China’s
recent leadership transition was widely depicted as a triumph for conservative
hard-liners and a setback for the cause of reform – a characterization that has
deepened the gloominess that pervades Western perceptions of China. In fact,
nothing could be further from the truth.
Xi
Jinping and Li Keqiang – the top two officials in China’s new governing council
(the Standing Committee of the Politburo) – are both well educated, well
traveled, and sophisticated thinkers who bring a wealth of experience to the
many challenges that China faces. As so-called Fifth Generation leaders, they
continue the steady progress in competence that has marked each of China’s
leadership transitions since the emergence of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970’s.
While
it is entirely premature to judge the style and direction that China’s new
leaders will take, three early hints are worth noting. First, Xi’s assumption
of power is more complete than was the case in earlier transitions. By
immediately taking the reins of both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the
Central Military Commission, he has a greater opportunity to put his personal
stamp on policy than his predecessors had at the start of their
administrations.
Yes,
China governs by a consensus of the Standing Committee. But Xi is well
positioned to drive the thinking of a now-leaner decision-making body
(downsized from nine members to seven). Moreover, he has long favored a
market-friendly, scientific approach to economic development, which will be
vital to China’s future.
Second,
Li Keqiang – the presumptive incoming premier – could be the big surprise in
the new leadership team. Unlike the current premier, Wen Jiabao, who was third
in the chain of command for the past ten years, Li has been elevated to number
two, which suggests a greater potential for power-sharing between the CCP and
the government at the top of China’s new team.
With
a Ph.D. in economics, Li, who, as Executive Vice Premier, headed the
all-important “Central Committee Finance and Economy Leading Small Group,” is
especially well equipped to deal with the long-awaited structural
transformation of China’s economy. Indeed, having overseen China 2030 – an extraordinary joint report recently
produced by the World Bank and China’s own high-level think tank, the
Development Research Center – he has a deep understanding of the roadmap that
China must embrace. His promotion could be a major step up from Wen, who
emphasized rhetoric and strategy more than implementation.
Third,
and contrary to prevailing wisdom in the West, Wang Qishan, one of China’s
savviest and most experienced senior officials, has not been relegated to
obscurity in his new position overseeing “discipline” on the Standing
Committee. Yes, Wang has invaluable experience in the financial sector, and it
would have been logical for him to assume similar responsibilities on the new
leadership team. But, as one of the top seven in the CCP hierarchy, he will
still be able to weigh in on all important economic and financial matters,
while assuming responsibility for tackling one of China’s toughest problems –
corruption. Having known Wang for more than 15 years, my sense is that he is
very well suited to this vital task.
The
other members of the new Standing Committee bring a broad array of experience
and skills. That is especially true of Yu Zhengsheng and the two Zhangs,
Dejiang and Gaoli, who come from senior roles in three of China’s most powerful
and dynamic urban centers – Shanghai, Chongqing, and Tianjin. Their deep
knowledge of the key role played by urbanization in driving economic
development will be critical to broadening the structural transformation that
China now faces.
The
West is not only overlooking the new Chinese leaders’ enhanced skill set, but
is also misjudging the current state of the country’s economy, which, while far
from perfect, is not crisis-torn and in desperate need of a quick fix. In fact,
China is emerging in reasonably good shape from yet another global slump. This
gives its new leaders leeway between now and the National People’s Congress in
March 2013 to focus on the development of implementation tactics for their
strategic agenda.
None
of this is to minimize China’s enormous challenges. But strategy is not the
problem; the pro-consumption 12th Five-Year Plan lays that out with great
clarity. The new leadership must now shift the focus to commitment and
implementation of that strategy – namely, through enactment of a new set of
bold reforms, especially those related to the services sector, the social
safety net, and state-owned enterprises. Xi’s emphasis on the “top-level
design” of reforms lends itself particularly well to this agenda, as does Li’s
intimate familiarity with the detailed blueprint provided by China 2030.
Western
observers, focusing on recent public statements by Xi and Li, highlight a
dearth of comments in favor of economic or political reforms. But the same
could have been said of the early utterances of Deng, modern China’s greatest
reformer. As Ezra Vogel notes in Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of
China, Deng’s first public statement after his political rehabilitation in 1976
was, “Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought constitute the guiding ideology
of the party.”
Those
were not exactly enlightened words – especially in view of what was shortly to
come. Yet Deng seized the moment at a critical juncture that is strikingly
reminiscent of the one now faced by Xi and Li.
As
is the case in any country’s leadership transition, no one knows for certain
whether China’s incoming administration is up to the multiplicity of challenges
that they face. Since the days of Deng, China has had an uncanny ability to
rise to the occasion and meet its challenges head on. The new generation of
leaders has the right skills and experience for the task. Western biases
notwithstanding, we will know soon enough if they can translate strategy into
action.
Stephen S. Roach was Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia and the firm's Chief Economist, and currently is a senior fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute of Global Affairs and a senior lecturer at Yale’s School of Management. His most recent book is The Next Asia.
中国梦之队
对于中国最近的领导人交接，人们广泛认为这是保守强硬派的胜利，是改革的倒退——加深了普遍存在于西方的对中国的悲观情绪。事实上，没有比这更深的误解了。
习近平和李克强——两位中国新最高治国机构（中共政治局常务委员会）最高领导人都是读过万卷书、行过万里路之人，他们是成熟的思想家，也经历过中国所面临的诸多挑战。作为所谓的的第五代领导人，他们有能力继续沿着邓小平在20世纪70年代末定下，并在随后诸代中国领导人间实行不悖的交接程序走下去。
现在判断中国新领导人的风格和方向还为时过早，但有三个早期信号值得关注。首先，习近平的掌权比前几任更加彻底。他同时接过了中国共产党总书记和中央军委主席两职，与前几任相比，他有更大的机会在掌权伊始就实行自己的政策。
诚然，中国的治国方针需要政治局常委们的一致意见。但习近平的地位有利于他推动规模有所瘦身（从九人减为七人）的新决策机构的思想。此外，长期以来，他一直偏好市场友好的、科学的经济发展观点，这对中国的未来来说十分关键。
其次，未来总理李克强可能成为新领导集体中的大惊喜（the big surprise in the new leadership team）。与现任总理温家宝不同——十年来他一直是权力序列的第三号人物——李克强被提升到二号人物的地位，这表明在中国新的最高领导层中，党和政府之间会有更大的权力分配。
李克强拥有经济学博士学位，在担任常务副总理期间，他主持着最重要的“中央财政和经济领导小组”，是处理期待已久的中国经济结构转型的最佳领导人。事实上，作为《中国2030》（China 2030，世界银行和中国高级智库国务院发展研究中心共同起草的最新特别联合报告）的主管，他对中国必须采用何种路线胸有成竹。他上位后将在温家宝的基础上更进一步，后者更多地是在发声和强调战略，在实施层面作为较少。
第三，与西方的普遍看法不同，王岐山——中国最精明、最有经验的高级官员之一——在政治局常委中担任纪委书记一职并非沦为陪衬。诚然，王岐山在金融部门有着宝贵的经验，理应在新领导集体中承担类似的职责。但是，作为中共七位最高领导人之一，他仍可以在所有重要的经济和金融事务上产生作用，与此同时，他还将承担处理中国最棘手问题之一的反腐的重任。我认识王岐山已逾15年，在我看来，他十分适合这一关键职位。
新常委的其他成员则拥有诸多经验和技能。特别是俞正声、张德江和张高丽，他们来自中国最强大、最有活力的三个都市中心——上海、重庆和天津。他们对于城镇化推动经济发展的关键作用有着深刻认识，这将成为扩展中国当前所面临的结构转型至关重要。
西方不仅忽略了中国新领导人强化了的技能组合，也错判了中国经济的现状。目前，中国经济尽管远称不上完美，但亦非饱受危机摧残、急切需要修补。事实上，在全球再次探底之际，中国的表现可谓相当出色。这给了新领导人充裕的回旋余地，可以在明年3月人大之前专注于制定其战略日程的实施策略。
所有这些都不会减轻中国的诸多挑战。但战略不是问题；支持消费的十二五规划制定得相当详细。新领导人现在必须将注意力从承诺转向这一战略的实施——也就是说，果断实施新的改革，特别是服务部门、社会安全网和国有企业方面的改革措施。
西方观察者专注于习近平和李克强最近的公开讲话，强调他们缺少对经济和政治改革的支持。但邓小平——现代中国最伟大的改革家——在掌权之初亦是如此。正如傅高义（Ezra Vogel）在《邓小平时代》（Deng Xiaoping and the
Transformation of China）所指出的，邓小平在1976年平反后的第一次发声是“马克思列宁主义和毛泽东思想是党的指导思想”。
这绝非启迪性的字眼——特别是从短期角度看。但邓小平抓住了稍纵即逝的重要契机，习近平和李克强现在面临的局面何其相似。
与任何国家的领导交接一样，没人能够确定未来中国政府会如何应对他们所面临的多重挑战。自邓小平时代以来，中国有一种游刃有余的魔力，能够轻松化解前进道路上的挑战（an uncanny ability to rise to the occasion and meet its challenges head on）。在这方面，新一代领导人拥有正确的技能和经验。尽管西方对他们存在偏见，但我们很快就能一睹他们是否能够将战略转化为行动。
