After decades of
following Deng
Xiaoping's dictum
"Hide brightness, cherish obscurity," China's leaders have realized that
maintaining economic growth and political stability on the home front will come
not from keeping their heads low but rather from actively managing events
outside China's borders. As a result, Beijing has
launched a "go out" strategy designed to remake global norms and
institutions.China is
transforming the world as it transforms itself. Never mind notions of a
responsible stakeholder; China has
become a revolutionary power.
Yet all
this is about to change. China's leaders once tried to
insulate themselves from greater engagement with the outside world; they now
realize that fulfilling their domestic needs demands a more activist global
strategy. Rhetorically promoting a "peaceful international
environment" in which to grow their economy while free-riding on the tough
diplomatic work of others is no longer enough. Ensuring their supply lines for
natural resources requires not only a well-organized trade and development agenda
but also an expansive military strategy. The Chinese no longer want to be
passive recipients of information from the outside world; they want to shape
that information for consumption at home and abroad. And as their economic
might expands, they want not only to assume a greater stake in international
organizations but also to remake the rules of the game.
For the rest of the world, China's new agenda will require far
greater attention to the country's internal dynamics and a much more activist,
coordinated foreign policy effort. The world needs to ensure that China respects the interests of others as it
seeks to meet its needs. And if the United States wants
to retain its preeminence, or at least maintain its role in shaping the norms
and values that will guide the world in the twenty-first century, its China policy cannot merely be a reaction to Beijing's initiatives. It must be
part of a broader, long-term global strategy that begins with a clear assertion
of the
United States' domestic
priorities. As a first step, while Beijing searches for how to sell
its revolution to the rest of the world, the rest of the world needs to move
quickly to understand the shape of this revolution and anticipate its impact.
THE REVOLUTION WITHIN
In the late 1970s, the
Chinese leader Deng began the process of "reform and openness,"
precipitating a series of reforms that, over three decades, produced
revolutionary change. China's economic institutions,
patterns of social mobility and interaction, and societal values and even the Communist
Party were transformed. By
almost any measure, Deng's revolution also produced one of the great economic
success stories of the twentieth century. China is now
the second-largest economy and exporting nation in the world. Through a booming
export sector, a continuous flood of foreign capital, and a managed currency,
its central bank and state investment institutions now hold the largest
reserves of foreign currency in the world. In the process, hundreds of millions
of Chinese have been lifted out of poverty in just a few decades.
Yet for China's current leaders, Deng's
revolution has run its course. They must now confront the downside of 30 years
of unfettered growth: skyrocketing rates of pollution and environmental
degradation, rampant corruption, soaring unemployment (reports range from 9.4
percent to 20 percent), a social welfare net in tatters, and rising income
inequalities. Together, these social ills contribute to over 100,000 protests
annually. In response, China's leadership is poised to
launch an equally dramatic set of reforms that will once again transform the
country and its place in the world. If all goes according to plan, in 20 years
or less,China will be
unrecognizable: an urban-based, innovative, green, wired, and equitable
society.
At the heart of this next
revolution is Beijing's plan to urbanize 400
million people by 2030. In 1990, just 25 percent of all Chinese lived in cities;
today, that number is almost 45 percent. By 2030, it will be 70 percent.
Urbanizing China will allow for a more effective distribution of social
services and help reduce income disparities. An urban China will also be knowledge-based. No
longer content to have their country be the world's manufacturing powerhouse, China's leaders have embarked on an
aggressive effort to transform the country into a leading center of innovation. Beijing is supporting research and
development; recruiting Chinese-born, foreign-trained scientists to return to China to head labs and direct research
centers; and carefully studying the models of innovation that have proved
successful in the West.
Even as China moves ahead with its bold plans to
transform its economy and society, new pressures and challenges will emerge.
The resource demands of rapid urbanization are substantial. Half of the world's
new building construction occurs in China, and according to one estimate, the country will
construct 20,000-50,000 new skyscrapers over the coming decades. Shanghai ,
already the country's most populous urban center, will soon be surrounded by
ten satellite cities -- each with half a million people or more. Connecting all
these and other new cities throughout the country will require 53,000 miles of
highway. Once the cities are built and connected, the demand for resources will
continue to grow: urban Chinese consume more resources than those in rural
areas (roughly 3.5 times as much energy and 2.5 times as much water), placing
significant stress on the country's already scarce resources. By 2050, China's city dwellers will likely
account for around 20 percent of global energy consumption.
Urban
Chinese also make more organized political demands -- for a cleaner
environment, broader cultural expression, and more transparent governance --
than their rural counterparts. Civil society blossoms in China's cities: homeowners'
associations, artists, and environmental and public health advocates all assert
their rights and demand change with increasing frequency. Expanding China's middle class by 400 million
people will bring only more demands and put more political pressure on China's leaders.
Expanding popular access to
the Internet will further up the ante for China's leaders
by significantly increasing the odds that political discontent will solidify
into a broad-based challenge to Communist
Party rule. Premier Wen
Jiabao has admitted to
"surfing the Net" daily to help him understand people's concerns, but
President Hu
Jintao has expressed
some concern about what the Internet might mean for China: "Whether we
can cope with the Internet is a matter that affects the development of
socialist culture, the security of information, and the stability of the
state." Hu's comment signals that China's leaders are aware of the political
challenge the Internet could pose to their rule in the future.
Already, the Internet is
evolving into a virtual political system in China: the Chinese people inform themselves, organize, and
protest online. In July
2010 , bloggers provided firsthand accounts of a large-scale pollution
disaster in Jilin
Province , contradicting official reports. Thousands of people
ignored government officials, angrily accusing them of a cover-up, and rushed
to buy bottled water. Chinese are also "voting" online. In one
instance, a journalist sought by the police on trumped-up charges of slander
took his case to the Internet. Of the 33,000 people polled, 86 percent said
they believed he was innocent. The
Economic Observer , a Chinese financial weekly, then launched a broadside
against the police, condemning their attempt to threaten a "media
professional." The charges against the journalist were dropped.
Activists have also used the
Internet to launch successful campaigns -- some involving physical protests --
to prevent the construction of dams and polluting factories and to oppose the
removal of Cantonese on television programs airing inGuangdong .
Most striking, perhaps, has been the emergence of iconic cultural figures who
use the Internet for political purposes. The renowned artist Ai Weiwei, for
example, has pursued justice for families whose children died in the Sichuan earthquake,
even documenting his encounters with recalcitrant officials on YouTube. The
racecar driver and novelist turned blogger Han
Han , routinely calls for greater media and cultural freedom. Since its
launch in 2006, his blog has received more than 410 million hits. Perhaps most
significant, Twitter, which is banned in China, has emerged as the most vibrant underground forum
for uncensored political debate -- including a pathbreaking online conversation
between Chinese netizens and the Dalai Lama in May
2010 .
The
core priorities of China's leaders today remain very
much the same as those of Deng three decades ago: economic growth and political
stability. Yet the domestic environment in which they operate and their
understanding of the road to success are radically different. It is no longer
enough to focus on the home front; China's leaders
want to shape the international context in which they do business.
In the 1990s, then Chinese President Jiang
Zemin launched his
country's first "go out" policy, encouraging the country's
state-owned enterprises to go abroad in search of natural resources. As a
result of Jiang's initiative, China's trade with the
resource-rich countries of Southeast
Asia , Latin
America , and Africa exploded between 2001 and
2007, growing by 600 percent. Tens of thousands of Chinese companies now
operate throughout the developing world, often rejuvenating previously moribund
economies with their investments. Leaders from theDemocratic
Republic of the Congo to Venezuela and Cambodia have welcomed Chinese
investment and infrastructure as the type of practical assistance their
countries most need. In many instances, Chinese state-owned enterprises are
willing -- and able, with the support of the government -- to take on projects
that no other multinationals find financially prudent. The copper mines in Zambia had remained closed for
more than a decade until the Chinese came to town. This economic outreach has
been matched by an unparalleled diplomatic effort. Chinaoffers a vast menu
of trade and aid deals, infrastructural support, and educational and technical
training opportunities to countries rich in natural resources.
Chinese investors are
generally welcomed for their implicit promise to bring some of the success of
"the China model" to the host countries. The
willingness of the Chinese government and its state-owned enterprises to do
business anywhere, anytime, and at any price has become legendary. As Sahr
Johnny , Sierra
Leone's ambassador to Beijing ,
commented in an interview regarding Chinese construction projects in his
country, "If a G-8 country had wanted to rebuild the stadium, for example,
we'd still be holding meetings. The Chinese just come and do it. They don't
start to hold meetings about environmental impact assessment, human rights, bad
governance and good governance."
Yet not everyone is as
sanguine about the way China does
business. Chinese companies have encountered resistance in a number of
countries, including Papua
New Guinea , Peru ,
and Zambia .
Poor environmental and safety practices, along with labor policies that overtly
favor Chinese workers, have caused intense conflicts with local residents in
all these countries. In Vietnam ,
a Chinese bauxite mining project that will bring in more than 2,000 Chinese
workers has raised the ire of Vietnamese workers, religious leaders, and even
military and government officials. A prominent Vietnamese lawyer has gone so
far as to sue the prime minister, accusing him of breaking four different laws
by expediting approval of the project.
The next wave of "going
out," however, will take China far
beyond investment in natural resources. As China becomes
an innovative, knowledge-based economy, its leaders are encouraging their
cash-rich state-owned enterprises and investment funds to take stakes in or
acquire foreign companies, particularly those with desirable technologies.
Where Chinese products are competitive, Chinese firms are jumping in feet
first. China's Ministry
of Commerce is an
aggressive advocate for the country's companies, for example, promoting an
"all-in-one" service for clean-technology exports: the provision of
equipment, expertise, and services. The government will even provide the
necessary loans, which can then be used to pay for Chinese-made equipment,
workers, and technologies. Beijing has already promised 1,000
such clean-energy projects to countries in Africa .
Ensuring
a fair deal for the countries in which Chinese firms invest will require that
those countries engage Chinese companies head-on. For example, the Chinese
Ministry of Railways , which is bidding with General
Electric to build California's high-speed
rail network, has promised to provide the financing, technology, equipment, and
"many high-end engineers and high-end technicians," potentially
raising questions about what role GE and American workers will play in the
project. California and other U.S. states will
need to ensure that Chinese investment satisfies multiple U.S. interests,
including labor.
Yet China has quietly continued to push the
issue within the International
Monetary Fund , and as its voting share within the IMF continues to
increase (it increased from 2.9 percent to 3.6 percent in 2006, and there is a
pending increase to 3.8 percent in 2010), China will
have more opportunities to press its case. Over time, China may also seek to upend other aspects
of IMF governance, such as the annual review of countries' currency practices
and the governance and transparency requirements for IMF loan recipients. Both
practices are headaches for China: the IMF has both obliquely and directly criticized Beijing for keeping the yuan artificially
low, and China's disregard for IMF-based
transparency and good governance standards in its trade and aid deals in the
developing world has earned it further criticism from the international
community.
Although the expansion of China's economic reach may be the
most noticeable manifestation of its new activist foreign policy, its efforts
to limit foreign competition in key strategic sectors, such as clean-energy
technology, will also have a major impact. China's initiative to support
"indigenous innovation" has drawn significant criticism from the rest
of the world. Consciously rejecting the Japanese and South Korean model of
technology innovation, which was rooted in a long-term catch-up strategy of
licensing foreign technologies, China is
looking to develop its own technologies and product standards. And it is trying
to use international institutions to promote its domestic standards as global
standards. For example, it is currently engaged in trying to push its own
standards for software encryption and wireless local area networks as global International
Organization for Standardization standards.
(The ISO has previously rejected Chinese proposals to adopt the new protocol
globally largely due to its use of an undisclosed algorithm, which has raised
concerns about unfair trade practices.) As Jeremie Waterman, a senior director
at the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce , noted in his testimony before the U.S.
International Trade Commission in June
2010 ,Beijing has "recently begun to
implement a medium- and long-term indigenous innovation plan via a growing web
of discriminatory industrial policies, including in the areas of government
procurement, information security, standards setting, tax, antitrust, intellectual
property protection and enforcement and industrial espionage." In effect,
rather than working to address the long-standing problems in its trade and
investment sectors, China is
using the weaknesses of its regulatory and enforcement regime to provide an
even greater competitive advantage to its companies. Appropriating the
intellectual property of other firms takes less time and is less costly than
licensing it or creating one's own. As long as Chinese companies are unlikely
to be sanctioned for taking the intellectual property of other firms, they are
unlikely to change the way they do business.
China has also taken steps to protect its hold on strategic resources
and, in some cases, to compel foreign companies to locate their manufacturing
bases in China or be put out of business. In the
process, Beijing is undermining global trade
norms. In November
2009 , the United States and
the European
Union launched a case in
the World
Trade Organization against China for using export restraints on over 20
raw materials, such as bauxite and coke, that are essential for basic
manufactured goods, including steel, semiconductors, and aircraft. Less than a
year later, Beijing announced
another round of restrictive trade policies, this time for rare-earth metals,
cutting its export quotas by 72 percent. These metals, over which Chinaholds a near
monopoly, are necessary to produce not only magnets, cell phones, and
fiber-optic cables but also electric-vehicle batteries and wind turbines. If it
is not rescinded, China's action could force many
clean-energy firms to manufacture significant components in China, given that the United States and many other countries would need
several years to rebuild their rare-earth mining capacity.
The world has become
accustomed to many of the global impacts of China's economic
revolution. China is
already a trade and investment powerhouse, a significant purchaser of U.S.
debt, and a major player in global commodities markets. As Beijing now seeks to more actively
shape international trade and investment norms to suit its next revolution, the
rest of the world can draw on past experience to negotiate with, and
occasionally even redirect, China. The same cannot be said, however, of China's efforts to expand its
military reach.
NAVAL GAZING
In April
2010 , Chinese Rear Admiral Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the East
Sea Fleet, baldly declared that the country's naval strategy had changed:
"We are going from coastal defense to far sea defense. . . . With the
expansion of the country's economic interests, the navy wants to better protect
the country's transportation routes and the safety of our major
sea-lanes." In reality, Zhang's pronouncement was merely the coming-out
party for a strategy that had been on the books as early as 2007. The strategy
envisions China's naval capacity as expanding
in three stages: first, to a navy that can cover the "first island
chain," which includes islands from Japan to Taiwan to the
Philippines ; then, to a regional naval force with capabilities
extending to Guam , Indonesia ,
and Australia ;
and finally, to a global force by 2050. The state-owned Global Times reinforced
the initial steps in describing the navy's strategic shift: "Naturally,
the transformation of the Chinese navy will bring changes to the strategic
pattern in East
Asia and the west Pacific
Ocean that has lasted
for the last five decades."
The international community
reacted swiftly. At the June
2010 Shangri-la Dialogue,
in South
Korea , which brought together defense ministers from throughout the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. Secretary of
Defense Robert
Gates asserted that the
United States' interest
in the South
China Sea was ensuring
"stability, freedom of navigation, and free and unhindered economic
development." U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton followed suit at
the July
ASEAN Regional Forum , in Hanoi ,
by offering U.S. assistance in mediating the disputes surrounding the South
China Sea's islands
and resources. Her offer was immediately supported by several, although not
all, of the claimants. And in August, Vietnam and the United States held their first joint naval exercises
ever in the South
China Sea .
More
challenges will follow. In July
2010 , one of China's foremost security scholars, Shen
Dingli , laid out the rationale for establishing a more permanent
Chinese military presence abroad through the establishment of military bases.
Although retired Chinese naval officials and current senior political officials
have offered differing perspectives on the idea, there appears to be political
momentum behind such a move. The Chinese government has already pushed forward
with the development of deep-water ports in Pakistan , Myanmar (also called Burma ),
and Sri
Lanka and is openly
discussing the potential of other sites in Bangladesh and Nigeria .
It may take a decade or more for the capacity of China's navy to match its
ambitions, but the contours of China's more activist security strategy
are already evident.
GETTING THE STORY RIGHT
As the impact of China's transformational policies
reverberate throughout the world, Beijing has recognized the need to
match its economic and military expansionism with an equally aggressive media
strategy. As the Internet is allowing foreign perspectives into China, Chinese officials
have become convinced of the need for China to tell
its own story to the rest of the world. As one senior propaganda official commented,
"We must . . . initiate targeted international public opinion battles, and
create an international public opinion environment that is objective,
beneficial, and friendly to us."
The result is a Chinese media
blitz, with a price tag upward of $80
billion . The
Xinhua News Agency is
launching a 24-hour global English-language television news service,
headquartered in New
York City's Times
Square , to compete withCNN and the BBC in order to "provide
international and China news
with a Chinese perspective to global audiences." Already, China's state media post 400
correspondents in 117 bureaus around the world, and they are planning for 180
bureaus by 2020. Chinese media companies -- such as Xinhua, the China
Daily , the Global Times, and the People's
Daily -- now routinely ask
foreign experts for commentary on global affairs.
At the same time, Chinese
officials remain committed to controlling the flow of information into and
within the country. Censorship, Internet police who monitor and guide online
discussions, new regulations for the registration of Internet Protocols, and
arrests of Internet dissidents are all designed to prevent the Chinese people
from straying too far outside acceptable political boundaries. Moreover,
foreign media companies have been largely unsuccessful in capturing significant
market share in China, and some -- such as Google and the media magnate Rupert
Murdoch -- have scaled
back their efforts or pulled out in the face of highly restrictive policies.
How successful Chinese media
will ultimately be in winning the hearts and minds of the rest of the world
will likely rest on their ability to change the way they do business. Other
authoritarian states seek to emulate the Chinese model, restricting Internet
access and controlling domestic media. However, gaining the respect and trust
of the rest of the world will require China to
adopt a very different strategy. An open and critical approach to reporting
news about Chinawill be essential. Ultimately, the impact of the
Chinese media foray abroad may be less transformative globally than on the home
front. As Chinese media companies remake themselves to compete in the
international marketplace with more investigative and open reporting, the
pressures will mount to adopt similar strategies in the domestic market.
China has been remarkably consistent over the past three decades in
defining its core interests as economic growth and political stability. What
has changed is the leadership's understanding of what is required to achieve
these goals. China's drive to remake global
norms is also fueled by a resurgent nationalism that hearkens back to the days
when China was a world trading power. For some
Chinese officials, the past century -- in which China has been largely absent as an economic
and military force -- was merely a historical aberration. In their eyes, things
are now returning to normal.
In the United States, China's more activist foreign
policy necessitates a strategic reevaluation. Buzzwords such as
"containment," "engagement," and "congagement"
and the notion of a "G-2" will not be useful concepts in the years to
come. Instead, the White
House needs to consider its
policy on three different planes.
First, rather than relying
primarily on bilateral engagement (an effort attempted and later discarded in
the face of Chinese lack of interest), the Obama administration should continue
to work with others to help influence Beijing .
theUnited States, the European
Union , and Japan often coordinate their
trade policies toward China; U.S. cooperation with Russia brought China along on a round of UN sanctions
against North
Korea ; and the United States and
a number of Southeast Asian nations have found common cause in pressing Beijing to come to the negotiating
table over the South
China Sea . As China expands
its naval activities in the coming decades, such multilateral cooperation --
and pressure -- will be essential in convincing China to discuss military transparency and
the rules of the road in maritime security.
The White
House must also continue to
make clear that it believes certain core values should underpin the
international system. These values above all reflect an American commitment to
freedom -- freedom of the seas, the air, space, and the Internet; free trade;
the rule of law; and the political freedoms associated with basic human rights.
The degree to which these values conflict with those espoused by China helps explain why the road to trust
and cooperation between the two countries remains so challenging. Within China, there are
political thinkers, activists, and even officials who share the ideals espoused
by the United States. Until
such views become more prevalent, however, it is essential that the United States be willing to advance them through
both its diplomatic and its policy initiatives.
U.S. policy toward China cannot consist merely of blocking and
parrying Chinese initiatives and promoting American ideals. Nor can Washington rely on annual dialogues
designed to hash over a laundry list of issues that, in the end, simply
delineate where the United States and China disagree and contribute little to
attaining U.S. interests.
The third plane of U.S.
policy should concern the
United States' domestic
interests and objectives. The Obama administration should begin by taking a
page fromChina's playbook. Like China, the United States should derive its foreign policy first
from a clear articulation of its objectives and strategy for its own future:
What does the United States want
to look like 50 years from now, and how is it going to get there? From such a
vantage point, policy toward China becomes
an instrument of achieving U.S. goals rather than an end in itself.
If the United States wants to be the global leader in
clean-energy technology by 2050, for example, it should now be developing the
intellectual, financial, and political infrastructure to get there. And when
Chinese clean-energy investment interests come knocking, as they are doing, the United States will be well positioned to determine
what types of investment should be welcomed. When done right, such deals have
the potential to result in equitable partnerships and successful cooperation.
In August
2010 , for example, the United Steelworkers union struck a deal with the
Chinese companies A-Power
Energy Generation Systems and Shenyang
Power Group to develop a $1.5
billion wind-farm venture
in Texas that will create 1,000 jobs
for U.S. workers -- up from 330 U.S. jobs when the project was first proposed
-- and use about 50,000 tons of U.S.-made steel.
Similarly, China's efforts to move the
international financial system away from the dollar as the world's reserve
currency, although potentially costly if done abruptly, might nonetheless be
advantageous for Washington over the long run. If theUnited States were
no longer able to borrow money at a better rate than other countries or run
greater trade deficits with the benefit of a much-delayed economic impact, for
example, it would impose a potentially helpful fiscal discipline on the U.S.
economy.
Paying close attention to
transformations within China will
pay significant dividends for U.S. policymakers seeking to predict what China might do next. Growing water scarcity
in China, for example, will
likely shape and perhaps even limit agricultural and industrial opportunities
there over the coming decades. Listening to early signals of policy shifts,
such as the recent scholarly but public commentary on the future of Chinese
military bases abroad, is also important. Finally, China's own leadership will be
replaced in 2012. Five of the seven top leaders in the Standing
Committee of the Politburo , including President Hu and Premier Wen, will
retire. These relatively insular engineers will be replaced by a leadership
class dominated by more confident, well-traveled, and politically
entrepreneurial social scientists. Bold political change may not be on their
agenda, but a few of them initiated political experiments or reforms as
provincial leaders. It is a group of leaders that, when given the reins, will
certainly bring more change and perhaps even a few surprises.Although China's leaders have laid out their
vision and put change in motion, both domestic and international pressures may
well produce an outcome far different from the one they anticipate. All
revolutions are inherently unstable, and China's is no exception. the United States needs to be ready, and that requires
more than simply reacting to Beijing's more active foreign policy;
it demands a U.S. policy toward China that
looks inside China's domestic revolution to
anticipate the future challenges and opportunities for the international
community that will arise as a result of it.
As China seeks to remake global norms and
institutions, it is also essential that theUnited States continue to assert its own ideals and
strategic priorities and continue to work closely with other like-minded
nations. Ultimately, however, the United States will
succeed only when it can clearly articulate its own economic and political
priorities and then ascertain how China can
best help meet those objectives. The
United States' China policy
should be a means to an end, not an end in itself.
作者為美國「外交關係協會」亞洲研究主任
（全文下載）
卡内基国际和平研究院：《规则的改变者——应对中国外交政策的变革》
“The Game Changer: Coping With China's Foreign Policy Revolution”
易明(Elizabeth C. Economy)，《外交事务》，第89卷，第6期 ，2010年11/12月刊 ，第142－153页
易明(Elizabeth C. Economy)，《外交事务》，第89卷，第6期 ，2010年11/12月刊 ，第142－153页
“经过数十年遵循邓小平的‘韬光养晦，有所作为’原则后，中国领导人已经意识到要维持国内大后方经济增长与政治稳定，决不能继续放低姿态听人摆布而应主动出击走出国门。因此，北京启动了一项旨在重塑全球标准与制度的‘走出去’战略。中国正在像变革自身一样在变革世界。别再想什么负责任的利益相关者这一套了；中国正在成为一股掀起革命浪潮的力量。”
易明在《外交事务》杂志上的这篇文章的主要观点是中国的国际战略已从低调转变为主动。这种转变在很大程度上并不是有意识的，而是受中国国内变革的影响。在中国进行这一转变的同时，世界应认识这一转变的形态及其可能影响。
文章认为，中国的转变体现在经济、军事和宣传各个领域。美国应针对这一转变重新评估它的对华政策。作者建议，与其主要依赖双边对话，奥巴马政府应继续推行“曲线救国”——通过他方影响中国。第二，白宫应继续向北京强调国际体系所赖以生存的核心价值——海洋、航空、太空及网络的自由，贸易自由，法治，政治自由等。第三，美国应为其对华政策设定整体目标。对华政策应为美国国家发展目标的工具，而非目标本身。