亚洲重返世界舞台中心是本世纪具重大意义的实力转移。在1750年，亚洲人口约占世界的五分之三，总产出也占全球的五分之三。到1900年，即欧洲和美国工业革命后，亚洲在世界总产出中的比例已缩减到五分之一。然而，到2050年，亚洲的经济水平预计会重回其300年前的水平。
美国对亚洲在新世纪的崛起没有给予应有的关注，反而把这个世纪的首10年浪费在伊拉克和阿富汗战争上。现在，正如美国国务卿希拉里在最近的一次演讲中表示，美国外交政策的重心将转移到东亚。
奥巴马总统决定在澳大利亚北部的基地轮流部署2500名海军陆战队队员，是重心转移的更早迹象。此外，于11月在奥巴马故乡夏威夷举行的亚太经济合作组织会议(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation)，也倡议进行称为“泛太平洋伙伴关系协定” (Trans-Pacific Partnership)的新贸易谈判。这两项发展进一步强化奥巴马所发出的信息，即美国打算继续留在亚太区域。
把重心转向亚洲并不意味着世界其他地区不再重要。相反的，以欧洲为例，它的经济比中国更大和更富裕。但就如奥巴马的国家安全顾问多尼隆最近表示，美国近年的外交政策着重于伊拉克和阿富汗战争、对恐怖主义的关注、伊朗和朝鲜核扩散的威胁及不久前的阿拉伯起义，奥巴马11月对亚洲的访问，是要配合区域的长远重要性，调整美国外交政策的优先考量。
多尼隆说，“把这个充满活力的区域提升为美国的战略重点之一，表明奥巴马决心不让美国这艘航船因当前的危机脱离航道。”奥巴马政府也表示，不论国防预算辩论的结果如何，“我们都会保护我们继续留在亚太区域所需要的力量”。
奥巴马11月的访问也向中国传达了信息。在2008年的金融危机后，许多中国人错误的认为美国将一蹶不振，因此表示中国应该更为自信——特别是在南中国海主权问题上——可以忽略美国盟友和伙伴的利益。在奥巴马执政的第一年，美国政府很重视同中国的合作，但中国领导人似乎把美国的政策误读为软弱的表现。
只有中国能遏制中国
美国政府在南中国海问题上采取了较强硬的态度。美国国务卿希拉里于2010年7月在河内举行的亚细安会议上表达了美国的立场。隔年1月，中国国家主席胡锦涛成功对美国进行国事访问。然而，许多中国评论员对美国尝试“遏制 ”中国和防止中国和平崛起表示不满。
近来，中国对美国这种假定的遏制政策的不满情绪又在升温，原因是希拉里坚持将南中国海争端提上明年于马尼拉举行的东亚峰会的议事日程(编者按：亚细安明年的轮值主席国是柬埔寨，还不知道峰会是在金边还是暹粒举行)。奥巴马、胡锦涛及其他区域领导人都将出席峰会。
然而，美国的对华政策不同于对苏联集团的遏制战略。冷战时期，美苏间只有有限的贸易和民间往来。如今，美国是中国最大的海外市场;中国入世受到美国的欢迎和协助;每年有12万5000名中国学生进入美国大学。若美国目前对中国的政策是冷战式的遏制，就似乎过于“热情”了。
自1995年开始便引导美国政策，由美国国防部发布的《东亚战略评论》(East Asia Strategic Review)，提出通过贸易和交流计划让中国加入国际体系。美国虽然两面下注，也同时加强与日本的关系，但这却说不上是遏制。毕竟，就连中国领导人也不能准确预测其继承者的意向。美国希望中国的崛起是和平的，但这谁也不能保证。两面下注显示了美国的谨慎，不是敌意。
美军不希望以冷战的方式遏制中国，但他们却可以帮助塑造未来中国领导人作出决策的环境。我仍然维持我在1995年美国国会听证会上的立场，对那些当时倡导遏制而不是同中国交往的人，我的回应是：“只有中国能遏制中国（Only China can contain China）。”
中国如果在亚太地区横行霸道，其他国家会同美国一起和它对抗。正是因为这个原因，自2008年中国外交政策变得较强硬以来，其邻国纷纷加强同美国的关系。但美国最不想看到的，是在亚洲上演第二场冷战。
尽管中美两国存在竞争，双方在贸易、金融稳定、能源安全、气候变化和疫病控制等课题上的合作对彼此都有利。区域内的国家也可以受惠。奥巴马政府把重心转到亚洲，显示美国认识到这个区域的巨大潜能，绝不是发出遏制的号召。
作者為美国前助理国防部长，现任哈佛大学教授。
Obama’s Pacific Pivot
by Joseph S. Nye Dec. 6, 2011
Asia’s return to
the center of world affairs is the great power shift of the twenty-first
century. In 1750, Asia had roughly three-fifths of the world’s population and
accounted for three-fifths of global output. By 1900, after the Industrial
Revolution in Europe and America, Asia’s share of global output had shrunk to
one-fifth. By 2050, Asia will be well on its way back to where it was 300 years
earlier.
But, rather than keeping an eye on that ball, the United States wasted the
first decade of this century mired in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, as US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it in a recent speech, American foreign
policy will “pivot” toward East Asia.
President Barack
Obama’s decision to rotate 2,500 US Marines through a base in northern
Australia is an early sign of that pivot. In addition, the November
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting, held in Obama’s home state of
Hawaii, promoted a new set of trade talks called the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Both events reinforce Obama’s message to the Asia-Pacific region that the US
intends to remain an engaged power.
The pivot toward
Asia does not mean that other parts of the world are no longer important; on
the contrary, Europe, for example, has a much larger and richer economy than
China’s. But, as Obama’s national security adviser, Tom Donilon, recently
explained, US foreign policy over the past few years has been buffeted by the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, concerns about terrorism, nuclear-proliferation
threats in Iran and North Korea, and the recent Arab uprisings. Obama’s
November trip to Asia was an effort to align US foreign-policy priorities with
the region’s long-term importance.
In Donilon’s
words, “by elevating this dynamic region to one of our top strategic
priorities, Obama is showing his determination not to let our ship of state be
pushed off course by prevailing crises.” The Obama administration also
announced that, whatever the outcome of the defense-budget debates, “we are
going to make sure that we protect the capabilities that we need to maintain our
presence in the Asia-Pacific” region.
Obama’s November
trip was also a message to China. After the 2008 financial crisis, many Chinese
expressed the mistaken belief that the US was in terminal decline, and that
China should be more assertive – particularly in pursuing its maritime claims
in the South China Sea – at the expense of America’s allies and friends. During
Obama’s first year in office, his administration placed a high priority on
cooperation with China, but Chinese leaders seemed to misread US policy as a
sign of weakness.
The administration
took a tougher line when Clinton addressed the South China Sea question at the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations meeting in Hanoi in July 2010. Chinese
President Hu Jintao’s subsequent official visit to Washington in January 2011
was successful, but many Chinese editorialists complained that the US was
trying to “contain” China and prevent its peaceful rise.
China’s anxiety
about a supposed US containment policy is on the rise again, now that Clinton
is insisting that the country’s maritime disputes with its neighbors be placed
on the agenda at next year’s East Asia Summit in Manila, which will be attended
by Obama, Hu Jintao, and other regional leaders.
But American
policy toward China is different from Cold War containment of the Soviet bloc.
Whereas the US and the Soviet Union had limited trade and social contact, the
US is China’s largest overseas market, welcomed and facilitated China’s entry
into the World Trade Organization, and opens its universities’ gates to 125,000
Chinese students each year. If current US policy towards China is supposed to
be Cold War-style containment, it seems unusually warm.
The Pentagon’s East
Asia Strategy Review, which has guided American policy since 1995, offered
China integration into the international system through trade and exchange
programs. Although the US hedged its bet by simultaneously strengthening its
alliance with Japan, this does not constitute containment. After all, China’s
leaders cannot predict their successors’ intentions. The US is betting that
they will be peaceful, but no one knows. A hedge expresses caution, not
aggression.
hAmerican
military forces do not aspire to “contain” China in Cold War fashion, but they
can help to shape the environment in which future Chinese leaders make their
choices. I stand by my testimony before the US Congress of 1995 in response to
those who, even then, wanted a policy of containment rather than engagement:
“Only China can contain China.”
If China becomes a
bully in the Asia-Pacific region, other countries will join the US to confront
it. Indeed, that is why many of China’s neighbors have strengthened their ties
with the US since 2008, when China’s foreign policy became more assertive. But
the last thing the US wants is a Cold War II in Asia.
Whatever the two
sides’ competitive positions, Sino-American cooperation on issues like trade,
financial stability, energy security, climate change, and pandemics will
benefit both countries. The rest of the region stands to gain, too. The Obama
administration’s pivot towards Asia signals recognition of the region’s great
potential, not a clarion call for containment.
