Chinese government is pushing them to do so.
While China’s—like other powers— engagement in Africa may not be entirely altruistic, it is simply untrue to say that Beijing works solely for its own benefit at the expense of Africans. In many cases the interactions between China and Africa have indeed been mutual beneficial and depicting China as a modern colonial power is overly simplistic at best. Indeed, as Rob Davies, South Africa’s Minister of Trade and Industry, has pointed out, with China’s growing involvement in Africa “We don’t just have to sign on the dotted line whatever is shoved under our noses any longer; we now have alternatives and that’s to our benefit.”
Elleka Watts is an editorial assistant for The Diplomat. She is currently studying Global Affairs and Chinese Area Studies at George Mason University.
原文链接：http://thediplomat.com/china-power/as-xi-jinping-visits-africa-what-are-chinas-intentions/?all=true
China and Africa in the Xi Jinping Era
作者：David H. Shinn 2013年3月25日The Diplomat
Fifty of Africa’s 54 countries now recognize China while four still recognize Taiwan. China has an embassy in all 50 except for Somalia. China passed the United States in 2009 as Africa’s largest trading partner. It is providing an estimated $2.5 billion annually in OECD-equivalent foreign aid to Africa as compared to $8 billion from the United States. While China’s cumulative investment in Africa lags that from the United States, which started earlier, it hasprobably been greater in recent years than that originating in the United States. Washington has more extensive security interests, including a military base in Djibouti with more than 3,000 personnel, in Africa than does Beijing. On the other hand, China has 1,500 military and police personnel assigned to six of the seven UN peacekeeping missions in Africa compared to less than 30 from the United States.
China now offers about 5,000 fully paid scholarships annually to African students to study in China and has provided technical training for some 30,000 Africans. Since 1963, more than 18,000 Chinese medical personnel have served in 46 African countries. Several years ago, China began sending to Africa small numbers of youth volunteers in a program that is similar to the much larger U.S. Peace Corps. Its official news agency, Xinhua, has more than 20 bureaus in Africa and China Radio International and China Central Television are rapidly expanding their presence in Africa. China has 29 Confucius Institutes, which teach Chinese language and culture, in 22 African countries.
Over the past two decades China has significantly stepped up its efforts in Africa and this will continue under Xi Jinping’s leadership. While China casts the relationship as part of its “win-win” strategy for helping to develop the continent, the picture is more complicated. Like all countries, China is operating in its own interests and it has at least four of them in Africa.
First, it needs access to African raw materials, especially energy and minerals, to fuel its strong industrial economy. The continuing success of this economy helps ensure that the Communist Party of China remains in power. Second, China relies on the political support of its African friends in international forums such as the United Nations and World Trade Organization. Third, Beijing seeks eventually to replace Taipei in those four countries that continue to recognize Taiwan. Fourth, China grasped sooner than the United States that Africa’s more than one billion people and growing middle class offer an attractive market for its exports.
Xi Jinping will continue to pursue these interests in Africa and almost certainly increase efforts to strengthen ties with individual African countries and African regional organizations such as the African Union, Economic Community of West African States, Southern African Development Community, and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. In 2000, China established the Forum on China Africa Cooperation, which meets at the summit level every three years, to help coordinate this rapidly expanding engagement. China is committed to Africa for the long-term.
China also faces challenges in Africa and China in the Xi Jinping era will find increasingly that it must address these issues. China’s Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun recently estimated there are between one and two million Chinese small traders and entrepreneurs living in Africa. As their numbers grow, they face more opposition from African counterparts who often are not able to compete successfully. African civil society and even a few governments are beginning to complain publicly and take action to slow Chinese migration to Africa. In 2009, for example, Tanzania passed a law forbidding foreigners (aimed at Chinese) from owning shops in Dar es Salaam. The Chinese traders and many African traders sell Chinese products often at lower prices than comparable African manufactured products. This is also causing concern among African manufacturers.
China’s trade with Africa exceeded $200 billion in 2012 and has been generally balanced in recent years. On the other hand, there are huge disparities in bilateral trade relationships. Some 15 African energy and mineral exporting countries have large trade surpluses with China while more than 30 resource poor countries have major trade deficits. The trade balance of the remainder is generally in balance. China is finding that it must address its large trade surpluses with poorer African countries as these relationships are not sustainable.
Xi Jinping’s visit to Tanzania, South Africa and Republic of the Congo make the point. Tanzania has consistently had a major trade deficit with China; in 2011, for example, it exported $428 million in goods to China and imported $1.8 billion in products from China. South Africa had large trade deficits with China until 2010, when trade was in balance. In 2011, South Africa had a modest trade deficit with China. The Republic of the Congo, a major oil exporter to China, has had a huge trade surplus over the past decade. In 2011, the Congo exported $4.2 billion of oil and timber to China while its imports from China totaled only $541 million.
Reflecting problems within China, other issues that Xi Jinping’s team will find itself addressing in Africa are environmental concerns, corporate social responsibility, worker safety and complying with local labor regulations. China has traditionally been weak in all of these areas in China; it is not surprising that it has fallen short in Africa.
To its credit, China seems prepared to do better in each of these areas. In remarks made prior to Xi Jinping’s trip, Vice Minister Zhai Jun called on Chinese businesses in Africa to compete with integrity and quality, respect local laws, improve treatment of and hire more local labor, and improve environmental protection. These are areas where the government of China often does not have control over Chinese companies but is interested in minimizing their sometimes embarrassing actions.
China’s greater engagement with and presence in Africa come with increased risks, which Xi Jinping will be required to confront. In recent years, several dozen Chinese have been kidnapped and released in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, dozens of construction workers and oil personnel have been kidnapped and even killed in Sudan, and nine energy prospection personnel were killed in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region. In 2011, China had to evacuate 36,000 contractors from Libya during the overthrow of the Qadhafi government. China now faces essentially the same security threats that nationals from Western countries have long experienced in Africa. While China’s policy is to rely on the host African government for protection of its nationals, this does not always happen and China will find that it must increasingly step in to protect its interests.
While China’s policy in Africa during the Xi Jinping era will look much like that of the Hu Jintao period, the challenges will be greater. Hu Jintao had a relatively easy time of it; the Xi Jinping team will have to be more agile and work harder just to maintain China’s current position.
Ambassador David H. Shinn is an adjunct professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and former U.S. ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia. He blogs at http://davidshinn.blogspot.com.
